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vABSTRACT
This thesis examines groundwater management regimes in California and discusses how to
implement an optimal aquifer management scheme.
Chapter 2 examines the effectiveness of adjudication, a legal settlement among groundwater
pumpers, in managing groundwater basins in Southern California. As a form of self-
governance, adjudication generally leads to higher water level in the adjudicated basins than
the unregulated ones. However, its rigid rules impair dynamic efficiency. Compared with
the competitive pumpers, pumpers in the adjudicated basins actually have a less counter-
cyclical extraction pattern in response to surface water availability.
Chapter 3 examines how surface water trading intensifies groundwater depletion in Califor-
nia’s Central Valley. A surface water market only mitigates the groundwater over-extraction
problem when pumping costs are very high, while market failure arises when the pumping
costs are low. I build an agricultural water use model to connect the efficacy of the sur-
face water market with crop patterns response to surface water supply variation. The data
suggest that the Central Valley is in a low pumping cost regime where the farmers pump
groundwater to replace whatever surface water they sell. Therefore, the surface water trade
is inefficient because it depletes groundwater resources and should be curtailed until the
commons problem is addressed.
Chapter 4 studies optimal groundwater aquifer management. I solve the dynamic opti-
mization problem for groundwater extraction by a social planner when when farmers are
heterogeneous and the surface water supply is uncertain. To implement the optimal pump-
ing plan, the farmers must be allocated pumping rights each period equal to the socially
optimal extraction. An incentive compatibility issue arises if farmers have heterogeneous
access to groundwater. Those who overlie the deepest part of the aquifer might delay regu-
lation because they will get more water as others exit. A larger amount of farmers must be
included in the decision set to resolve this political conflict.
vi
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
Groundwater depletion has been a critical problem in dry regions like California. It leads
to environmental issues such as land subsidence, seawater intrusion, degradation of water
quality, etc., thus causing significant economic losses. According to a recent report1, the
cost of managing groundwater in the aquifer by recharge ranges from 90 to 1100 USD
per acre-foot, far below the cost of reservoir expansion (1700 to 2700 USD per acre-foot)
and seawater desalination (1900 to over 3000 USD per acre-foot). Therefore, groundwater
depletion is not merely in the interest of environmentalists. Groundwater users can take
action themselves to avoid the huge cost that may be incurred in the near future.
Luckily, running out of groundwater is not the destiny of California water users. The water
table in Southern California basins has been stabilized in recent decades, despite a long
history of decline. Most Southern California aquifers are managed through adjudication, a
form of self-governance that restricts average total extraction from the aquifer not to exceed
its sustainable yield.
Adjudication is expensive and slow. It can take decades for the water users to negotiate
the allocation of pumping rights and other management regulations. It is also expensive
to investigate the hydrology of the aquifer to determine the sustainable yield of the basin.
Since water rights are usually determined based on historical use, information asymmetry
about each party’s past water consumption also presents. As a result, it is not surprising
that adjudication mainly succeeds in Southern California, where rapid urbanization has
increased the users’ value of water and the willingness to pay for management.
No adjudication occurs in the Central Valley where the agricultural community consumes
more than 90% of water. Due to the sparse interest among farmers, no one is willing to pay
1Water in the West, “Recharge: Groundwater’s Second Act.”
2for the cost of management even though the collective action can benefit all the users. In
particular, farmers do not want to bear the cost to monitor. As a consequence, groundwater
basins in the Central Valley are still in open access today, and their water table keeps falling.
Without regulation, the commons problem is easily exacerbated by institutions that affect
the allocation of surface water, a substitute for groundwater. The farmers not only pump for
their own use. With well-defined surface water rights and a market for surface water trade,
they are likely to sell their surface water rights to those without enough irrigation water
and pump more groundwater to compensate the water sale. In Kern County, groundwater
districts supply their surface water to districts without groundwater and pump more for their
own use. The amount of extra pumping that is imputed to surface water sale accounts for
about 80% of the groundwater over-extraction in the county.
The open access groundwater system suffers more than just the commons problem. It is also
vulnerable to other institutional arrangements that target to improve water use efficiency.
This is an example of the second-best scenariowhere the partially efficient water system does
not generate the second-best outcome. Implementation of a surface water market should
take into account its unintended consequence on groundwater aquifer. A groundwater
regulation not only solves the commons problem, but also avoids the distortion caused by
the surface water market.
The optimal aquifer management requires a dynamic efficient groundwater extraction plan.
To implement that plan, the pumping rights and their allocation need to be carefully designed
to induce the efficient extraction and be incentive-compatible. In the rest of the thesis, I
will discuss the adjudication of groundwater rights in Chapter 2, the surface water market
in Chapter 3, and issues with respect to the optimal groundwater management in Chapter 4.
3C h a p t e r 2
ADJUDICATION OF GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies of self-governance have brought new perspectives on how to solve common
pool resource (CPR) problems (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2002). A rich body of lab exper-
iments (Messick, Allison, and Samuelson, 1988; Ostrom, Gardner, and J. Walker, 1994;
J. M. Walker et al., 2000) and field case studies (Berkes, 1986; Berkes et al., 1989a; Os-
trom, 1990; Blomquist, 1992; Casari, 20071) have confirmed that appropriators can devise
regulations among themselves to manage the common pool. Outside authorities (such as
the government) and private markets, as suggested by the conventional theory of the CPR
problem2Hardin (1968), are not the only solutions to “the tragedy of the commons” (Ostrom
and J. Walker, 2000).
Despite the growing consensus on the effectiveness of self-governance (Agrawal, 2001;
Rahman, Hickey, and Sarker, 2012; Atkinson et al., 2014), the literature provides little
quantitative evidence of the success of private solutions (Tang, 1992; Lam, 19983). For
this chapter, I assemble an original dataset from Southern California groundwater basins,
conduct a cross-sectional analysis and demonstrate that self-governance does improve sus-
tainability.
Beyond sustainability, I also extend the general framework of CPR to a multi-period model
with uncertainty in the availability of substitute resources. I analyze the dynamic efficiency
of different institutions depending on how the agents utilize the CPR as insurance against
demand and supply risk.
1The cases investigated in those studies include fishery (also lobster), wildlife hunting, forest management,
groundwater pumping, etc.
2Also see M. Olson (1965) for the discussion of the more general collective action problem.
3There studies looked at the performance of irrigation systems governed under different groups: the
government or farmers themselves.
4The context for this chapter is groundwater pumping in Southern California. Groundwater
contributes a significant proportion of the state’s total water supply. It provides more
than one-third of water used by Californians in an average year and more than one-half in a
drought year when other sources (mainly surface water) are scarce4. In Southern California,
groundwater basins account for nearly 35 percent of total water supply and almost 70 percent
of the local supply5.
Groundwater pumpers confront two layers of issues. First, in an unregulated basin, com-
petitive pumping leads to overdrafting and irreversible destruction of the basin’s storage
capacity. Second, it is unclear how to make joint use of groundwater and surface water
efficiently (Zilberman and Lipper, 2002). Unlike surface water, the groundwater supply
is not sensitive to immediate weather condition. I argue that groundwater use is the most
efficient if pumpers save water in wet years and pump more during droughts. Their doing
so of course depends on incentives.
Two broad types of groundwater management exist in California. Most basins remain
unregulated. Within them, anyone can drill a well and pump groundwater. Some basins
are managed in a different way. They have been adjudicated, meaning that the overlying
pumpers have arrived at a legal settlement to close the common pool and apportion the
pumping rights among themselves. We consider adjudication as a self-governing institution
since the pumpers initiate the process and design the management rules among themselves.
Although the courts are involved, they are merely a third-party enforcement agency whose
authority is recognized by the pumpers.
Using a theoretical model, I analyze the sustainability and dynamic efficiency of the two
different institutions. I start by demonstrating that competitive pumping leads to more
extraction than the socially optimal level. I hypothesize that adjudicated basins are more
likely to be sustainable than the unregulated ones – in simple terms, they suffer less ground
water level decline. In terms of dynamic efficiency, I argue that an optimal intertemporal
4See findings in the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) of California.
5See the UrbanWater Management Plan (2015) of theMetropolitanWater District of Southern California.
5groundwater-pumping pattern requires a certain level of counter-cyclicality6 to offset the
variation of surface water supply. Due to the saving externality, competitive pumpers do not
have enough of an incentive to use the basin as a drought buffer. In my model, adjudication
generates an even smaller counter-cyclical pumping pattern than the competitive case.
My empirical findings confirm the claims that self-governing institutions can solve the CPR
problem. By comparing the changes of water levels of wells located in adjudicated and
unadjudicated basins within the same period, I find that the self-governed systems are better
at preserving water levels. The panel data analysis also shows that groundwater use in
adjudicated basins is less counter-cyclical than unadjudicated ones. This result is consistent
with themodel, and verifies our concern that adjudicationmay have a problemwith dynamic
efficiency.
I begin with some necessary background of groundwater basins and groundwater manage-
ment in California. In Section 2.3, I present the dynamicmodel of pumpingwith uncertainty.
I will impose different institutions, and then solve for agents’ best responses. Section 2.4
contains the empirical analysis, which tests the hypotheses developed in Section 3. Section
2.5 summarizes my conclusion and discusses the broader implications of my findings.
2.2 Background
Groundwater basin as a common pool
Groundwater is generally stored in subsurface zones of saturated sediments called aquifers.
A groundwater basin is defined as an alluvial aquifer or a stacked series of alluvial aquifers
with reasonably well-defined boundaries (nonwater-bearing material such as bedrock or an
underground displacement of rock such as a fault or divide) in a lateral direction and a
definable bottom7. Groundwater travels within an aquifer from areas of higher elevation
towards areas of lower elevation. It may also flow into adjacent basin across underground
divides, but the confining boundary makes it much harder for water to leave than flow
6Cyclicality in this chapter refers to surface water supply, which is high in wet years and low in dry years.
7The definition is from the Department of Water Resource (DWR) Bulletin 118 (2003 update).
6within the aquifer (Heath, 1983). Although not completely isolated, each basin can be
approximately treated as an isolated system, which is mainly affected by pumping from its
own aquifers8.
In a typical basin, groundwater is a renewable resource. As discussed inKaramouz, Ahmadi,
and Akhbari (2011), water enters a groundwater basin either by percolating through the
soil and overlying sediments or by flowing in from adjacent underground water systems. A
certain amount of water may be “harvested” over regular intervals without impairing the
resource. This is the safe yield of the basin. The “annual safe yield” of a basin is roughly
its long-term average annual natural replenishment. Overdrafting in modest amount and
for limited periods is unlikely to cause serious adverse consequence in most groundwater
basins. Persistent over-pumping, however, can make the sediments compact. Then, the
aquifer’s storage capacity may dwindle or even disappear. With extensive compaction, land
may subside, which causes serious problems for surface structures.
A basin satisfies the definition of CPR system as it generates finite water resources with one
person’s use negatively affecting others’ access to water. The negative externality occurs
through two channels. First, water level declines increase pumping lift and imposes greater
cost on others. If the water level falls below a certain threshold, wells must be deepened or
replaced, pushing out those pumpers who cannot afford the capital investment. Second, if
the outflow of water is not fully compensated by recharge, the storage space of an aquifer
may shrink. Water users then need to invest in expensive ground facilities such as reservoirs
for water storage (Carruthers and Stoner, 1981).
Groundwater rights and management regime in California
The groundwater rights system of California recognizes two different sets of water rights.
Overlying rights allow landowners to extract water from wells on their property. Appro-
priative rights are recognized mainly for water purveyors that deliver water to customers.
8Basins are not completely independent, but moving of water between basins are slow due to the confining
boundaries. I assume independence in this chapter, but even though the cross-basin externality exists, it should
not affect the qualitative results.
7Although appropriative rights are generally subordinate to overlying rights, neither water
right system specifies quantity or associated rules to prevent others from obtaining new
rights (Sawyers, 2005). As a result, every pumper is an unlimited groundwater right holder,
which makes it difficult to restrict extraction.
Prior to 2014 groundwater was not regulated by the State. The political power of counties
andmunicipalities tomanage groundwater is uncertain, since basins generally do not respect
county or municipal boundaries. Even for matters within the jurisdiction of local political
entities (regulation of well drilling), counties or municipalities rarely attempt to restrict
pumping9. In fact, through California’s history, local pumpers are always the primary
decision-makers on groundwater issues. The California Legislature has repeatedly held
that groundwater management should remain a local responsibility (Sax, 2002). The most
recent legislation (SGMA2014) requires basins to form their owngroundwater sustainability
agencies, continuing its long stand of letting the users to solve their problem locally.
In adjudication, the most prominent path to groundwater management, local pumpers turn
to courts to settle disputes over how much groundwater can be extracted by each party.
It starts when a suit is brought to adjudicate the basin (e.g. City of Pasadena v. City of
Alhambra et al.), but usually evolves to a situation in which each defendant’s answer to
the complaint is treated as cross-complaints against other defendants because of the mutual
prescriptive nature of water rights conflict (Blomquist, 1992). The court helps defining the
limitation of resource and boundary of water rights community, but it requires the parties
to negotiate agreements among themselves. Therefore, each case of adjudication is a fully
decentralized bargaining process. The court judgment is in fact a private contract among
the water users in the basin, with the court acting as the enforcement agency. In a typical
adjudication, the court rules on several matters10:
9Some counties or cities (for example the Venura County and the city of Beverly Hills) have ordinances
to regulate well permitting process or groundwater extraction. However, the regulating power is mainly on
the public purveyors who have high value of water use and plenty of supplemental water resources.
10See the DWR report: Groundwater Management in California (1999).
81. who the extractors are;
2. how much each party can extract; and
3. who the watermaster will be to monitor and sanction the violation against the court’s
decree.
Adjudication is usually slow and costly due to the uncertainty about basin hydrology, the
complexity of existing water right and the massive and diverse interests in the bargaining
process. It took seven years to adjudicate the Raymond basin, and more than ten years
passed in the first attempt for the Mojave river basins that ended in failure. Although
adjudication is well understood by groundwater users in the state, it has hardly diffused to
north of the Tehachapi Mountains, leaving Southern California the unique field to examine
the influence of self-governance on CPR’s performance.
Next, I analyze a model of groundwater pumping.
2.3 A Model of Pumping under Uncertainty
There are N > 1 water users overlying a basin. Denote the agents by i = 1, ..., N . For
simplicity, assume the water users are identical11. Each agent obtains revenue f (q) from
“consuming” q units of water. Depending on the type of the water user, “consuming” means
selling the water if the agent is a water purveyor, or watering crops if the agent is a farmer.
The revenue function is increasing and concave.
There are two sources of water, surface and ground water. Surface water is available at a
price that depends on current condition (high in drought, low in rainy years). Denote the
severity of drought as d. The unit price of surface water p(d) is an increasing function of
the drought level.
11Heterogeneity among water users does not hurt our results when there is no regulation since agents make
decisions independently. When there is regulation, for example, adjudication, water users can trade water
rights. Heterogeneity to some sense is offset by the private market, so it does not affect the qualitative result
if the market works.
9Groundwater must be pumped. The cost of pumping has two components, the amount of
extraction and the depth of the water table. When the water table falls, pumping lift in the
well increases and groundwater contains a larger quantity of dissolved solids. Both will
increase the pumping cost. Let the influence of water level be linear. The pumping cost
takes the form: c(e) = l¯e, where e denotes the amount of extraction and l¯ is the average
depth to the water in the well during the pumping process.
Water depth l changes with production and recharge. In the short run, natural recharge is
negligible. The water level change in agent i’s well is only affected by her own extraction
ei. Therefore, we have the final water depth li = l0 + eisw where l0 denotes the water depth
before extraction and sw is the size of the well.
In the long run, water moves from high elevation to low elevation within the basin. Fol-
lowing previous economic studies (Gisser, 1983; Koundouri (2004)), I model the basin as a
bathtub12. Long-termwater level in the basin is determined by the total extraction E =
∑
i ei
and natural recharge H during the period. According to the bathtub condition, water depth
is the same across the agents in the long run: l1 = l0 + E−Hsb where sb denotes the size of the
basin.
Assume the number of the agents is linear to the size of the basin: sb = sN where s is
a positive parameter. The long-term change of water depth is l1 − l0 = eisN +
∑
j,i ei−H
sN .
Therefore, the larger the basin is, the less a single agent’s extraction contributes to the
overall water depth change.
For simplicity, I normalize sw = 12 and s = 1. Let h =
H
N . As a result, the short run average
water depth in agent i’s well is l¯ = l0 + ei, and the long-term water depth in the basin is
l1 = l0 +
∑
i ei
N − h.
12In the real world, basins can have distinct slopes. Users in the upper part of the slope are more sensitive
to drop of water level than those in the lower part. The CPR problem remains as long as there are enough
pumpers lying in the upper part who are affected by the change of water level. Besides that, in Southern
California, most groundwater pumpers are urban water agencies with a value of water much greater than the
cost of pumping. Those agents will always stay in the pool and compete with each other for groundwater
resource. Therefore, treating the basin as a bathtub will not affect the qualitative results.
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In a static setting, agent i selects water consumption qi and extraction ei to maximize her
payoff:
max
qi,ei
f (qi) − c(ei) − p(d)(qi − ei) (2.1)
Henceforth, I only consider the solution with qi > ei. In this case, surface water is the
marginal source, and agents will keep pumping until the marginal cost of groundwater
equals the surface water price. This assumption is reasonable in Southern California
because nearly all communities use imported surface water every year13. Both equilibrium
water consumption and extraction depend on the price of surface water:
qi = f ′−1(p(d)); ei = p(d) − l02
Agent i’s optimal level of extraction changes with surface water price and starting level of
water depth. Higher surface water price makes it more attractive to withdraw water from
the basin; a larger water depth makes it more costly to pump. In the static case, individual
extraction is essentially a private process since the water level only changes locally over a
short period. The problems with competitive pumping arise for longer time horizons.
This chapter models the externality through increased future pumping cost. Since water
moves within the basin, the starting water depth next period is l1 = l0 +
∑
i ei
N − h. In a
multi-period situation, every agent receives the full benefit from current extraction, but only
bears part of the future increased pumping cost. As a result, individual rational choice of
extraction leads to “over-pumping” of the basin.
Typically, there is another channel of externality caused by pumping. Given the finite
recharge rate of the basin, any agent’s extraction increases the possibility of overdrafting
and shrinkage of basin storage space. As the risk is also positively correlated with overall
pumping, I shut down this channel in the modeling process. However, we will keep it in
mind when discussing the incentive of adjudication.
13According to the Urban Water Management Plan (2015) of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, about a half of total water supply in Southern California comes from imported water sources that
include the State Water Project and Colorado River.
11
Another potential problem with competitive pumping is the failure to consider dynamic
efficiency. Competitive agents have little incentive to save for future dry years since the
overall over-pumping will result a high pumping cost anyway. Intuitively, in an efficient
pumping scheme, users should pump less in wet years to save for dry years when the
alternative surface water is very expensive. I employ a two-period model to study water
users’ intertemporal pumping decisions. Weather d is realized in the beginning of each
period (t = 1, 2), as well as the surface water price p(d) and natural replenishment H(d)
as a function of the drought level. H′(d) < 0 and h(d) = H(d)N . l0 is the water depth at
the beginning of Period 1; l1 is the water depth at the end of Period 1 and beginning of
Period 2. Agents choose water consumption and extraction for each period after observing
the weather condition. The discount factor is 114.
State of nature
The first case I will explore is the state of nature when no governing agency controls
pumping. Each agent extracts based on her own cost-benefit analysis. The optimization
problem is solved backwards. In Period 2, agent i’s maximization problem is:
max
q2i,e2i
f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i) (2.2)
where c(e2i) = (l1 + e2i)e2i. I only consider the case when parameter values yield the
interior solution with positive surface water purchase. Let the value function of Period 2 be
V2i. The Period 1 problem is:
max
q1i,e1i
f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i] (2.3)
14Since we are discounting the long term (Period 2) payoff, the discounting factor is generally less than 1.
I set it at 1 to shut down the influence of discounting, which, if any, should only erode the dynamic efficiency
because agents care even less about the future than the present.
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where c(e1i) = (l0 + e1i)e1i. The solution to the above two-period problem is:
qn1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); qn2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
en1i =
2Np(d1) − h(d1) − (2N − 1)l0 − M
4N − 1 ; e
n
2i =
p(d2) − l0 − E
n
1
N + h(d1)
2
En1i =
2Np(d1) − h(d1) − (2N − 1)l0 − M
4 − 1N
; En2 =
N[p(d2) − l0 + h(d1)] − En1
2
where M = Ed[p(d)].
Any reduced extraction in Period 1 will increase water level in Period 2. Due to the structure
of the cost function, a dynamic efficient pumping arrangement will encourage an optimal
amount of saving by each agent. However, in a competitive case, an agent bears the full
cost of saving but only receives part of its benefit since raising the water table generates a
positive externality to others. Therefore, in the model, lack of regulation not only leads to
more pumping than is sustainable, it also fails to be dynamic efficient. I will validate this
argument by a comparison with the socially optimal pumping strategy.
Social planner’s problem
An opposite scenario to the competitive pumping allocates pumping decisions to a central
authority. Uncertainty to weather remains, but the central planner has all the information
she needs and optimizes as social planner. Again, there is a two-period problem:
Period 1: max
q1i,e1i,i=1,. . . ,N
∑
i
{ f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i]} (2.4)
Period 2: max
q2i,e2i,i=1,. . . ,N
∑
i
{ f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i)} (2.5)
The Period 2 social planner’s problem is the same as the individual agent’s problem, since
any agent’s extraction does not affect others’ pumping cost and the world ends at the end of
the period. The major distinguishing feature between the social planner and the individual
pumper is in Period 1 when the social planner internalizes all the externalities in future cost
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of pumping. The solution to the two-period problem is:
qsp1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); qsp2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
esp1i =
2p(d1) − h(d1) − l0 − M
3
; esp2i =
p(d2) − l0 − E
sp
1
N + h(d1)
2
E sp1i =
N[2p(d1) − h(d1) − l0 − M]
3
; E sp2 =
N[p(d2) − l0 + h(d1)] − E sp1
2
When N is large enough, En1 > E
sp
1 is approximately equivalent to [M − p(d1)]+ [M − l0 +
2h(d1)] > 0. M − l0 + 2h(d1) > 0 always holds by construction. Since M = Ed[p(d)], on
expectation, M − p(d1) = 0. Therefore, ex ante, competitive pumping leads to a depleted
basin. In the short term, it is possible for p(d1) to be very high due to extremely dry weather.
A dynamic efficient pumping scheme may require the agents to pump even more than the
competitive level and compensate by reduced extraction in the future. This confirms our
speculation that competitive pumping does not provide agents with sufficient incentives to
save water for dry years.
Adjudication
Although a social planner can achieve maximal welfare for the group of pumpers as a whole,
it is not always feasible to implement an optimal scheme. In a world with heterogeneous
pumpers, the central authority may not have the appropriate information to decide the
pumping allocation15. What’s more, it is not clear who can play the role of social planner in
particular because of agency problems16. Lam (1998) has shown that government systems
actually do worse than self-governing irrigation systems in Nepal. The same concern
exists among Southern California pumpers (Blomquist, 1992). Adjudication, as a form of
15In Gordon (1954), the author mentioned the failure of the international fishery agreement between the
United States and Canada that established a fixed-catch limit during the early 1930s. The limit led to a
competitive race for fish and over-investment in capital. A similar problems also arose in the Canadian
Atlantic Coast lobster-conservation program. To the contrary, also mentioned by the author, in a few places
the fishermen have successfully reduced fishing gears and improved income by banding with each other and
setting up rules regulating their own operations.
16According to Berkes et al. (1989a), there is also an “ideological” reason that some societies subscribe to
the idea of freedom of the commons.
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self-governance, may also be more acceptable to the local pumpers than the centralized
regulation by the state.
Pumpers rely on adjudication to achieve two main outcomes. First, it protects the basin
from overdrafting by setting the total annual pumping rights equal to the long-term safe
yield of the basin. Second, it avoids competition between the pumpers by assigning an exact
amount of pumping rights to each of them.
As each basin devises its own rules, the flexibility of adjudicated rights varies across
adjudications. A key source of variation is the benchmark used to decide the pumping
rights R. Some basins target the long-term average yield of the basin, i.e. R = Ed[H(d)].
Others use a varying annual yield17, the so-called operating safe yield, to determine pumping
right each year, i.e. R(d) = H(d). Both adjudication rules can achieve sustainability, but
they have different short-term implications.
A second dimension of difference worth exploring is the option to save. Some basins allow
pumpers to store any unused pumping rights and increase their future rights accordingly.
Others strictly execute the assigned pumping allocation, and impose replenishment fees
for over-pumping immediately. The savings option can influence agents’ intertemporal
pumping decisions. In my model, any adjudication achieves sustainability by assumption,
but it remains uncertain how the adjudication rules affect dynamic efficiency. I will examine
the two dimensions of flexibility by considering the 2 × 2 cases: long-term average yield
versus operating safe yield, and savings versus no savings.
Long-term average yield without savings
Using long-term average yield and not allowing savings seem to be the most rigid type
of adjudication. Appropriators face the same upper bound of pumping r = RN in each
period independent of the weather18. In Period 2, the agent faces a constrained optimization
17To do so, some technical advisor estimates the yield of the basin in next water year before it starts. The
estimation is taken as the operating safe yield.
18I assume the identical agents share the pumping rights equally. The distribution of adjudicated rights
actually does not matter as long as there is a market for pumping rights with minimal friction.
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problem:
max
q2i,e2i
f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i) s.t. e2i ≤ r (2.6)
The value function of Period 2 is not smooth at the point that the constraints bind. Taking into
account the expected value in Period 2, the agent solves another constrained optimization
problem in Period 1:
max
q1i,e1i
f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i] s.t. e1i ≤ r (2.7)
If neither constraint binds, the problem is the same as competitive pumping. In this chapter,
we are interested in cases where adjudication is not trivial. Therefore, I only consider the
case where both constraints bind. This is true when natural recharge or adjudicated pumping
rights is so limited that, even at the boundary, the marginal cost of pumping is too low to
generate any incentive for saving. Water use and extraction in each period are:
ql,ns1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); ql,ns2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
el,ns1i = r; e
l,ns
2i = r
E l,ns1i = R; E
l,ns
2 = R
Without doubt, the rigid adjudication rules lead to rigid pumping decisions. Extraction is
constant in each period irrespective of surface water availability.
Operating yield without savings
Amodification to the rigid allocation above is to use operating yield as the benchmark when
deciding annual pumping rights. However, without savings accounts, agents still do not
have an incentive to smooth pumping over time. Compared with the first case, the constraint
to the maximization problem now varies according to the realized weather condition in the
period:
Period 1: max
q1i,e1i
f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i] s.t. e1i ≤ r(d1) (2.8)
Period 2: max
q2i,e2i
f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i) s.t. e2i ≤ r(d2) (2.9)
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Again, I only consider the case when both constraints bind. Since the basin does not allow
savings, the overall extraction only reflects the change of natural recharge. Water use and
extraction in each period are:
qo,ns1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); qo,ns2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
eo,ns1i =
H(d1)
N
; eo,ns2i =
H(d2)
N
Eo,ns1i = H(d1); Eo,ns2 = H(d2)
Although it seems more flexible, I argue that using operating yield without a savings
account actually decreases the overall welfare. Since H′(d) < 0, indeed in the constant
annual extraction program, groundwater use is less than recharge in wet year and more than
recharge in dry years. With operating yield extraction, groundwater use will be less in dry
years and more in wet ones. Therefore, agents actually buy more surface water in dry years
when it is expensive and less in wet years when it is cheap. The pro-cyclical pattern of
groundwater recharge actually undermines the basin’s function as drought buffer.
So far, neither adjudication rule provides the agents with the right incentive to use ground-
water as drought insurance. That is why it is important to have a savings option with
adjudication.
Long-term average yield with savings
In a two-period model with savings allowed, each agent does the cost-benefit calculation
with an overall budget constraint. The constrained optimization problem is:
Period 1: max
q1i,e1i
f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i] (2.10)
Period 2: max
q2i,e2i
f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i) s.t. e2i ≤ 2r − e1i (2.11)
Since the total budget of extraction is fixed, the agent smooths her pumping over two periods
such that the difference of marginal pumping cost equals to the difference of price. The
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solution to the two-period problem is:
ql,s1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); ql,s2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
el,s1i =
N[p(d1) − h(d1) − M] + (4N − 2)r
3N − 1 ; e
l,s
2i = 2r − el,s1i
E l,s1i =
N[p(d1) − h(d1) − M] + (4N − 2)r
3 − 1/N ; E
l,s
2 = 2R − E l,s1i
Given savings account, pumpers are willing to save in the first period if the price of surface
water is low (el,s1i decreases with p(d1)).
Operating yield with savings
Themost flexible case is using operating safe yield as adjudicated rights and allowing savings
at the same time. When pumping rights depend on realized weather condition, pumpers are
assigned more pumping allocation in wet years than in dry years. The extraction budget is
not fixed ex post, motivating the agent to choose the two periods’ pumping in a way that
not only takes into account the expected surface water price, but also the expected future
pumping allocation. The constrained optimization problem is:
Period 1: max
q1i,e1i
f (q1i) − c(e1i) − p(d1)(q1i − e1i) + Ed[V2i] (2.12)
Period 2: max
q2i,e2i
f (q2i) − c(e2i) − p(d2)(q2i − e2i) s.t. e2i ≤ H(d1)N +
H(d2)
N
− e1i(2.13)
The solution to this problem is similar to the last case:
qo,s1i = f
′−1(p(d1)); qo,s2i = f ′−1(p(d2))
eo,s1i =
N[p(d1) − h(d1) − M] + (2N − 1)(H(d1)N + r)
3N − 1 ; e
o,s
2i =
H(d1)
N
+
H(d2)
N
− eo,s1i
Eo,s1i =
N[p(d1) − h(d1) − M] + (2N − 1)(H(d1)N + r)
3 − 1/N ; E
o,s
2 = H(d1) + H(d2) − Eo,s1i
Adjudication here also generates an incentive for saving, but when compared with the
socially optimal case, the incentive is not enough. When the social planner decides pumping
levels, the first derivative of Period 1 total extraction with respect to the surface water price
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is ∂E
sp
1
∂p(d1) =
2N
3 . That is always greater than
∂Eo,s1
∂p(d1) =
N
3−1/N , the derivative when pumpers
are managed by adjudication with a savings account. The externality still exists since one
agent’s saving will raise everyone’s water level in the second period. Adjudication may
successfully limit the amount of extraction and keep the water level stable, but we still have
an unsolved problem of how to provide agents with a strong enough incentive to save in wet
periods.
Extensions
The simple two-period model has its limitations. The fact that pumping ends in Period 2
may be insufficient for a full comparison of dynamic efficiency across institutions. In the
real world, savings accounts can last much longer than two periods, increasing the agents’
incentive to save. In addition, the Period 2 equilibrium extraction is solved under a “use it
or lose it” situation. That is not a problem when the quantity of pumping rights is specified.
However, in looking at the social planner’s optimum, something is lost because agents pump
more in Period 2, which has an unexpected effect on their Period 1 pumping plan.
Chapter 4 extends the two-period model to an infinite horizon problem. Both sustainability
and dynamic efficiency have a different implication in the infinite horizon game than the
two-period model. In the steady state, the expected annual extraction from the basin should
be equal to its long-term recharge rate under any institution, so sustainability is not defined
based on the amount of pumping. Instead, lack of sustainability is associated with a lower
steady state water level, which indicates that the basin is exposed to higher risk of depletion.
Since the competitive pumpers always have larger incentive to extract than the social planner,
the steady state water level under the state of nature should be lower than the socially optimal
level. In addition, during adjudication pumpers can select any water level to maintain by
scheduling a controlled overdraft or artificial replenishment. The steady state water level
in an adjudicated basin should be close to the socially optimum to achieve larger overall
benefits. Therefore, I speculate that the competitive case would have lower sustainability
than other institutions in the infinite horizon model.
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As for dynamic efficiency, it depends on how agents allocate the same amount of steady
state extraction across different weather conditions. The social planner’s incentive to save
in wet years as drought insurance does not change; the agents have an incentive to save but
they still suffer from the externality. The competitive case is more complicated. On one
hand, pumpers react to the surface water price with little incentive to save; on the other
hand, the amount of extraction depends on the water level which is much lower during a
drought cycle due to lack of natural recharge. As a result, I anticipate that adjudication
still have a problem with dynamic efficiency, but it remains unclear how adjudication works
compared with the state of nature.
As for this chapter, I will put aside the difference between this model and an infinite horizon
game. In next sub-session, I discuss the hypotheses drawn from the simple two-period
model. I will test these hypotheses in the next section.
Hypotheses
Two sets of hypotheses can be drawn from the equilibrium analysis:
Hypothesis 2.1 (Sustainability) As adjudication generally limits the maximal amount of
extraction, I expect adjudicated basins to pump less than unadjudicated ones and hence are
more likely to maintain groundwater resources.
The other hypothesis is related to the dynamic efficiency. I expect the optimal mechanism to
have some responsiveness to changing weather conditions. Once again, the first derivative
of Period 1 total extraction to the price of surface water is a measure of dynamic efficiency19.
It shows to what extend agents adjust their pumping plan according to the availability of
supplemental water resources.
19Weather also affects extraction through natural recharge. Since surface water supply is more sensitive to
weather condition than groundwater recharge, I ignore H ′(d) and only consider the influence of surface water
price.
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The first derivatives of Period 1 total extraction over surface water price are as follows:
∂En1
∂p(d1) =
2N
4 − 1N
;
∂E sp1
∂p(d1) =
2N
3
;
∂E l,ns1
∂p(d1) =
∂Eo,ns1
∂p(d1) = 0;
∂E l,s1
∂p(d1) =
∂Eo,s1
∂p(d1) =
N
3 − 1N
(2.14)
They satisfy:
∂E sp1
∂p(d1) >
∂En1
∂p(d1) >
∂E l,s1
∂p(d1) =
∂Eo,s1
∂p(d1) >
∂E l,ns1
∂p(d1) =
∂Eo,ns1
∂p(d1) (2.15)
As a result, I argue that neither the state of nature nor adjudication generates enough counter-
cyclicality of pumping. Within the adjudicated basins, adjudication without the option to
save is rigid, because agents do not take into account the price of surface water at all. In the
hypothesis of dynamic efficiency, I put adjudication with a savings account in one category
and without in another category. Since we only observe the state of nature and adjudication
in Southern California,20 I compare the relative counter-cyclicality of those two institutions:
Hypothesis 2.2 (Dynamic efficiency) The state of nature generates a larger counter-
cyclical pumping pattern than adjudication, and among the adjudicated basins, those
without a savings option do not have enough counter-cyclicality.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical basis for this study is a collection of depth to water (henceforth well depth)
data for 87 wells in 33 Southern California basins. Under the assumption that an aquifer is
like a bathtub, the hydrology of a basin satisfies the formula:
∆Water Level × Size of Aquifer = Total Recharge − Total Extraction (2.16)
Therefore, the change in the water level in a basin is a monotonic function of recharge and
extraction normalized by the size of the basin. In reality, the bathtub condition generally
does not hold, so we do not have a unified measure of water level change in one basin. As
20In fact, we also observe a third type of institution that a central authority uses tax to regulate agents’
pumping behavior (see Orange County Water District). As the tax rate is set such that overall tax revenue
equals to the total cost to recharge the basin, an individual agent has the incentive to pump more than the
efficient level since the replenishment cost is distributed among all the agents through the uniform tax rate. I
save the discussion of that mechanism for later.
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an alternative, I look at individual wells in each basin and use the change of well depth as
the measure of water level change.
There is no clear geological definition for Southern California as a whole. In this study, I
follow the classifications of the DWR’s Southern Region Office and include three hydrolog-
ical regions: South Coast, South Lahontan, and Colorado River. Selection of those regions
is reasonable since all adjudicated basins, except for some coastal ones, are in this area21.
DWR identifies 214 basins or subbasins in Southern California, among which I only select
the 59 basins that produce more than 3000 Acre-feet (AF) groundwater per year22. The
largest basin produces as much as 342,000 AF of groundwater each year, so the lower limit
excludes a large number of extremely small basins where a single dominant agent may bear
the cost of collective action.
Because of data limitations23, the period of study is 2000 to 2015. Not all wells have 16
years of well depth readings. For each basin, I only pick the wells with 14 or more years’
observation from 2000 to 2015. I keep at most 3 wells for one basin if that basin has more
than 3 wells satisfying our requirement. We end up with 33 basins and 87 wells in our
sample. Most basins have 2 or 3 wells.
Table 2.1 illustrates the representativeness of our sample. According to the p-values from
the t-tests, our sample does not have a statistical significant difference from other large
basins (> 3000 AFY) in terms of size, share of agricultural land and population density.
It does include more adjudicated basins, consistent with the fact that adjudicated basins
are more likely to monitor their water levels. The comparison of the sample basins and
the excluded small basins imply that the basins with less than 3000 AFY have significantly
different basin characteristics. In particular, they are smaller and less populated, confirming
21Coastal basins have a different incentive to adjudicate than inland ones. They are more likely to be
threatened by seawater intrusion instead of increasing pumping cost.
22The estimates are from DWR California Groundwater Update 2013.
23Monitoring effect of water level varies across different agencies. The United State Geological Survey
started a comprehensive monitoring program only after 2006. DWR requires local groundwater pumping
agencies to submit their well depth data to its database. However, most local agencies read their well depth in
very low frequency (annually or biannually) and keep few records for the years before 2000.
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our concern that those basins may have a smaller group of pumpers and thus a different
groundwater use situation.
Basins in the Sample Other >=3000 AFY Other South Cal. Basins
Number 33 26 181
Mean Mean Mean difference p-value Mean Mean difference p-value
Fraction of adjudication before 2000 0.52 0.23 -0.28 0.03 0.06 -0.45 0.00
Basin size (acres) 135545.27 149605.15 14059.88 0.78 87051.51 -48493.76 0.10
Fraction of ag. land 0.18 0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.03 -0.15 0.00
Population density (per acre) 3.30 2.27 -1.03 0.33 1.05 -2.25 0.00
Table 2.1: Representativeness of the Estimated Sample
Well depth change is our outcome variable and the two main equations we want to estimate
are:
y jit = α1 + β1Ai + θ1zi + σ1t + 1 jit (2.17)
y jit = α2 + β2Ai + γDt + δAi × Dt + θ2zi + σ2t + 2 jit (2.18)
y jit is change of well depth for well j in basin i at period t. Ai is a dummywhich equals to 1 if
the basin is adjudicated before 2000 and 0 otherwise. Ai is a vector of institution dummies,
which equals to (1, 0) if the basin is adjudicated before 2000 with a savings account, (0, 1)
if the basin is adjudicated before 2000 without a savings account, and (0, 0) if it has not
been adjudicated before 2000. Dt is a weather dummy which equals to 1 if the period t
is a dry period, and 0 otherwise. Ai × Dt is the cross-term to test the marginal effect of
institutions on water level changes during different weather cycles (dynamic efficiency); zi
is a vector of control variables including relevant basin characteristics; σt is the time fixed
effect; and  jit is the error term. Because error terms for wells from the same basin are
generally correlated, they are clustered at the basin level in the regression analysis.
As for the institution variable, the DWR has established the Adjudicated Basins Annual
Reporting System where we can find the names of the adjudicated basins and the terms of
adjudication. There were 27 court adjudications in California through 2015. Twenty of
them occurred in Southern California, and they cover 30 basins. According to Table 2.2,
17 of them have enough well data to be included in our sample. 14 adjudications occurred
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before 2000 and three afterwards. To avoid the identification problem that arises in our
sample because a basin may be unadjudicated before a certain year and then adjudicated
afterwards, and to eliminate the immediate effect of adjudication, I use a dummy variable
indicating whether a basin is adjudicated before 2000 as our main institution variable24.
Through the division of basins according to their institution choice at 2000, I compare those
basins that are always adjudicated in our sample period with the rest.
For each adjudicated basin, I use the adjudication documents to identify the specific rules
adopted by that basin. Some adjudicated basins allow carry-over of unexercised pumping
rights while some do not give credit for that. I code the basin as adjudicated with a savings
account if its adjudication rule allows for storage of unused pumping rights; otherwise, I
code the basin as adjudicated without a savings account. Twelve out of 17 adjudicated
basins allow savings.
The primary source of well depth data is California Statewide Groundwater Elevation
Monitoring Program; theWaterData Library ofDWRalso provideswell depth observations.
I also ask water agencies directly for well monitoring data if CASGEM contained less than
three qualified wells in their basin. For each well in our sample, we have scattered readings
of water level on dates casually drawn from the 16-year period. Difference between any
two readings is one observation of water level change25. For instance, the water level on
January 1st, 2005 minus the water level on January 1st, 2004 is an observation of one-year
water level change. A positive water level change reflects an increase of water table and a
negative water level change a decline. In the tests, I only use water level changes over one,
two, three or four full years to get rid of seasonality.
The unit of observation in the regression analysis is an individual well. We have a panel
dataset since in principle we can observe water level changes of all wells on any time
24In our sample, all adjudicated basins were adjudicated before 2000 except for one in 2015. Even if we
use the exact treatment (adjudicated or not), our empirical results will not change too much.
25Water level change is the same concept as water depth change. A higher water level corresponds to a
smaller water depth. So water level changes in the opposite direction to water depth, but in the same scale.
24
interval between 2000 and 2015. For instance, there should be 365 × 1526 observations of
1-year water level change for each well during our sample period. Unfortunately, water level
observations occur at low frequency, and we do not always have two readings at a distance
of 1 year. We end up with fewer observations than the theoretical number, even when I
relax the definition of 1-year water level change to the change between 12 ± 1 months27.
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the outcome variables that I use in the regression
analysis. We have 9172 observations of 1-year well level change in our regression. Among
them, nearly a half are from the adjudicated basins, which is close to the fraction of
adjudication basins over all sample basins. I also compute 2-year, 3-year and 4-year
water level changes. The sample is quite balanced since there are always more than 45%
observations from the adjudicated basins.
Adjudicated before 2000 Not Adjudicated before 2000 Total Mean(not adj.) - Mean(adj.) p-valueNumber Mean Number Mean Total Mean
Basin 17 16 33
Well 45 42 87
Change of water level (feet)
1-Y 4314 -0.52 4858 -1.87 9172 -1.23 -1.35 0.00
2-Y 3916 -0.24 4540 -4.15 8456 -2.34 -3.91 0.00
3-Y 3562 -0.74 4228 -5.81 7790 -3.50 -5.07 0.00
4-Y 3221 0.65 3927 -7.52 7148 -3.84 -8.18 0.00
Population density (per acre) 4769 3.02 5153 2.67 9922 2.84 -0.35 0.00
Fraction of ag. land 4769 0.04 5153 0.48 9922 0.27 0.44 0.00
Drought index 4769 -1.86 5153 -1.90 9922 -1.88 -0.04 0.59
Precipitation (inches) 4749 0.68 4986 1.01 9735 0.85 0.32 0.00
Note: The unit of observation is well*date.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
P-values from the t-tests of water level changes in the adjudicated and unadjudicated basins
indicate that for all time intervals I examine, the adjudicated basins have experienced smaller
water level decreases compared with unadjudicated ones. This suggests that adjudication
does lead to improvement in sustainability. For example, the mean differences imply that
the water level drops in the adjudicated basins is on average 1.4 feet less in 1-year interval,
3.9 feet less in 2-year interval and 8.2 feet less in 4-year interval28. The difference is
26The water level readings are at the daily level. From 2000 to 2015, we can find 365 × 15 pairs of dates
that are at a distance of 1 year. The difference of water levels between each pair of dates is one observation
of one year water level change.
27I also allow 30-day flexibility for two-, three- and four-year intervals.
28The change is not linear because water moves within the basin. The difference between short-term and
long-term changes reflects the shape of aquifer and the speed of water movement.
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significant both statistically and economically. On average, well levels drop 1.9 feet in the
unadjudicated basins each year, while the wells in the adjudicated basins drop 62% less. If
we look at 4-year intervals, well levels in the unadjudicated basins on average drops 7.5 feet
within 4 years, while they actually increase 0.7 feet in the adjudicated basins.
Table 2.2 also reports the mean of population density, fraction of agricultural land, Palmer
drought severity index (PDSI) and monthly precipitation for all observations. The first two
variables are at the basin level. DWR divides California into Detailed Analysis Units (DAU)
by which it estimates population and size of agricultural land annually. For the purpose
of our study, I match DAUs to each basin. There are cases that one basin overlies several
DAUs or several basins overlie the same DAU. For each basin, I add up estimates from all
DAUs it overlies. Then I calculate the annual growth rate of population and agricultural
land using the sums. As I obtain 2010 population and agricultural land size for each basin
from another data source (DWR 2013 Update), I apply the growth rate to the 2010 data,
and get an annual measure of population and agricultural land size for each basin. The unit
of population density is person/acre. As the data shows, on average, the adjudicated basins
are more populated and have a smaller proportion of land in agriculture.
The last two variables concern the weather. PDSI is an index that uses temperature and
precipitation data to estimate relative dryness. It is at monthly level and only published for
two broad regions: Colorado River/South Lahontan and South Coast. As a result, there is
very little variation of PDSI across the basins. Therefore, I merely use it to define drought
and wet cycles over Southern California. I employ monthly precipitation data at the basin
level to control for basin specific weather conditions. The PDSI data I use in the study
comes from the National Centers for Environmental Information, and the precipitation data
mainly comes from the California Irrigation Management Information System (CIMIS).
CIMIS has monthly-accumulated precipitation information for various stations. I associate
each basin with the closest station and assign the precipitation figure from that station to the
basin. A complementary source comes from the California Data Exchange Center, which
has similar monthly precipitation data for different stations. Since the precipitation record
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may not start until after 2000, we have fewer observations with precipitation data than with
other control variables. In general, the drought index does not show any difference between
adjudicated and unadjudicated areas, but the more detailed precipitation data shows that on
average the adjudicated basins have less rain than the unadjudicated ones.
Two coefficients from the two estimation equations are of particular interest for this research.
β1 measures the average effect of adjudication over the changes of water level across wells
from different basins and across different dates. According to Hypothesis 2.1, β1 should be
positive since the adjudicated basins should have greater water level changes due to their
limits on extraction.
The other coefficient we care about is δ = (δ1, δ2). As the coefficients of the cross-terms of
institution and drought dummy, δ1 and δ2 measure the effect of institution over the dry-wet
year difference of water level changes. The benchmark for the difference-in-difference
analysis is counter-cyclicality of the unadjudicated basins, where the agents only react to
surface water price. According to Hypothesis 2.2, adjudication with a savings account
should be less counter-cyclical than the competitive case, or in other words, it should have
a greater dry-wet year difference of water level changes. Furthermore, adjudication without
a savings account is expected to result a flat extraction pattern, with an even greater dry-wet
year difference. As a result, δ1 should be positive and δ2 should be greater than δ1.
There is a potential problem with endogeneity because basins with severe overdraft might
be forced to adjudicate. Even when we choose the institution variable so that the treatment
happens before the sample period, we cannot ensure the underlying conditions causing
the overdraft do not persist. Omitted variables such as precipitation and urbanization rate
might, for example, cause the selection bias in our estimation. A basin with less rain usually
has less natural recharge to the aquifer, but it is also more likely to experience drought and
then adjudicate. Similarly, a more urbanized basin will have an easier time transferring the
adjudication cost to water users, and the urbanized area also has different water demand and
natural recharge rate compared with agricultural area.
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I use accumulated precipitation, growth of population density and growth of agricultural
land ratio to account for the potential effects of weather and human activity. The selection
bias may still exist even after controlling for those three variables. However, since a basin
with higher propensity to be adjudicated is also more likely to suffer from the factors that
cause water level decline, the selection effect, if any, should only bias our estimation results
downwards. Therefore, I can safely draw conclusions from the estimated coefficients despite
of the endogeneity issue.
In Table 2.3, I test the effect of adjudication over water level changes. Control variables
for the basin-level characteristics are included. The effect of adjudication becomes larger
than indicated by the summary statistics in all time intervals after adding the controls. For
instance, the adjudicated basins now on average experience 0.7 feet increase of water level
in one year compared with 1.9 feet drop in the unadjudicated basins. Precipitation has a
positive effect in that 1 inch more precipitation in a year raises the water level up about 0.48
feet.
Both population density and agricultural land ratio growth lead to lowerwater level, implying
both urban and rural water use have a negative effect on water level compared with places
with less human activities. In 1 year, a one standard-deviation increase of population
density growth leads to 0.75 feet decline of water level; a one standard-deviation increase
of the change of agricultural land ratio leads to 1.3 feet fall of groundwater. Both effects
are significant in magnitude. One may worry that population density and the change in the
agricultural land ratio work in opposite directions. I also run regressions with only one of
the two variables. The coefficients only change little, implying collinearity is not a concern.
The test of sustainability confirms the effectiveness of adjudication. Even without a central
planner or privatization, the agents within a basin can effectively regulate themselves and
protect the basin from overdrafting. The role of self-governance on sustainability is crucial.
Without adjudication, basins on average experience decline of water level, while those
adjudicated basins actually experience rise of water table.
28
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Water level change 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year
Adjudication before 2000 2.621** 7.533*** 9.445*** 14.43***
(1.098) (2.119) (3.012) (3.800)
Precipitation 0.482* 0.564** 0.523** 0.502***
(0.249) (0.231) (0.204) (0.181)
Population density change -19.79*** -20.42** -10.02 1.315
(7.210) (8.154) (7.880) (8.960)
Agricultural land change -139.2** -37.71 -196.6*** -83.74
(58.150) (35.620) (52.250) (79.860)
Constant -6.581** -15.99*** -22.53*** -30.33***
(2.879) (5.489) (7.656) (9.297)
Observations 8,771 8,036 7,364 6,729
R-squared 8.5% 14.5% 16.7% 16.9%
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at basin level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: Effect of Adjudication on Water Level Change
Another hypothesis that I test is the dynamic efficiency of the adjudication rules. Since the
cyclicality of pumping results from the intertemporal decisions of the agents, we do not
want to disturb the estimation by including periods with overlapping dates. Instead, I divide
the whole sample period into 3 drought cycles (2001-2004, 2007-2009 and 2012-2015)
and two wet cycles (2005-2006 and 2010-2011)29. I run panel analysis on the five cycles
to check the marginal effect of institution on water level change under different weather
conditions.
Since there are not too many variations of adjudication rules in terms of savings account,
in the first two columns of Table 2.4, I pool the adjudicated basins as one category. The
29According to definition of the National Centers for Environmental Information, a year is in drought
if the average monthly PDSI is below -2. I define a period is a drought cycle if it consists of consecutive
drought years. Our identification of drought cycles are consistent with other sources such as the United States
Department of Agriculture and Taeb et al. (2016).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Depend Variable: water level change during hydrological cycles
Adjudication before 2000 3.785*** 2.507**
(1.187) (1.164)
Adjudication before 2000 & Savings 4.168*** 3.503***
(1.215) (1.183)
Adjudication before 2000 & No Savings 8.321*** 8.563***
(1.265) (1.228)
Dummy for drought cycle -0.727 -13.01*** 0.581 -11.24***
(2.181) (2.371) (2.152) (2.328)
Adjudication before 2000 X Dummy for drought cycle 8.911*** 7.868***
(1.751) (1.702)
Adjudication&Savings X Dummy for drought cycle 2.699 -0.0889
(2.348) (2.282)
Adjudication&NoSavings X Dummy for drought cycle 4.461*** 0.989
(1.382) (1.361)
Length of the cycle -13.34*** -2.411 -11.47*** -0.555
(1.461) (1.642) (1.454) (1.633)
Precipitation 0.333*** 0.230*** 0.336*** 0.244***
(0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0257)
Population density change 12.31*** 8.229** 7.923* 2.356
(4.219) (4.098) (4.310) (4.199)
Agricultural land change 153.5*** 13.37 102.6*** -43.82
(34.64) (35.18) (32.99) (33.77)
Constant 21.31*** 4.479 16.02*** -1.305
(2.923) (3.207) (2.799) -3.085
Cycle fixed effect N Y N Y
Observations 2,404 2,404 2,404 2,404
R-squared 16.3% 21.9% 16.2% 21.8%
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Effect of Institution on Cyclicality of Groundwater Extraction
effect of institution persists. Adjudication before 2000 results in higher water level. The
estimated coefficient for the cross term is positive, indicating that the difference of water
level change between dry and wet cycles is 6.7 feet larger in the adjudicated basins compared
with the unadjudicated basins. So, the adjudicated basins do have a less counter-cyclical
groundwater use pattern than the unregulated ones.
Column 3 and 4 present the estimation by dividing the adjudicated basins into those with a
savings account and those without. The effect of adjudication remains. The sign of cross
terms are as expected. In the regression without cycle fixed effect, the marginal effect of
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adjudication without a savings account is statistically significant. The coefficient for the
cross term of adjudication with a savings account is smaller than the coefficient for the cross
term of adjudication without a savings account, indicating that adjudication rules with a
savings option generate greater counter-cyclicality than the rigid rules.
Several issues remain unsolved for Table 2.4. Both the population density change and
agricultural land ratio change have signs that are the opposite of our expectation. Also, after
clustering the error term at the basin level, we lose all significance. A better specification
of the estimation model is needed to address those issues.
2.5 Conclusion
A rich body of literature has documented self-organized governance on CPR systems around
the world. In this chapter, I analyze groundwater management in Southern California
and confirm the effectiveness of self-governing institutions in solving the CPR problem.
Through adjudication, pumpers in the same basin arrive at a contract that specifies the exact
amount each pumper can extract from the basin, as well as rules to monitor and sanction
the violations. By looking at water depth of wells located in different basins, I show that
the adjudicated basins have greater water level increase or smaller water level decrease than
those unregulated ones within the same time period.
My findings have significant real-world implications. Since Elinor Ostrom’s pioneering
work (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, 2002), adjudication of groundwater rights has been considered
as a major solution to CPR problem in groundwater basins. In the important case of
California, however, this institution rarely diffused to the north of the state. The reason
may be more complicated stakes in water rights (for instance in the Central Valley). If so,
then my quantitative measure of the effect of adjudication can resolve the uncertainty that
the agents face weighing between the status quo and the legal settlement. The evidences
found in this chapter will help the advocates of self-governance and accelerate institutional
change.
In the economic literature on common rights, this work is the first one to evaluate the
31
self-governing institutions in terms of the dynamic efficiency of the CPR system. One
concern raised by this chapter is that adjudication does not necessarily enhance the dynamic
efficiency of groundwater use. Allowing flexibility in adjudication rules can provide an
incentive for the agents to save water in wet years, but adjudication in general generates
smaller counter-cyclical pumping pattern than the unregulated state. The fact that indi-
viduals governing the CPR may not have enough of an incentive to develop an efficient
intertemporal appropriating plan suggests it is worth weighing the trade-off between self-
governance and other type of institutions more carefully. Moreover, institutional designers
may need to think about the proper mechanism if dynamic efficiencymatters a lot for welfare
of the community.
A problem remains open: why is adjudication so slow to diffuse. Since the first adjudication
(Raymond Basin 1944), only 30 out of 214 basins have adjudicated in Southern California
and less than a handfull elsewhere in the State. Given the large benefit it brings, it is urgent
to figure out why pumpers in some basins organize themselves and why they fail to do so
in other place. The study has to go back to the early stage when the adjudications actually
occurred. Work by Ostrom and Blomquist has conducted case studies over several large
basins. A further step we can make is to find quantitative evidence for the reasons behind
adjudication.
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C h a p t e r 3
SURFACE WATER TRADING AND GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN
CALIFORNIA CENTRAL VALLEY
3.1 Introduction
Economists have long argued that markets allocate resources efficiently (A. Smith, 1776;
Walras, 1874; Marshall, 1895; Coase, 1960). For example, water markets have been
established in many places around the world to cope with water scarcity (Bjornlund, 2003;
Bithas, 2008). In California, the property rights that allowed private capture of water from
streams to support mining and farming, laid the foundation of water trade (G. D. Libecap,
2007). Moreover, a surface water market should help address the mismatch of historical
water rights allocation and current demand within and beyond agriculture. Yet there remain
strong reservations in the agricultural community, principally because of fears that water
will be “stolen” by urban communities (G. D. Libecap, 2008). Meanwhile, there are also
concerns that trading surface water accelerates aquifer depletion since surface water is a
substitute for groundwater (Hanak, 2005). These are the focus of this chapter.
How can the surface water market affect the performance of groundwater basins? The
answer depends on the severity of common-pool resource (CPR) problem confronting the
groundwater system. This chapter investigates this issue using data from agricultural output
and water supply in the Central Valley of California. I build a model to establish the
implications of surface water trade in a variety of property rights settings for groundwater. I
then test which of these conditions apply to California. My analysis shows that the evolution
of crop patterns over space and time are consistent with the assumptions that surface and
ground water are perfect substitutes in the economy and the groundwater basin is in open
access. I then demonstrate that the private trade between agricultural water districts leads
to both lower overall social efficiency and unsustainability of the groundwater basin.
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For most aquifers, scholars and policy makers only have access to data on surface water
consumption at the district level. In particular, all estimates of groundwater consumption
are obtained as a residual difference between expected water consumption by activity and
realized surface water application. One reason for this is that, as is the case in the Central
Valley, most wells are unmetered. To offset this lack of data, I develop a theoretical model
that details how crops respond to different property rights regimes. I evaluate the social
welfare change when the agricultural economy moves from autarky to water markets, and
compare the two regimes with the social planer’s optimal allocation. The efficacy of market
depends on the marginal cost of groundwater use.
With a high enough pumping cost, themarginal cost of using groundwater equals itsmarginal
return in the economy (henceforth this case will be referred to as the water constraint binds).
In this case, if only the high-value users pump groundwater, the surfacewatermarket reduces
overall reliance on groundwater because low-value farmers will sell their surface water to
high-value users and will not pump groundwater to replace the surface water they sold. If
the low-value farmers also use groundwater, as long as the water constraint binds, the overall
extraction in the economy remains unchanged after reallocating surface water from low-
value to high-value users. Under both circumstances, the surface water market is efficient
in reallocating resource while not causing extra depletion of the aquifer.
With a low enough pumping cost, the low-value farmers find it still profitable to use
groundwater until all their land has been farmed (henceforth this case will be referred to
as the land constraint binds). With a surface water market, farmers who have access to
groundwater will sell their surface water to farmers who do not and then pump the amount
sold off to continue their low-value farming. The rise of a surface water market thus speeds
up the depletion of groundwater aquifer and is not necessarily efficient.
The theoretical model establishes the link between market efficiency and the underlying
condition of the economy. It is important to note that in this chapter the effectiveness
of market solution, or the “social welfare,” only depends on whether the water or land
34
constraint binds in the economy. A recent law in California (SGMA 2014) defines the
“social optimum” as maintaining the sustainability of the basin (average extraction equals
recharge). My model is consistent with the legislation as it accounts for the difference
of groundwater depletion rate under different institutions. When a market is inefficient in
allocating resources, it leads to lower social welfare because it accelerates the depletion of
the aquifer.
I use a micro-level crop choice data published by Kern County Department of Agriculture to
test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model. The dataset includes geocoded crop
choice for each plot of farmland in Kern County from 1999 to 2016. Combining the crop
choices with water supply data that I collected from various sources allows me to estimate
the reaction of individual crop choice to changes of water supply, hence identifying whether
the water or land constraint binds in the Central Valley.
The key empirical finding is that fallowing1 is invariant to surface water supply. It does not
change with annual surface water delivery or the extent of water sales. This fundamental
invariance implies that whenever the low-value users sell more surface water to high-value
users without access to groundwater, they pump more groundwater to satisfy the water
demand of their crops. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model only
when the land constraint binds and is not consistent with its prediction when the water
constraint binds. Therefore, the surface water market in the Central Valley is not efficient
in reallocating resource, and it has a negative impact for the sustainability of the basin.
This chapter offers a telling example of the classical theory of the second best (Lipsey and
Lancaster, 1956): Without an integrated market for surface and ground water upon the
cap-and-trade practice, it would be better to postpone the implementation of a surface water
market if the groundwater basin is unregulated. This conceptual framework can extend to
any situation where a market is put in place for a private resource that is a substitute to a
1There are other reasons why farmers fallow their land. Sometimes a farmer fallows her land for a period
as part of crop rotation in order to restore fertility. This chapter concerns fallowing that results from water
scarcity. As will shown by the plot-level data, most of the fallowing in the data persists over time, implying
that the farmland is no longer actively farmed.
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CPR. For example in fisheries, a transferable quota system for certain species will cause
less efficient fishermen to sell their quota and transit to technologies that help to catch
the non-targeted species, leading to depletion of those species that remain in open access
(Squires et al., 1998). The emission trading system also has an unintended substitute effect
that exacerbates air pollution. As documented by Martin et al. (2014), firms tend to sell
their emission quota and reallocate to regions with less strict environmental restrictions
after the implementation of the European Union Emissions Trading System. This results in
worse pollution in those unregulated regions and a potential higher global leakage.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the subject.
Section 3.3 provides some necessary background on water markets in the Central Valley
of California. Section 3.4 presents the model that illustrates how a surface water market
affects the depletion of a groundwater basin. Section 3.5 presents the empirical analysis
including the tests on the model implications. The final section concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to the literature on water market by revealing the unintended
consequence of a surface water market on an open access groundwater system. Brozovic,
Carey, and D. L. Sunding (2002), Chong and D. Sunding (2006), Grafton et al. (2012) and
many others have written about the efficiency gain from a surface water market without
considering its consequences on aquifers. Srivastava, Kumar, and Singh (2009) examined
groundwater market in India, noting that it leads to depletion of groundwater tables although
it helps small and marginal farmers realize better yields. In response to the 2014 legislation,
scholars have been evaluating the cap-and-trade regime of groundwater (Nylen et al., 2017;
Bruno 20172, 20183; Duym 20184). Culp, Glennon, and G. Libecap (2014) expressed the
same concern on restricting groundwater pumping when implementing a water market.
2Ellen M. Bruno, “California’s New Groundwater Law and the Implications for Groundwater Markets.”
2017. ARE Update 20.4:1-4. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics.
3Ellen M. Bruno, “The Economic Impacts of Agricultural Groundwater Markets.” 2018. ARE Update
21.6: 9-11. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics.
4Dirk van Duym, “Water Policy and the Common Pool: Examining Crop Choice in California” 2018
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Findings in this chapter echoes Ostrom’s exploration of common property management
institutions (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, and J. Walker, 1994; Ostrom and J. Walker,
2000; Ostrom, 2002). According to Ostrom, managing a commons requires defining clear
group boundaries, which is also necessary for a market solution to work.
The two closest papers to this one are probably R. E. Howitt (1994) and Knapp, Weinberg,
et al. (2003). Those studies focused on California’s first public water market in 1990s
and reached a similar conclusion that a surface water market accelerates the decline of the
water table and the source region only benefits from the market if the groundwater basin
is depleted at an efficient rate. This early work mostly depended on county or district
level data, and calculated aggregate water demand elasticity to estimate the difference of
groundwater extraction under different regimes. My empirical analysis based onmicro level
crop choice data shows that such estimation is inaccurate as the calculation of aggregate
elasticity does not condition on other factors. Instead, I find that crop acreage is actually
not sensitive to water supply changes, and the transition of crops is mainly driven by price
and spatial influences.
Moreover, previous work generally relied on the accounting model to calculate groundwater
extraction (residual of aggregate crop demand minus surface water supply), and requires
a strict bathtub assumption for estimation of groundwater depletion rate. My work is
based on a theoretical model that lays out how an individual farmer reacts as water supply
conditions change and my empirical analysis examines the individual groundwater use
decision without relying on the accounting model and the bathtub condition, both of which
have been criticized for their inaccuracy.
3.3 Background: Water Market in the Central Valley of California
In 2012, California produced nearly $45 billion in agricultural products, or about one-tenth
of the total for the entire nation (Cooley, Gleick, and Wilkinson, 2014). The Central Valley
is the center of the state’s agricultural production. It consumes around 70% of the state’s
total water use. How institutions manage that water is critical for the state’s future. It
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also forms a valuable laboratory to understand the interaction between surface and ground
water. The marginal value of water use varies dramatically across regions with different
types of crops, as well as between agricultural and urban users. Given agriculture’s share
in total water use and frequent water shortage in the state, economists are promoting water
markets to allocate water in a more efficient manner (Murphy et al., 2000; Culp, Glennon,
and G. Libecap, 2014).
California’s first public watermarket took off in the early 1990s as an outcome of a prolonged
drought. The state’s Department of Water Resource (DWR) and the federal Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR) conducted a series of dry-year water trade programs, including the
California Drought Water Bank examined in R. E. Howitt (1994). According to that paper,
about 17% of water purchased by the Bank came from north of the state where surface
water was in excess supply, about a half came from farmers who fallowed their low-value
crops and a third came from farmers who then increased their groundwater extraction.
Despite the increased overall income and employment documented by Howitt, communities
in the source regions have raised concerns about the potential adverse effect of the water
market on local economy and groundwater aquifer (Hanak, 2005). By 2002, 22 of the
state’s 58 counties had issued ordinances that required a permit to export groundwater or
to extract groundwater used in substitution for exported surface water (Hanak, 2003). As a
result, trade in water across counties may be coming to a standstill.
The resistance to a large-scale water market by agricultural communities continues to this
day. California water authorities have still not established a statewide water exchange.
However, as the sources of most surface water supply, the state water project (SWP) and
central valley project (CVP) actually allow water transfer between their contractors. Local
surface water rights owners, for example the City of Bakersfield who owns the primary Kern
River water rights, have also been involved in transfer contracts to supply surplus water to
their neighbors. Brewer et al. (2008) and R. Howitt and Hanak (2005) report consistent
water transfers in California from 1980s to 2000s.
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Under the de facto loose control, a private water market has emerged as a natural adaptation
towater supply imbalance across agriculturalwater districts. Privatewater transfers between
agricultural districts have increased in response to the decline in surface water delivery. On
one hand, districts without groundwater demand additional irrigation water; on the other
hand, faced with high prices, districts with groundwater are now willing to sell their surface
water entitlement and turn to the alternative water source. The water sold off could be
temporary surface water delivery from SWP or CVP, or storage of water that the districts
put in the water bank during water surplus period5.
Water districts with access to groundwater sell tens of thousands of acre feet of surface
water to districts without groundwater every year and, as I will show, farmers then extract
additional groundwater to replace what they sold off. As a result, the overall farming acreage
in the Central Valley has not changed in the last twenty years despite frequent droughts and
a large drop in surface water delivery. The overall demand for irrigation water has grown
and become less flexible due to a rapid rise in permanent crop acreage. Permanent crops are
more water intensive and require irrigation every year. Not surprisingly, the groundwater
basins are in critical overdraft across the Central Valley.
In next section, I derive a theoretical framework of how a surface water market affects
the groundwater basin’s depletion and social welfare. A market can lead to higher social
welfare or not, depending on whether it successfully reallocates resource from low-value to
high-value users without speeding up the depletion of CPR system. The model is designed
to analyze agricultural water use in California Central Valley, and it is easily to be applied
to the case including both agricultural and urban users, as well as other situations where a
market is put in place for a private resource that is a perfect substitute to a common pool
resource.
5According to the board meeting memo of Berrenda Mesa Water District in November 5, 2015, its
neighboring district, Buena Vista Water Storage District (BVWSD) has offered to sell its 21,000 AF of banked
water through a co-managed water bank. Based on an interview with the engineer in BVWSD, it has also sold
surface water supply to its neighboring districts in 2014 and pumped water that year to replace the water sold
off.
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3.4 TheoreticalModel: Depletion of Groundwater Basin with SurfaceWaterMarket
The decision maker is called a “farmer.” It refers to whomever (owner-operator, tenant or
landlord) makes the key decisions. In the Valley, due to frequent drought and upstream
environmental concerns in recent decades, surface water supplies are highly uncertain.
Farmers’ residual demands for irrigation water are satisfied by pumping from the Valley’s
aquifer. The model examines how farmers choose what crops to grow and how much water
to pump based on water supply conditions and the suitability of their land to different crops.
I use the analysis to compare aggregate extraction under different institutional regimes.
Water supply
I consider a two-period, no-discounting, agricultural economy where water is the key input
in production. For simplicity, all farms are of equal size, D6, and both annual and permanent
crops require 1 unit of water. Therefore, every farmer demands D units of water to fully
irrigate her land. A farmer may use water from up to two sources: surface and ground water.
The two are perfect substitutes to each other. I assume a farmer always has unsatisfied water
demand after using up her own surface water supply.
I assume that surface water (W s) is delivered each period by an outside agency in equal
quantity to each farm7. That amount depends on the realized state s. s ∈ {H, L} where H
denotes a wet year and L denotes a dry year. The realized state in each period is i.i.d. from
a binary distribution: Pr(W s = W L) = q and Pr(W s = WH) = 1 − q. As surface water is
generally cheaper than groundwater, I normalize the cost of surface water to 0.
6The model ignores any effect of the size of farm or identity of farmer. Tests of the theory are also robust
at farm, plot or acre level despite different degrees of measurement error. Although big farms might enjoy an
advantage in capital investments or in moving water around, the organization of water districts mitigates this
advantage to a large extent. In particular surface water allocation is per acre based so that farms of various
sizes have equal rights to water. See the empirical analysis later for more evidence.
7Surface water delivery per acre actually varies across water districts as their water rights per acre differ.
As I will show in the model results, the spatial variation of surface water supply does not affect the equilibrium
outcome in the regime with a social planner or a surface water market since surface water will always be
reallocated to high-value farmers. In the autarky equilibrium, farmer with more surface water rights can plant
more permanents. Both model implications are further confirmed by the empirical tests.
40
Groundwater is pumped from the aquifer at a per unit cost cg > 08. It is a CPR, so in the
absence of regulation, everyone with access to groundwater can extract as much as they
want up to their well’s capacity (we assume that well capacity does not bind). Because of
the externalities of CPR use, extraction has a social cost as well. The social cost includes
future increased pumping lift and associated energy consumption due to a lower water table.
It also includes the cost of drilling deeper wells as groundwater may become unreachable
with current wells. There are also important environmental impacts from rapid depletion
of the aquifer like land subsidence and increased water salinity. For now, I model all these
costs in a reduced form. I assume the social cost is paid each period as a function of
that period’s aggregate extraction and is shared equally per acre. The overall extraction E
produces a social cost g(E) with g′(E) ≥ 0 and g′′(E) ≥ 0. As g(.) is a monotonic function
of E , I make no specific assumption about g(.). Instead, I use E to measure the social cost.
Farmers (and farms) can be divided into two subgroups: those who only use surface water
as Fs and those who have access to groundwater as Fg.
Crop choice
In each period, each farmer decides between an annual crop (a) and a permanent crop (p).
The permanent crop requires a one-time fixed cost co to plant, which captures the investment
needed before a harvest can be brought in9, and pays back rp ∈ (12co, co) every period. The
annual crop requires no fixed cost to grow and pays back ra each period. The permanent
crop needs to be irrigated in both periods to have a return in the second period (otherwise
the crop dies and must be replanted).
The return of annuals (ra) and the fixed cost of planting permanent crops (co) do not vary
across space or time, while the return of permanent crops differs over space. rpi reflects
the heterogeneity of land quality across farms. I relabel the agents such that rpi > r
p
j if
8Pumping depth varies across the basin, so does the pumping cost. I leave this aside because how the
individual pumping cost varies only affects the identify of the marginal groundwater user. It has no influences
on the comparison of different regimes in the model.
9It takes 7-10 years for pistachio trees to reach significant production; almonds start to bear in the third
year and reach full production after 5-6 years.
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i < j (farmer i has a farm that is more productive in permanent crops than farmer j if
i < j). I assume that there is a farmer i∗, such that for all i > i∗, the average two-period
return of permanent crops is lower than the return of annuals: rpi − 12co < ra and for all
i ≤ i∗: rpi − 12co > ra. I also assume cg < ra, therefore it is profitable for all farmers to use
groundwater10.
I denote those with index i > i∗ as group Fa since they always prefer annual to permanent
crops. For those i ≤ i∗, they belong to group Fp since they prefer permanents to annuals if
they receive enough water supply.
Recall that the farmers also differ by their access to groundwater. The land quality and
water supply conditions produce four types of farmers (by slightly abuse of the notation, F
also denote the farmland by the farmers):
1. Fsa: annual crop farmers restricted to surface water. Fsa = Fs ∩ Fa;
2. Fsp: permanent crop farmers restricted to surface water. Fsp = Fs ∩ Fp;
3. Fga: annual crop farmers with access to groundwater. Fga = Fg ∩ Fa;
4. Fgp: permanent crop farmers with access to groundwater. Fgp = Fg ∩ Fp.
There aremsa,msp,mga andmgp farmers in each group. I assume the number of groundwater
users mg = mga + mgp is large, so the classic CPR problem arises.
Surface water market
The surface water market allows agents to exchange surface water. As there is no product
differentiation, I assume the sellers are involved in Bertrand competition, and water’s
transfer price thus equals the opportunity cost for sellers. If the sellers only use surface
10A farm with land quality low enough (max{ra, rpi − 12co} < cg) can only operate in the autarky regime.
With an opportunity to trade, the farm should sell its surface water rights and exit since overall surface water
is in shortage. To keep a consistent count of farmland, my model only considers active farmland with high
enough quality that using groundwater is profitable in some situation. Adding low-quality land in my model
will increase the efficiency gain from a surface water market.
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water, the price of water equals the return of using water on their own land. If the sellers
pump groundwater, the price equals the pumping cost cg plus whatever social cost they
individually have to bear.
Timing
In each period, events unfold as follows: First, every farmer observes the realized state of
surface water supply. Each farmer then decides what to plant. For permanent crops, in
Period 1, she decides what acreage to plant and in Period 2, she determines the fraction
of existing crops to irrigate. For annual crops, she decides what acreage to plant for the
current period. Second, if there is a water market, farmers can trade for surface water.
Third, farmers may pump groundwater to irrigate her crops after using up their surface
water supply. Finally, every groundwater user pays an equal share of the social cost.
I examine three regimes in this model. In the first regime, a social planner runs all the
farmland together. He decides the overall extraction and crop choice to maximize the total
social welfare. The second regime is autarky. Each farmer has her own water supply, and
water trade is prohibited. In the third regime, I introduce a market where farmers can trade
their surface water. Groundwater remains open access in all cases.
I start with the social planner:
Social Planner
The social planner (SP) runs all farmland together. He can allocate the surface water
wherever he wants, although the groundwater can only be applied locally11. His endowment
is therefore D = mD of farmland and surface water supplyWs = mW s.
Social welfare in this model is defined as the total profit from the crops minus the cost of
11In a world where the supply of surface water is higher than the demand from regions without access to
groundwater, optimality achieves if the social planner moves water to irrigate all high-quality land. This is not
necessarily true when surface water supply is low relative to the demand of farmland without groundwater.
Some high-quality land might remain fallowed even when all surface water is supplied to no groundwater area
(efficiency will require moving some groundwater as well). The Central Valley is the former case.
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extraction. At period t, it is:
Rt = r
p
t N
p
t + r
aNat − g(Et) − cgEt (3.1)
where rpt is the average return on permanent crop land that sums up to N
p
t . In each period t,
SP chooses a portfolio (Nat , N pt ) of annual and permanent crops subject to the land constraint
Nat + N
p
t ≤ D. Because it is lower cost, SP will always use all the surface water before
pumping groundwater. Extraction of groundwater equals the residual demand for water:
Et = Nat + N
p
t −Wst .
I solve the SP’s problem backward. In Period 2, SP maximizes social welfare by choosing
Na2 and N
p
2 :
Period 2: max
Na2 ,N
p
2
R2 = r
p
2 N
p
2 + r
aNa2 − g(E2) − cgE2 (3.2)
with E2 = Na2 + N
p
2 −Ws2.
Since it does not pay to grow new permanent crops in Period 2 (rpi < c
o), Period 2’s
permanent crop is subject to a resource constraint: N p2 ≤ N p1 . Meanwhile, since permanent
crop land Fp yields higher return than annual crop land Fa, SP always irrigates the existing
permanent crops first: NP2 = N
P
1 whenever N
a
2 > 0.
SP’s crop choice problem is equivalent to an optimal extraction problem. He faces two sets
of constraints when choosing how much groundwater to extract. Extraction has an upper
bound from the land constraint:
Land Constraint: E2 ≤ Ds = D −Ws2 (3.3)
There is also a water constraint that SP will not pump at a higher cost than the return to
groundwater. Depending on the marginal use of water, it needs to either satisfy a water
constraint (3.4) or equalize marginal cost and marginal return (3.5):
cg + g′(E2) ≤ ra when Na2 > 0 (3.4)
or cg + g′(E2) = rp2 > ra when Na2 = 0 (3.5)
Three cases arise in Period 2:
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1. If surface water satisfies the demand from permanent crops, SP will pump to irrigate
annuals.
2. If surface water is not enough for all permanents but cg is low enough that it pays to
plant annuals with groundwater, SP will irrigate all permanents first and then apply
groundwater on the annuals.
3. If surface water is not enough for all permanents and cg is large enough that it does
not pay to plant annuals with groundwater, SP will irrigate permanent crops with
groundwater until the marginal cost equals the marginal return.
For the first two cases, the marginal crop is annuals. The water constraint (3.4) matters
so that the marginal cost of using groundwater is equal to or below the marginal return of
annuals. For the third case, the marginal crop is permanents. Constraint (3.5) matters: the
marginal cost of using groundwater equals the marginal return on farmland i after all land
with quality higher than i is irrigated.
The model also has implications for the SP’s decisions given that surface water supply
varies. Indeed if groundwater is cheap SP grows annuals in both wet and dry years. But
if groundwater is expensive to pump SP may decide to grow annuals only in wet years or
even to never grow annuals. As we will see in the empirical section, in the Central Valley,
substantial vegetables and field crops are harvested every year. That implies that annuals
are always the marginal crop, and henceforth I focus on that case.
When annual crops are at the margin (Na2 > 0), either the land (equation 3.3) or water
constraint (equation 3.4) binds in equilibrium. When groundwater is cheap, the land
constraint binds. In other words, the social planner farms all land because the basin’s
sustainability is not a concern. In a water deficit state like California, fallowing is observed
constantly in the Valley. Therefore, I consider the solution with a binding water constraint
and leave the land constraint case to further discussion.
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In Period 2, as the water constraint always binds, groundwater extraction is the same in dry
and wet years: E2 = g′−1(ra − cg). All permanent crops are irrigated, and therefore the size
of permanent crops remains unchanged: N p2 = N
p
1 . Any residual water goes to annuals:
Na2 = W
s
2 + E2 − N p2 . For a given acreage of farmland, marginal cost of pumping is higher
in dry years than wet years because of lower surface water supply. As a result, some annual
crop land that is actively farmed in wet years will turn to fallowing in dry years.
In Period 1, SP expects to irrigate all permanent crops in Period 2. He chooses N p1 and N
p
2
to maximize the expected two-period sum of social welfare:
Period 1: max
Na1 ,N
p
1
R1 + E(R2) = (2rp1 − co)N p1 + ra(Na1 + E(Na2 )) − 2g(E) − 2cgE (3.6)
Given that all permanent crops will be irrigated in Period 2, SP grows permanents on all
Fp land since the average return is higher than annuals (rp1 − 12co > ra): N p1 = mgD. Water
constraint always binds so pumping is constant: E = E1 = E2 = g′−1(ra − cg). Residual
water after satisfying demand of permanents goes to annual crops: Na1 = W
s
1 + E − N p1 .
Only annual crop land is fallowed in either period. Since permanent crops are more valuable
than annual crops, the social planner reallocates some surfacewater from Fa to Fsp to ensure
irrigation of the high-value crops. Fsa land is fallowed, some of the Fga land is also fallowed
because the marginal cost of pumping has already reached the marginal return of annual
crops (water constraint binds).
In summary, the overall extraction, crop acreage and social welfare in the social planner’s
case are:
ESP = g′−1(ra − cg) (3.7)
N p,SPt = m
pD (3.8)
Na,SPt = W
s
t + E
SP − N pt (3.9)
RSPt =
∑
i∈Fp
rpi D + r
aNa,SPt − coN p,SPt 1{t = 1} − g(ESP) − cgESP (3.10)
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Autarky
Under autarky, farmers choose a crop depending on their water supply and land quality.
Therefore, I characterize the strategy of the four types of farmers separately.
Surface water only annual crop farmer: Fsa
Fsa only uses surface water and prefers annual crops. For annuals, the farmer’s decision is
independent in each period. As the return of the annual crop is positive, Fsa grows annual
crops up to her surface water supply each period:
For farmer i ∈ Fsa : np,Ati = 0; na,Ati = W st (3.11)
Surface water only permanent crop farmer: Fsp
Fsp prefers permanent crops over annuals if there is enough water to secure the second
period irrigation. Since she has no access to groundwater and the surface water supply
varies over time, the farmer has to choose a portfolio of crops that deals with the supply
risk of irrigation water.
There is a risk-free acreage of permanent crops,W L , that the farmer can always irrigate. If
W s1 = W
L , she can plant at mostW L permanents, and there is no irrigationwater risk because
W s2 ≥ W L . If W s1 = WH , she chooses the amount of permanents crops np1i ∈ [W L,WH] to
maximize her expected two-period payoff:
max
np1i
np1i(rpi − co) + (WH − np1i)ra + qW Lrpi + (1 − q)[np1irpi + (WH − np1i)ra] (3.12)
Note that, the maximal amount of permanent crops the farmer can irrigate in Period 2 when
the state is low isW L .
The problem takes one of the two corner solutions:
np1i = W
H if (2 − q)(rpi − ra) − co > 0 (3.13)
np1i = W
L if (2 − q)(rpi − ra) − co < 0 (3.14)
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When the chance of low water supply, q, is large enough: q > 2− co
rpi −ra
, the expected future
return is so low that the farmer prefers the risk-free solution np1i = W
L . When q < 2− co
rpi −ra
,
the expected future return is large enough that she is willing to bear the risk np1i = W
H .
It is reasonable to assume q > 2 − co
rp1 −ra
in this model – at least for California, where
droughts hit frequently. More generally, if we consider the second period as a longer
horizon representing the lifetime of a real permanent crop, it is likely that q has a high
value. As a result, every permanent crop farmer isp chooses to grow W L acreage of
permanents in Period 1, and uses extra water to grow annuals whenever it is available:
For farmer i ∈ Fsp : np,Ati = W L; na,Ati = W st −W L (3.15)
Groundwater users: Fga and Fgp
Groundwater users are considered together since they affect each other through the negative
externality of extraction. As the cost of pumping cg is uniform for all pumpers and every
groundwater user takes the same fraction 1mg of the social cost, the marginal cost of using
groundwater is the same across all agents. In equilibrium, the aggregate extraction E At in
period t is where the lowest marginal return of the pumpers equals the marginal cost of
using groundwater at that level.
The farmer’s extraction decision depends on the social cost. Three cases arise:
If the social cost shared by each farmer is negligible: 1mg g
′(mg(D −W s)) < ra − cg, every
groundwater user pumps. The land constraint binds for all groundwater users, and the
equilibrium outcome in the economy is that:
For farmer i ∈ Fgp: npti = D; nati = 0; eti = D −W st (3.16)
For farmer i ∈ Fga: npti = 0; nati = D; eti = D −W st (3.17)
If the social cost taken by each individual is moderate: 1mg g
′(mgp(D −W L)) < ra − cg <
1
mg g
′(mg(D −W s)), it is profitable for all permanent crop farmers to use groundwater but
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only a fraction of annual crop farmers find it worth pumping. The water constraint binds.
The marginal groundwater user is always an annual crop farmer, therefore the equilibrium
aggregate extraction in the economy is constant: E A = g′(mg(ra − cg)). Permanent crop
farmers Fgp pump to irrigate all their land and annual crop farmers Fga pump extra water
as well. Without loss of generality, I assume smaller i pumps first if several agents have
the same marginal return12. Then there are two marginal annual crop farmers iL and iH
that cg + 1mg g
′(∑i∈Fg,i≤iL (D −W L)) = ra and cg + 1mg g′(∑i∈Fg,i≤iH (D −WH)) = ra, who
correspond to the highest i who pumps in dry and wet years respectively. The equilibrium
outcome of the economy is that:
For farmer i ∈ Fgp: npti = D; nati = 0; eti = D −W st (3.18)
For farmer i ∈ Fga npti = 0 and for (3.19)
i ≤ iL : nati = D; eti = D −W st (3.20)
iL < i ≤ iH :

nati = D; eti = D −WHt if W st = WHt
nati = W
s
t ; eti = 0 if W st = W Lt
(3.21)
i > iH : nati = W
s
t ; eti = 0 (3.22)
In this case, the marginal groundwater user farms annual crops. But which farmer is
marginal changes due to the variation in surface water supply. Given the acreage to irrigate,
the marginal cost of using groundwater is lower in wet years than dry years thanks to more
surface water supply. Therefore, more annual crop farmers can use groundwater in wet
years: iH > iL and less need to fallow their land.
If the social cost is sufficiently large: 1mg g
′(mgp(D −W L)) > ra − cg, only permanent crop
farmers use groundwater. Similar to when the marginal pumper is an annual crop farmer,
there will be a marginal groundwater user who always grow permanents on all her land,
12Since annual crop farmers are assumed to have the same marginal return, it could also be the situation
that they all use some groundwater and fallow a fraction of crops. How groundwater extraction is allocated
among the annual crop farmers does not affect the outcome of the model as we only care about the aggregate
volume.
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and farmers with lower quality land fallow part of their land just like the surface water only
farmers. I will discuss this case in detail when introducing the surface water market.
I mainly consider the first two cases when the marginal groundwater user is an annual crop
farmer because, for the last half century at least, a large fraction of annual crops in the
Central Valley are irrigated using groundwater.
The extent of fallowing in the autarky case depends on each farmer’s water supply condition.
For Fs, D−WH acres of land are never used due to lack of water. They growWH−W L more
acres of annuals in wet years and fallow that land in dry years. Fgp farmers never fallow
because the permanent crops make pumping worthwhile. If the social cost is negligible,
Fga farmers do not fallow since the pumping cost cg is smaller than the return of annuals
ra. When the social cost is large enough, some Fga farmers find using groundwater too
expensive. They only use surface water to irrigate their crops and fallow their surplus land
as the surface water only farmers.
When the social cost is negligible (land constraint binds), the overall extraction, crop acreage
and social welfare in the economy are:
E At = m
g(D −W st ) (3.23)
N p,At = m
spW L + mgpD (3.24)
Na,At = m
saW st + m
sp(W st −W L) + mgaD (3.25)
RAt =
∑
i∈Fsp
rpi W
L +
∑
i∈Fgp
rpi D − coN p,At 1{t = 1} + raNa,At − g(E At ) − cgE At (3.26)
When the marginal groundwater user is always an annual crop farmer (water constraint
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binds), the overall extraction, crop acreage and social welfare in the economy are:
E A = g′−1(mg(ra − cg)) (3.27)
N p,At = m
spW L + mgpD (3.28)
Na,At = m
aW st + m
sp(W st −W L) + E A − mgp(D −W st ) (3.29)
RAt =
∑
i∈Fsp
rpi W
L +
∑
i∈Fgp
rpi D − coN p,At 1{t = 1} + raNa,At − g(E A) − cgE A(3.30)
We now compare the autarky and the social planner’s outcomes to see where the inefficiency
comes from.
Autarky vs. Social planner
The social optimal extraction is13 ESP = g′−1(ra − cg). Most farmers in the Central
Valley have access to groundwater, so the overall extraction under autarky exceeds the
social optimum (E A > ESP) when either the land or water constraint binds14. Under both
situations, all permanent crop farmers with access to groundwater Fgp will pump and fully
irrigate their land and annual crop farmers Fga pump the extra water until the corresponding
constraint binds.
The acreage of permanents under autarky is N p,At = mspW L + mgpD, which is smaller
than the social planner’s case: N p,SPt = mpD. On the other hand, the acreage of annuals
is larger than in the social planner’s case since the overall water use is higher: Na,At =
E A +W st − N p,At > ESP +W st − N p,SPt = Na,SPt .
The overall crop choice and groundwater extraction under autarky both deviate from the
social optimum. Autarky’s inefficiency has two sources. One is the CPR problem: ground-
13Recall section 4.1. This is the outcome when the water constraint binds in the social planner’s case.
If the social planner’s land constraint binds, the socially optimal extraction will be larger than groundwater
demanded by all groundwater users in the autarky regime: ESP > mg(D −W s) = EA. Thus, sustainability
of the basin is not a concern and inefficiency of the autarky regime comes from the rigidity to move water
around.
14When the water constraint binds, the overall extraction under autarky satisfies: cg + 1mg g
′(EA) = ra.
The overall extraction with the social planner satisfies: cg + g′(ESP) = ra. Since g′′(.) > 0 and mg  1, we
have EA > ESP . As for the case when land constraint binds, it is possible that ESP > EA if the social cost is
low and the size of land without access to groundwater is large. Neither is true in the Central Valley.
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water users only bear a fraction of social cost, leading to a higher level of extraction than
the social optimum. The other comes from the resource misallocation in the economy:
some farmers with low productivity ra are able to produce using surface water, while some
farmers with high productivity rpi > r
a can not fully utilize their land because they have no
access to groundwater. I calculate the inefficiency of autarky in this case:
RSP − RA = g(E A) − g(ESP) − (E A − ESP)(ra − cg) +∑
i∈Fs∩Fp
(D −W L)(rpi − ra) (3.31)
The first line in the RHS measures the distortion from the common pool (the increased
social cost minus the return of using the extra water to grow annuals). The second line in
the RHS measures the distortion from resource misallocation, which is the gain that would
arise if water in the annual crop land was used to grow more permanents. Next, I introduce
a surface market in the autarky model and examine how it affects social welfare.
A market in surface water
With the market, farmers can trade in surface water. The opportunity cost of selling one’s
surface water allocation is the return from farmland or the cost of pumping groundwater.
The market’s efficiency depends on the identity of marginal groundwater user.
If the marginal groundwater user is a permanent crop farmer, annual crop farmers do not
pump and are willing to sell their surface water. Indeed, permanent crop farmers are willing
to pay more than the return of annuals: pw > ra. Moreover, permanent crop farmers with
lower return than the marginal farmer will also sell their surface water, since their marginal
return from water is lower than the marginal cost of using groundwater. Permanent crop
farmers with high value are potential buyers of the surface water. In equilibrium, the
price for surface water equals to the marginal cost of using groundwater, and the marginal
permanent crop farmer’s return is such that: rpi = c
g + 1mg g
′(iD −W s).
In this case, the water market leads to less groundwater extraction than autarky. Under
autarky Fgp farmers can only use their own surface water and must pump groundwater,
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while with a market they buy the cheaper surface water and pump less. When the cost of
using groundwater is high enough, the surface water market is both efficient and preserves
sustainability of the common-pool system. Unfortunately, it does not seem this case has
ever held in California. Instead, the Central Valley suggests that the marginal groundwater
user is always an annual crop farmer.
Water constraint binds
If the water constraint binds, the opportunity cost of using groundwater equals the return
to planting annuals (ra). At a price of ra, Fsp farmers will use the market to make up for
any deficiency in surface water. The sellers are all annual crop farmers (both Fsa and Fga).
Because the water constraint binds, the cost of pumping water is higher than ra, thus annual
crop farmers will not pump groundwater to replace surface water they sell. Instead they
will fallow.
In equilibrium, extraction EM remains the same as under autarky. Buyers of water now
have a secured water supply, so they will grow permanents on all their land. The overall
extraction and crop acreage in the economy are:
EM = g′−1(mg(ra − cg)) (3.32)
N p,Mt = m
pD (3.33)
Na,Mt = mW
s
t + E
M − mpD (3.34)
I calculate the welfare gain with surface water market at Period 2 (Period 1 is similar except
for an extra term of the fixed cost in planting permanent crops):
RM − RA =
∑
i∈Fsp
(D −W L)(rpi − ra) > 0 (3.35)
As a result, the surface water market improves social welfare since it reallocates water from
low to high value users. If I compare the market with the social planner’s case, the acreage
of permanent crops is the same but more groundwater is used on annual crop land. In
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this case, the market solves the reallocation problem, but it does nothing to attack the CPR
problem if it arises under autarky.
The size of fallowing in the economy changes with surface water delivery in this case:
N f ,Mt = mD − mW st − EM (3.36)
Permanent crop farmers purchase surface water to irrigate their crops; therefore, the size of
permanent crop land is not sensitive to the realized surface water supply. However, annual
crop farmers who sell water to the permanent crop farmers fallow more land in dry years
since they receive less surface water supply and sell more water.
Land constraint binds
If the land constraint binds under autarky, the marginal cost of using groundwater water is
cg + 1mg g
′(E A) < ra. The cost of pumping is less than the opportunity cost of surface water
users who plant annual crops. Fg farmers who sell their surface water, pump extra water
to replace it. Without loss of generality, I assume the land constraint still binds after the
water trade. Therefore, water is only sold out by groundwater users, and the price out of a
Bertrand competition is below ra.
Farmerswithout groundwater have an opportunity cost equal to or above ra and are unwilling
to sell at the prevailing price. In fact, all surface-water-only farmers are potential buyers of
water. Since water price pw < ra, Fsp farmers purchase water to secure irrigation of their
permanent crops, and Fsa farmers purchase water to grow annuals.
The surface water market leads to higher extraction, since more farmland will receive
irrigation. The overall extraction and crop acreage in the economy are:
EMt = m(D −W st ) (3.37)
N p,Mt = m
pD (3.38)
Na,Mt = m
aD (3.39)
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Without loss of generality, I calculate the welfare change with surface water market at Period
2 when a drought hits:
RM − RA = g(E A) − g(EM) +
∑
i∈Fsp
(D −W L)(rpi − cg) +
∑
i∈Fsa
(D −W L)(ra − cg) (3.40)
Although the surface water market does induce trade from low-cost pumpers to high-value
users, the efficiency gain from water reallocation is not realized since the sellers just pump
more groundwater. If the increased social cost with a surface water market |g(E A)−g(EM)|
is larger than the return of extra crops grown by the surface-water-only farmers (the last
two terms in Equation (3.40)), the distortion from CPR problem dominates, and the market
produces an outcome worse than autarky.
By assumption, themarginal social cost of extraction is higher than the net return of annuals:
g′(EM) > g′(E A) > g′(ESP) = ra − cg. Unless the return to permanent crops is so high that
irrigating more permanent crops using groundwater is socially beneficial, Equation (4.18)
will be negative since the increased social cost is more than the value of the extra acreage
of permanents. In this case, although the surface water market has solved the resource
misallocation problem (as all Fp land is irrigated), it exaggerates the CPR problem by
inducing a lager extraction than the autarky case.
No fallowing occurs in this case:
N f ,Mt = 0 (3.41)
In summary, when the marginal groundwater user is an annual crop farmer, the efficiency
of surface water market depends on the condition of the groundwater basin and the severity
of the CPR problem15. If the social cost of extraction borne by individual pumper is large
15Note that discussion in this section is based on the assumption that land constraint does not bind in the
social planner’s case. If the land constraint binds, there is no CPR problem. Overall extraction from the basin
is below the social optimum even when all land is farmed. Extraction under autarky is at an inefficient level
since some farmers have no access to groundwater and have to fallow part of their land, while surface water
market will lead to the same level of efficiency as the social planner since it grants all farmland irrigation
water through surface water reallocation.
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enough, overall extraction from the basin is limited by the marginal return of annuals.
Introducing a surface water market will not result in more extraction but only reallocate
water efficiently. However, if the social cost borne by each farmer is small, the surface water
market lets Fs farmers irrigate their crops using groundwater through the nominal surface
water trade, leading to a higher level of extraction from the aquifer.
Hypotheses
The theoretical model generates two sets of hypotheses. One set summarizes how crop
choices react to water supply changes. The other set describes how the underlying condi-
tion of the economy and the effectiveness of surface water market affect fallowing decisions.
Hypothesis 3.1 In area with frequent drought, the size of permanent crops does not respond
to changes in surface water delivery.
Hypothesis 3.2 In surface-water-only districts, without surface water trade, the size of
annual crops increases with surface water delivery.
Whether the water or land constriant binds in the economy has different implications on the
efficacy of water market. Although I lack direct observation on the cost and payoff structure
of each farmer, and cannot directly decide which constraint binds, the model makes different
predictions at the fallow decisions of water sellers under the two situations:
Hypothesis 3.3 If the surface water market is efficient, annual crop farmers fallow less
land when surface water supply is high.
Hypothesis 3.4 If the surface water market is inefficient, fallow acreage is not correlated
with surface water supply.
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3.5 Empirical Analysis
To test the hypotheses, I focus on Kern County in the Central Valley because its Department
of Agriculture has published crop choice data for each plot of farmland since 1997. I match
the crop data to local water supply conditions.
In Kern County, surface irrigation water is supplied by 21 water districts who hold contracts
for delivery of surface water from the State Water Project (SWP), Central Valley Project
(CVP) and Kern River. Some water districts also drill wells and deliver groundwater to
their clients together with surface water. Most districts charge a uniform basic price for the
water they deliver. The on-site price may include a varying surcharge based on the distance
between the water user and the water delivery facilities.
There are also some farms in the county that do not belong to any water districts and rely on
private wells for irrigation. Within the water districts, many farmers have also drilled private
wells and pump groundwater to supplement what they receive from the district. Because
private wells are not metered, the actual water used by individual farmers is unknown. In
most water districts, every acre has an equal and proportional right to surface water, so I
assume each acre receives the total district water supply divided by acres farmed.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for each water district over the period 1999-2016.
There are four districts without access to groundwater (henceforth referred as surface-water-
only–SWO–districts). They cover 13% of the farmland in Kern County. The SWO districts
use 22% of all surface water delivered to the county, implying that they hold more long-
term surface water rights than the water districts with groundwater (henceforth referred as
groundwater–G–districts). Nevertheless, surface water supply for these four districts only
accounts for 60% of their total water demand, and they also purchase short-term water
delivery from other agencies.
These SWO districts choose different crops than the rest of the valley. They grow 19% of
the permanents in the whole county but only 6% of the annuals. They fallow more farmland
(26%) than G districts (18%). The large fraction of fallowing in SWO districts reflects
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Water District Farmland Annuals Permanents Fallowing Water Demand Surface Water
Delivery
Without access to groundwater
Belridge Water Storage District 52,110 12,003 32,111 7,997 132,761 74,187
Berrenda Mesa Water District 37,720 6,427 23,814 7,478 92,274 56,537
Lost Hills Water District 62,664 11,859 28,059 22,747 119,436 72,723
Tejon - Castac Water District 2,005 - 10 1,995 33 1,926
Total 154,500 30,289 83,994 40,217 344,504 205,374
With access to groundwater
Arvin - Edison Water Storage District 157,854 78,472 49,463 29,919 354,461 86,879
Buena Vista Water Storage District 48,351 37,377 5,313 5,661 110,444 13,005
Cawelo Water District 42,158 1,911 35,809 4,439 119,365 23,323
Delano - Earlimart Irrigation District 8,191 150 7,358 683 23,921 112,141
Henry Miller Water District 39,668 19,233 158 20,276 48,590 21,675
Kern - Tulare Water District 15,484 1,551 11,064 2,869 39,282 43,697
Kern County Water Agency 7,123 4,149 16 2,957 10,425 24,752
Kern Delta Water District 160,409 115,395 10,444 34,570 321,908 15,671
North Kern Water Storage District 75,596 20,313 46,984 8,300 201,129 7,854
Rag Gulch Water District 450 5 124 321 409 4,138
Rosedale - Rio Bravo Water Storage District 40,102 24,090 11,048 4,964 95,578 27,411
Semitropic Water Service District 160,289 86,825 55,509 17,956 394,689 95,916
Shafter - Wasco Irrigation District 35,519 13,071 19,754 2,694 95,890 47,993
Southern San Joaquin Municipal Utility District 50,968 8,359 39,727 2,882 148,024 87,719
Tehachapi - Cummings County Water District 17,292 7,268 317 9,707 19,184 2,625
West Kern Water District 4,114 1,541 829 1,743 6,508 3,969
Wheeler Ridge - Maricopa Water Storage District 128,970 44,158 57,724 27,089 295,111 120,333
Unserved area 65,576 38,634 10,195 16,747 129,209 -
Total 1,058,115 502,502 361,835 193,778 2,414,127 739,100
Summary statistics for the Kern County water districts, averaged over the period 1999-2016. The crop data is from Kern County
Spatial Data. The water supply data is from SWP and CVP websites. The units on land are acres and the units on water are acre-feets.
Table 3.1: Water District Summary Statistics
water scarcity due to lack of groundwater access. Surprisingly, those districts are devoting
a larger fraction of farmland to permanent crops than the G districts. For farmers in SWO
areas, surface water imports are thus essential.
In Table 3.2, I report the history of crop change by water district type and surface water
delivery. The major crop in Kern County has moved from annuals to permanents over the
sample period. Surface water delivery for all the water districts has been very variable,
which is not surprising given that California has multi-year wet-dry cycles. Moreover, there
is a general declining trend due to delivery reductions associated with increasingly stringent
environmental regulations.
In G districts, acreage of annuals has dropped by 20%. Fallowed acres have also fallen
despite the reduction in surface water supply. Permanent crop acreage has grown rapidly,
driving up total agricultural water demand. The water demand unsatisfied by surface water
58
Surface water only districts
Year Fallowing Annuals Permanents Annual Crop Wa-
ter Demand
Permanent Crop
Water Demand
Total Water de-
mand
Surface Water
Delivery
1999 6,406 80,973 61,889 202,433 198,044 400,477 333,218
2000 8,233 73,892 67,143 184,731 214,857 399,588 302,846
2001 9,650 70,991 68,627 177,476 219,607 397,084 131,233
2002 35,457 48,135 65,676 120,336 210,164 330,500 235,547
2003 30,498 51,830 66,940 129,576 214,207 343,783 302,846
2004 48,016 30,478 70,774 76,194 226,478 302,673 218,722
2005 42,263 21,682 85,323 54,205 273,035 327,240 302,846
2006 27,101 31,118 91,049 77,796 291,356 369,152 336,496
2007 28,230 24,305 96,732 60,763 309,543 370,306 201,898
2008 35,654 21,126 92,488 52,815 295,960 348,775 117,774
2009 49,169 10,108 89,991 25,270 287,971 313,241 134,598
2010 42,795 14,236 92,237 35,590 295,159 330,749 168,248
2011 42,146 18,320 88,802 45,799 284,167 329,966 269,197
2012 40,813 15,143 93,311 37,858 298,596 336,454 218,722
2013 40,686 11,414 97,168 28,535 310,937 339,471 117,774
2014 52,043 5,832 91,393 14,581 292,457 307,037 33,650
2015 49,705 3,309 96,254 8,272 308,014 316,286 67,299
2016 40,874 12,303 96,091 30,757 307,492 338,249 201,898
Groundwater districts
Year Fallowing Annuals Permanents Annual Crop Wa-
ter Demand
Permanent Crop
Water Demand
Total Water de-
mand
Surface Water
Delivery
1999 172,047 499,624 276,477 1,249,061 884,727 2,133,788 1,003,912
2000 153,961 501,006 293,182 1,252,515 938,182 2,190,696 1,017,148
2001 174,219 491,289 282,641 1,228,223 904,450 2,132,673 534,894
2002 170,124 493,556 284,469 1,233,890 910,300 2,144,190 780,341
2003 166,716 497,259 284,173 1,243,148 909,353 2,152,501 949,094
2004 176,226 481,332 290,591 1,203,330 929,890 2,133,220 713,229
2005 146,709 486,356 315,084 1,215,890 1,008,268 2,224,158 1,222,790
2006 147,277 460,955 339,917 1,152,387 1,087,733 2,240,120 1,144,164
2007 133,756 466,100 348,293 1,165,250 1,114,538 2,279,787 612,675
2008 106,552 480,579 361,017 1,201,447 1,155,256 2,356,702 569,138
2009 138,345 447,867 361,937 1,119,668 1,158,198 2,277,865 664,697
2010 138,605 441,759 367,784 1,104,398 1,176,909 2,281,307 909,563
2011 124,680 441,784 381,685 1,104,460 1,221,391 2,325,852 1,086,108
2012 89,078 466,651 392,420 1,166,628 1,255,743 2,422,370 640,610
2013 93,508 440,957 413,684 1,102,392 1,323,788 2,426,180 456,750
2014 100,090 424,746 423,313 1,061,865 1,354,600 2,416,465 157,180
2015 76,999 423,879 447,270 1,059,698 1,431,265 2,490,964 155,595
2016 79,541 403,886 464,721 1,009,715 1,487,107 2,496,822 656,949
The units on land are acres and the units on water are acre-feets.
Table 3.2: History of Crop Change
is met by groundwater extraction. As a result, the changing crop pattern is accelerating the
basin’s depletion.
In SWO districts, the acreage of annual crops has dropped dramatically (85%). Half of the
decline goes to fallowing and half of the land transits to permanent crops. Depletion of the
basin has also increased because of SWO districts’ increasing demand for water import. It
peaked at 2014 when nearly 90% of irrigation water had to be imported from outside the
districts. In 2016, SWO districts still purchased about 130,000 acre-feed of extra water.
59
That accounts for 40% of water consumption within those districts.
The theoretical model predicts that the water transferred from G districts to SWO districts
has two possible implications: (1) more fallowing or (2) more groundwater pumping. That
overall the number of fallowed acres does not increase over time rules out the first possibility.
Moreover, the change of relative product price that favors permanent crops seems to push
against fallowing land and instead toward pumping groundwater. To confirm the aggregate
crop pattern, we examine the farmland transition matrix using plot-level crop choice data.
These data help clarify how much of the transition is caused by water sales and how much
is due to a price effect that favors permanents.
Crop transition at plot level
To start, we must construct a plot-crop data set from the Kern County Spatial Database. In
practice plots vary in shape over time, making it difficult to track the evolution of crops.
Instead of plots, I study the observed crop at 12102 fixed points on the map over time. Doing
so creates a spatially consistent data set where each dot stands for a square of 61.8 acres.
The number of dots with active farming information is similar to the number of registered
plots in the original data.
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of the reconstructed dot-level crop choice data. On
average, 35% of dots are used for annual crops, 39% are used for permanents and 26% are
fallowed. The number is close to the acreage data in Table 1 although the size of annuals is
reported larger in acreage because there might be multiple harvest of annual crops within a
year. In addition, the dot-level data picks up more fallowed land due to the ability to track
changes in consistent locations while in the acreage data sometimes the fallowed land is
not reported. The trends of declining annuals and rising permanents persist at the dot level.
While for fallowing, the dot data shows that it stabilized at around 28% after 2003 both in
SWO and G districts. This implies that neither the water market nor the price effect plays
an important role on fallowing in the recent decade, and crop transition mainly happened
between annual and permanent crops.
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Annuals Permanents Fallowing Fallowing (SWO) Fallowing (G)
Aggregate:
12102 35% 39% 26% 32% 25%
By year:
1999 49% 32% 19% 2% 17%
2000 47% 33% 20% 3% 17%
2001 46% 33% 20% 2% 18%
2002 43% 32% 25% 4% 21%
2003 43% 31% 26% 5% 21%
2004 39% 32% 29% 6% 23%
2005 37% 35% 28% 6% 22%
2006 35% 38% 27% 4% 22%
2007 33% 40% 27% 5% 23%
2008 32% 41% 27% 5% 23%
2009 30% 41% 29% 6% 23%
2010 31% 41% 28% 5% 22%
2011 30% 42% 28% 5% 23%
2012 29% 44% 27% 5% 22%
2013 27% 46% 27% 5% 22%
2014 25% 47% 28% 6% 22%
2015 24% 48% 29% 6% 22%
2016 23% 49% 28% 6% 22%
Table 3.3: Plot Level Summary Statistics
SWO and G districts have different dynamics. As shown by Table 3.4, in SWO districts,
fallowing increases by 150%, compared with a 30% increase in G districts. Fallowing
mainly comes from a reduction in annual crops. In SWO districts, only 7% of annuals in
1999 remain annual crop in 2016 and more than half are fallowed. While in G districts,
over 50% of annuals remain and only a quarter are fallowed. The large fraction of fallowing
in SWO districts confirms that they are water scarce.
Despite that scarcity, the number of dots with permanent crops in SWO districts grows over
time. Permanent crops’ share increases from 40% in 1999 to more than 50% in 2016, even
larger than the fraction in G districts. This is due to a substantial fraction of annual acreage
transitioning to permanents.
61
Panel A: All districts
crop choice in 1999
annual permanent fallow
Total 5,916 3,871 2,315
crop choice in 2016
annual 2,777 2,095 192 490
permanent 5,968 2,123 3,213 632
fallow 3,357 1,698 466 1,193
Panel B: Districts without groundwater
crop choice in 1999
annual permanent fallow
Total 829 711 267
crop choice in 2016
annual 116 60 15 41
permanent 1,014 331 607 76
fallow 677 438 89 150
Panel C: Districts with groundwater
crop choice in 1999
annual permanent fallow
Total 5,087 3,160 2,048
crop choice in 2016
annual 2,661 2,035 177 449
permanent 4,954 1,792 2,606 556
fallow 2,680 1,260 377 1,043
Table 3.4: Crop Transition Matrix
The big increase in permanent crops is consistent with a transition from autarky equilibrium
to market equilibrium in the model due to the introduction of private water trade. Under
autarky, SWO farmers could not expand permanents acreage in wet years since they would
not have enough water in the next drought. Instead, they grew some annuals and fallowed
annual crop land in dry years to water their permanent crops16. When it became feasible to
buy surface water, SWO farmers expanded their permanent acreage. The decline of annual
16In fact, Berrenda Mesa Water District has water allocation rule that permanent crop land is served first
whenever there is shortage in water supply.
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acreage is also predicted by the model.
Empirical methods
The crop transition at dot level show that the water market influenced crop choice in those
water districts without groundwater. Permanent crop acreage increased as a result of water
trade, which is consistent with the model prediction that water market reallocates surface
water from groundwater users to high-value users who have no access to groundwater. At
the same time, efficiency of water market is challenged by the fact that fallowing does not
rise in SWO districts as an outcome of water transfer from SWO to G districts. To confirm
those implications, I estimate crop choice at the plot level.
According to the hypotheses (3.3 and 3.4) developed in Section 4.4, the main outcome of
interest is how much annual crops are fallowed. Since annual crops are the marginal crops
that may be sensitive to water supply variations, I infer the underlying state of the economy
from the impact of water supply changes on the farmers’ fallowing decision. I also test the
impact of surface water supply to permanent crops (Hypothesis 1) and to annual crops in
surface water only districts (Hypothesis 2) to check the model predictions on permanent
crops and crop pattern in autarky equilibrium. The outcome variables could be a binary
choice such as whether a certain type of crop is planted on a certain plot or not, or a
continuous measure such as the fraction of a certain type of crop within a certain area.
Water supply is the main influence on crop choice as discussed in the model. Three
different variables are used to measure variation in water supply across space and time.
SWP allocation is a percentage of the full entitlement of SWP water the water district
receives in a given year. It is the main explanatory variable of interest as it measures the
change of surface water supply for the same land over time. It is highly correlated with a
drought index [see Chapter 2]. Surface water rights is the ratio of long-term surface water
supply over total crop water demand. It captures the spatial variation between different
water districts due to their different endowment of surface water. Groundwater access
captures the difference between surface water only and groundwater districts. It varies over
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space, but not time.
Additional control variables include:
Land quality: I acquire a cropland suitability index (CSI) for vegetables (CSI Potato)
and field crops (CSI wheat) from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations. I do not include FAO’s land suitability index for permanent crops because it does
not vary across the region examined.
Relative crop price: I compute the price ratio of permanent to field crops each year.
A common view on the cause of transition from annual to permanent crops is that price
changes favor permanent crops. Figure 3.1 shows that it is not always the case. In fact, the
price of vegetables has been rising even faster than the price of permanent crops, reflecting
the increase in labor cost because vegetables are much more labor-intensive than the tree
crops. Nevertheless, as the acreage of vegetables is relatively stable and the transition
mainly happens from field crops to permanent crops, I use the relative price of permanent
to field crops to control the price effect on crop decisions.
Figure 3.1: Change of Normalized Price of Different Types of Crops over Time
Agriculture capacity: Local density of agriculture matters as it affects the local investment
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of infrastructure or knowledge spillover. I measure the local agriculture capacity as the
number of dots that are actively farmed within one mile circle of the observation point.
Lagged crop choice: The lagged crop choicemeasures the influence of crop decision in the
past. Serial correlation arises for different reasons. For permanent crops, it is mainly due to
the fixed cost on planting trees. For annuals, it could be the special knowledge the farmers
gained before growing the crop, or special tools they purchased, or some unobserved factors
of the land that make growing a certain type of crops more profitable.
Network influence: The network influencemeasures how a farmer’s crop choice is affected
by the decisions of her neighbors. For each observation point, network influence is calcu-
lated as the density of the same type of crops within its one mile circle (number of dots
with the same type of crops divided by total number of dots). I use the lagged value of the
density to avoid simultaneous influences between farmers’ crop decisions.
In spatial analysis, individual observations usually correlate with each other based on their
geological closeness. Beyond the network influence, which is a special form of spatial
interdependence, spatial econometricians have developed econometric models dealing with
the issue of spatial autocorrelation between control variables or error terms. I take one of
the model that is appropriate to the water market context and the spatial autocorrelation in
my data.
Evidence of spatial autocorrelation
To evaluate spatial autocorrelation, I divide the dot sample into those dots with permanent
crops and thosewith other uses. If there is no spatial autocorrelation among the observations,
the crop choice should be random across locations, and the distributions of neighboring
density of permanent crops in the two subsamples should be similar. If there is positive
spatial autocorrelation, neighboring areas around the dots with permanent crops should also
have higher density of permanents.
Figure 3.2 displays the cumulative density distribution of the permanent density in the
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(a) Distribution of permanent density in 1999
(b) Distribution of permanent density in 2016
Figure 3.2: Density of Permanent Crops by Space and Time
neighboring area of the two subsamples. In the upper panel, I calculate the density of
permanent crops in 1999, and the results for 2016 is presented in the lower panel.
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Difference in distribution of permanent crop density between the two subsamples are striking
both in 1999 and 2016. Taking the one-mile circle (solid line) around the dots as an example,
at the 50% threshold, the density in the permanent crop dot subsample is around 0.7, while
in the other subsample is about 0.1.
Spatial autocorrelation generally decreases with distance. The cumulative density distribu-
tion line approaches to the 45-degree line (dot line) when it moves from one-mile circle to
one-to-two mile ring (dash line) and then to two-to-five mile ring (dash/dot line) around the
dots.
I also check the difference over time. Due to the increase of relative price of permanents
a large fraction of farmland transits to permanent crops through the sample period; thus, I
expect the distribution of permanent crop density to increase over time, and the distributions
of the two samples to become more similar. Comparison between the left and right panel
confirms my expectation. In fact, in the two-to-five-mile ring area, the two distributions are
quite similar in 2016 as both of them become close to the 45-degree line.
Moran (1950) developed a formal measure of spatial dependence called Moran’s I, which
is defined as:
I =
N
W
∑
i
∑
j wi j(xi − x¯)(x j − x¯)∑
i(xi − x¯)2
(3.42)
where N is the number of observations, x is the variable of interest, wi j is the spatial weight
between observation i and j andW is the sum of wi j .
If there is no spatial autocorrelation, the expectation of I is E(I) = −1N−1 , which converges
to 0 in a large sample. On the other hand, if there is spatial autocorrelation, the value of
I varies from −1 to +1 with negative value implying negative spatial autocorrelation and
positive value corresponding to positive spatial autocorrelation.
I calculate the Moran’s I for water districts without groundwater. As presented by Table
3.5, the value is positive and statistically significantly different from E(I) in both 1999 and
2016. It confirms that there is spatial autocorrelation in the data and the specification of
econometric model should account for it. Moreover, comparison between the two years
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is consistent with our observation from the figure that due to the increased popularity of
permanent crops, the distribution of crops around different dots becomes close. Therefore,
the Moran’s I is smaller in 2016 than in the first year of the sample period.
I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
1999 0.166 -0.001 0.001 155.605 0
2016 0.126 -0.001 0.001 118.889 0
*1-tail test
Table 3.5: Moran’s I in Districts without Groundwater
The econometric model
Outcome variables in the empirical analysis could be either a binary crop choice d ∈ {0, 1}
that d = 1 if a certain type of crop is planted at a given plot and d = 0 otherwise, or a
continuous variable d ∈ [0, 1] that d measures the density of a certain type of crop within a
certain area. Without loss of generality, I derive the econometric model based on the binary
crop choice of planting a permanent crop. The models for other binary choices follow
directly. Estimation using the continuous outcome variables are conducted as robustness
checks. The estimation technique is less complicated and standard in literature (Yu, Jong,
and L.-f. Lee, 2008; L.-f. Lee and Yu, 2010).
Whether to grow a permanent crop at dot i in year t is determined by the latent profit yit .
The farmer compares yit with other options, including growing annuals and fallowing in
current period. I pool other options as an outside option, and normalize the value of the
outside option to 0. Therefore, the relationship between the normalized profit and crop
choice is:
dit =

1, if yit > 0;
0, otherwise
(3.43)
Farmer of dot i chooses dit = 1 if and only if the latent profit yit > 0.
68
In a standard discrete choice model, the latent profit function can be written as:
yit = xitβ + εit (3.44)
where xit is a vector of explanatory variables and εit is individual-time specific error term.
In the absence of spatial autocorrelation (or more accurately εit is i.i.d.), probit or logit
regression could be applied to estimate the vector of coefficients β. However, because of
spatial interdependence, the standard probit/logit estimation results are no longer efficient
and may not be consistent.
There is a rich literature discussing the spatial autocorrelation in the land use problem
(Li, Wu, and Deng, 2013). The issue becomes complicated with a discrete choice model
since the usual differencing method can not be applied here. In addition, due to the
heteroskedasticity among the error terms, the standard maximum likelihood estimation is
infeasible as it requires n-dimensional integration where n is the size of the sample. Below,
I discuss specific forms of spatial autocorrelation that may exist in my data and provide
solutions to each.
In general, the crop choice data features two sorts of spatial autocorrelation. Factors that
are fixed over time but correlated over space cause permanent spatial interdependence.
Most geological features such as access to groundwater and surface water river or land
quality belong to this category. For this type of spatial autocorrelation, it is included in the
explanatory vector xit if it is observed; for example, the land suitability to specific crops
(Holmes and S. Lee, 2012). Otherwise, it contributes to an intercorrelated component in
the error term. Below is the vector of individual errors at period t:
εt = e + ut (3.45)
where e is the vector of unobserved individual feature. e = ρWe + v due to spatial interde-
pendence whereW is the weight matrix depending on the distance between observations, ρ
measures the level of spatial autocorrelation and v is a time-invariant individual shock.
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Note that, if the dependent variable is continuous, the fixed spatial autocorrelation could be
easily resolved by taking difference across time:
yt − yt−1 = (xt − xt−1)β + (ut − ut−1) (3.46)
Although we can not estimate the scale of spatial autocorrelation ρ, the estimator for
explanatory variables β is unbiased, efficient and consistent.
For the discrete choice model, Pinkse and Slade (1998) provide a GMMmethod to estimate
the discrete choice model with spatial dependent error terms.
A second type of spatial autocorrelation arises when the dependence between farmers’ crop
choices evolves over time. Different economic explanations could be applied to explain the
transitory spatial interdependence.
The first channel I consider is when a farmer’s crop choice is affected directly by others’
choices. For example, the economies of scale arises from having other land nearby planted
with the same crop, which may help lower costs by adding to the pool of labor with special
skill or allowing share of special tools (Holmes and S. Lee, 2012). Higher crop density may
also encourage local government/agency to invest in infrastructure that is more helpful for
that crop. For instance, agglomeration of water-intensive crops may encourage local water
suppliers to dig more wells. Finally, there is knowledge spillover from neighbors’ crop
choices (Munshi, 2004). Since the crop choices are observable, the latent profit function
includes the choices on other dots as in Mohammadian and Kanaroglou (2003):
yt = xtβ + ρWdt + εt (3.47)
Standard profit/logit estimation could be applied to estimate the model parameters.
When profitability is locally correlated, the second channel of transitory spatial autocorrela-
tion arises. This differs from the first channel as it involves forward looking behavior where
farmers are influenced by the additional value created by increasing a particular crop’s local
density. In this situation, farmers expect that high value of the latent variable will lead
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to growing permanent crops by other farmers, which in turn lowers costs and introduces
network effects. The specification of latent profit function in this channel is:
yt = ρW yt + xtβ + εt (3.48)
In the literature, such specification is often referred to as a spatial lag model. The latent
profit can be written as:
yt = (I − ρW)−1xtβ + (I − ρW)−1εt (3.49)
Smirnov (2010) proposes a Pseudo maximum likelihood estimator to estimate the above
model with an additional assumption that individuals disregard shocks on others. Klier and
McMillen (2008) extend the Pinkse and Slade (1998) GMM method to this setting.
The last channel of time-variant spatial autocorrelation involves situations when farmers’
decision are driven by unobservables that are correlated over space. The transitory case
of interdependent error term is an extension of the permanent spatial autocorrelation we
examined before, except that the error term now is written as:
εt = ρWεt + ut = (I − ρW)−1ut (3.50)
This model is often referred to as spatial error model. In the literature, econometricians
rarely distinguish the transitory and permanent cases, since the GMM estimator could be
applied in both situations. The latent profit function can be written as:
yt = xtβ + (I − ρW)−1εt (3.51)
As shown in Anselin and Florax (2012), the spatial lag model and spatial error model are
special case of each other with additional assumption on the parameters. Influence from
both channels exist in the farming decision. A farmer grows a certain type of crop on a
given dot based on her expectation of her neighbors’ choices. At the same time, neighboring
farmers profits are affected by similar local geological and water conditions.
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In the Central Valley, the major factor that drives the crop pattern change over the sample
period is the relative price of permanent to field crops. Since crop price affects the
farmers’ choice through their profit function, I consider the influence from latent profits of
neighboring land as the main channel through which farmland correlates with each other.
At the same time, most of local unobserved geological connections should be captured when
we include land quality, water supply and agriculture capacity in the latent profit function.
Therefore, I adopt the spatial lag model and conduct the pseudomaximum likelihood (PML)
estimation to examine the crop choice with spatial autocorrelation.
Derivation of PML estimator
The pseudo maximum likelihood estimator I use is a simplification of Smirnov (2010) that
facilitates computation with a large dataset. For the spatial lag specification, the latent profit
function is (the subscript for time is ignored):
y = Axβ + Aε (3.52)
where A = (I − ρW)−1 is the spatial multiplier matrix. A could be expanded as the limit
form:
A = lim
n→∞ I + ρW + ρ
2W2 + ... + ρnWn (3.53)
Denote by D the n × n matrix composed of the diagonal elements of the matrix A. D
indicates private effects of random shocks on the individual profits. As shown by Equation
3.53, these effects are the sum of direct non-spatial effects and aggregate spatial effects.
The conditional choice probability for the individual i to plant permanent crops is:
Pi = Pr(di = 1|{ε j, j , i}, β) (3.54)
Rewrite the latent profit function as:
y = Axβ + (A − D)ε + Dε (3.55)
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Note that the diagonal elements in the matrix A − D are zero, thus the conditional choice
probability is:
P = Pr(ε < Axβ + (A − D)ε
D
) (3.56)
Therefore, the individual conditional probability is:
Pi =
1
1 + exp(− gidii )
(3.57)
where gi =
∑n
j=1 ai j x j β +
∑n
j=1(ai j − di j)ε j .
Notice that the random components ε j in gi are i.i.d. with mean 0; therefore, they have
no systematic effect on the conditional choice probability Pi. Suppose individuals focus
only on spatial effects that systematically affect their conditional choice probability and
disregard all other effects. Then private shock aii = dii always affects the conditional choice
probability while ai j with j , i has no expected effect. The simplified closed form for the
conditional probability is:
Pˆi =
1
1 + exp(−
∑n
j=1 ai j xj β
dii
)
(3.58)
Estimation for such specification is equivalent to the spatial discrete choice model with
spatial random profit:
y˜i = Axβ + Dεi (3.59)
The pseudomaximum likelihood estimator for the originalmodel is themaximum likelihood
of this model. As the computation involves inversion of the spatial weight matrix A, which is
difficult with a sample size n over 10, 000, I simplify the spatial weight matrix by assuming
away the spatial effects of order larger than three:
A ≈ A˜ = I + ρW + ρ2W2 (3.60)
and denote the matrix of diagonal elements of A˜ as D˜. In the end, it is easy to find the
maximum likelihood estimator for:
y˜i = A˜xβ + D˜εi (3.61)
This is the PML estimator I will present in the estimation results.
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Estimation results
Table 3.6 reports the tests of Hypothesis 3.1: permanent crops are not correlated with water
supply changes over time. The coefficient of SWP allocation is negative and statistically
significant in column (1), implying that in years with less surface water supply, there is more
transition to permanent crops. This is consistent with the introduction of water trade in later
periods when the surface water supply was low. Such effect disappears in the other three
columns where lagged crop choice or time trend is added to control for long run changes
in crop choice. That SWP allocation does not matter is consistent with Hypothesis 3.1 that
permanent crops are not subjected to water supply variations.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Logit PML
SWP allocation -1.110*** -0.202 0.0991 -0.159
(0.22) (0.23) (0.08) (0.19)
Surface water rights -0.559 0.115 -0.561 0.0823
(1.09) (0.24) (1.09) (0.20)
Groundwater access -1.087*** -0.491*** -1.090*** -0.399***
(0.37) (0.13) (0.38) (0.11)
CSI (Potato) 0.232 0.19 0.233 0.163
(0.37) (0.15) (0.37) (0.13)
CSI (Wheat) -0.051 0.0564 -0.0516 0.0497
(0.26) (0.08) (0.26) (0.07)
Price ratio (p/a) 0.971*** 0.868*** -0.113 0.705***
(0.18) (0.24) (0.07) (0.20)
Agricultural capacity 0.178*** 0.125*** 0.179*** 0.103***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Lagged crop choice 6.284*** 6.659***
(0.11) (0.13)
Network influence 1.705***
(0.18)
Time trend 0.0725***
(0.01)
Spatial correlation 0.150***
(0.03)
Constant -3.628** -7.777*** -148.5*** -7.526***
(1.43) (0.74) (29.50) (0.54)
Observations 108,918 108,918 108,918 108,918
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at water district level.
2. All even years are included.
3. Spatial weight matrix: Neighbors within 1 mile circle.
Table 3.6: Determinants of Planting Permanent Crops
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Variation of surface water rights has no influence on the likelihood of growing permanents.
This is consistent with the idea that water scarcity is mitigated by surface water trade. The
positive coefficient of groundwater access implies that SWOdistricts growmore permanents
than G districts. This is also supported by water trade.
FAO measures of land quality have no impact on the permanent crop decisions. The price
effect is as expected (except for column (3) where the time trend that absorbs the price
effect) that higher relative price of permanent to field crops leads to more transition to the
permanents.
Influences from related agricultural decisions all have expected sign. A plot in a region
with denser agriculture, planted with permanent crops in the past, or in a neighborhood
with larger density of permanent crops is more likely to have a permanent crop. The
spatial correlation parameter estimated in PML estimation (column (4)) is also positive and
statistically significant, confirming the existence of spatial interdependence of crop choices.
Table 3.7 presents tests of Hypothesis 3.2. Although private water trade was always allowed
during the sample period, in the early years, water districts without groundwater had not
transited to permanent crops in large scale and surface water delivery was high, so there
was no need for private water trade and the economy was in the autarky equilibrium. The
year 2004 is chosen as the cutoff because in surface-water-only districts, the acreage of
permanent crop suddenly jumped 20% from 2004 to 2005 after a long period of slow
growth.
To confirm the model’s autarky predictions, I estimate the correlation between annual
crop decision and water supply conditions in water districts without groundwater before
2004. Coefficients for SWP allocation are positive across all specifications and statistically
significant in the subsample with high fallow density (column (4) and (6)). This implies
that on farmland with relatively low quality, the annual crop farmers pay attention to
surface water supply and fallow the land if water supply is low, consistent with the autarky
equilibrium that annual crops are sensitive to short-term surface water supply variation.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Logit & all data High fallow density PML PML& High fallow density
SWP allocation 0.372 0.576 0.72 2.506** 0.405 2.205**
(0.29) (1.35) (1.45) (1.09) (0.99) (0.95)
Surface water rights -6.154*** 5.983*** 6.148*** 12.49* 1.193 -7.309**
(0.79) (1.72) (1.88) (7.00) (3.45) (3.62)
CSI (Potato) -0.0772 -0.570*** -0.569*** -5.698 -0.426*** -1.2
(0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (4.59) (0.10) (1.22)
CSI (Wheat) -1.178* -0.0718 -0.0524 0.229 -0.111 -0.0156
(0.67) (0.23) (0.26) (0.56) (0.22) (0.30)
Price ratio (p/a) -3.191** -5.182* -5.867 -7.327* -3.839* -3.908**
(1.31) (3.06) (3.71) (3.91) (2.29) (1.76)
Agricultural capacity 0.0824 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.241*** 0.114*** 0.173***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Lagged crop choice 1.935*** 2.010*** 3.175** 3.625*** 3.058***
(0.40) (0.52) (1.57) (0.85) (0.80)
Network influence 3.029*** 3.028*** 1.650**
(0.77) (0.77) (0.83)
Time trend 0.0802
(0.15)
Spatial correlation 0.385*** 0.898**
(0.04) (0.38)
Constant 12.33*** 0.858 -159.2 28.47 2.965 11.98***
(4.66) (4.19) (298.50) (19.81) (4.80) (3.31)
Observations 9,035 9,035 9,035 1,432 9,035 1,432
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at water district level.
2. Years before 2004 are included.
3. Spatial weight matrix: Neighbors within 1 mile circle.
Table 3.7: Determinants of Planting Annual Crops in Water Districts without Groundwater
before 2004
As for other control variables, the effect of surface water rights is mixed. Districts with
more surface water allocation may grow more annuals or transit to more permanents. Land
quality has a negative sign, implying that high-quality land is more likely to be planted with
permanents when there is water scarcity. Other variables all have expected sign. The price
effect and spatial autocorrelation are both consistent with findings in Table 3.6.
The main results of this chapter are shown in Table 3.8. The two competing Hypotheses 3.3
and 3.4 provide different predictions about water market efficiency and fallowing decision.
I look at whether the likelihood of fallowing is affected by surface water supply conditions
or not. Column (1) and (2) report the logit regression results using all G districts, column
(3) reports logit regression results using only the regions with high density of fallowing,
column (4) reports logit regression results using only farmland that is never planted with
permanent crops and the last two columns report the PML estimation results based on all
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water districts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Logit & all data High fallow density Non-permanent PMLE
SWP allocation 0.118 0.0895 -0.282 0.0583 0.259 0.0385
(0.13) (0.06) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) (0.04)
Surface water rights 0.870*** 0.199 1.665*** 0.433* 0.856** 0.345
(0.29) (0.17) (0.33) (0.24) (0.33) (0.21)
CSI (Potato) -0.244** -0.133 -0.173 -0.235*** -0.299* -0.142*
(0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.17) (0.08)
CSI (Wheat) -0.000554 -0.0523 0.0288 -0.0235 -0.138 0.018
(0.11) (0.07) (0.20) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08)
Price ratio (p/a) -0.232* -0.140** 0.194 -0.219 -0.482 -0.0517*
(0.13) (0.07) (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.03)
Agricultural capacity -0.359*** -0.199*** -0.422*** -0.236*** -0.430*** -0.212***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Lagged crop choice 5.273*** 3.395*** 3.756*** 5.263***
(0.23) (0.48) (0.32) (0.27)
Network influence -4.272*** 2.310***
(0.50) (0.35)
Spatial correlation -0.416*** 0.398***
(0.02) (0.13)
Constant 3.882*** 1.910** 1.237 2.252** 4.292*** 2.517***
(0.984) (0.890) (1.324) (0.982) (1.42) (0.76)
Observations 72,065 72,065 11,160 32,186 72,065 72,065
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at water district level.
2. Year 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 are included.
3. Spatial weight matrix: Neighbors within 1 mile circle.
Table 3.8: Determinants of Fallowing in Districts with Groundwater
The key variable of interest is SWP allocation. None of the estimated coefficients for SWP
allocation are statistically significant, suggesting that fallowing is not sensitive to surface
water supply. Therefore, when a low-value farmer sells her surface water to high-value
users, she does not fallow her land. Instead, the farmer likely pumps more groundwater to
supplement irrigation water for her crops. This contradicts Hypothesis 3.3 and is consistent
with Hypothesis 3.4 that the market does not efficiently reallocate water from low-value to
high-value users; instead, it just provides high-value users with water.
Surface water rights have a positive and statistically significant influence on fallowing
decision. Such effect goes away when lagged crop choice is not controlled, implying that
places with less surface water rights fallow earlier than area with more surface water rights.
This is consistent with the lack of pumping capacity in early years of the sample period.
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Land quality has a negative effect on fallowing as expected, although the coefficient is only
statistically significant under some specifications. The relative price of permanent crops
to fields reduces fallowing. But the effect becomes smaller and even goes away when we
restrict the sample size or control for spatial autocorrelation, consistent with the findings at
aggregate level that price effect is not a main driver for fallowing.
The lagged crop choice and network influence have the expected sign. As the two are
usually highly correlated, the effect of network influence is absorbed by the lagged crop
choice (column (1)). This is confirmed by the coefficient of spatial correlation term in the
column (5) and (6). When I include the lagged crop choice in the regression with spatial
autocorrelation under control, the estimated measure of spatial correlation is negative. This
is because the lagged crop choice has already captured most of what determines whether
a plot will be fallowed or not. In fact, in column (6) where I do not include lagged crop
choice in the regression, the measure of spatial autocorrelation is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that dots where neighborhood fallow rate is high are also more likely
to be fallowed.
Robustness check
To booster confidence in the earlier results, I conduct a robustness check by replacing the
binary outcome variable with a continuous variable that measures the density of different
types of crops. I first divide the Kern County into blocks of 1914 acres, which is the average
size of farms in the data. Then, I calculate the fraction of fallowing, permanent crop and
annual crop within each block as the continuous outcome variables.
I rerun the previous three tests using bothOLS andMLE estimation of the SAR specification.
The results are shown in Table 3.9. Column (1) - (4) test the permanent crop decisions.
Column (5) and (6) explore the influencing factors for annual crop decision in SWO districts
before 2004. Column (7) and (8) evaluate fallowing decisions in G districts.
The estimated coefficients are consistent with the former results. For permanent crop
78
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Permenant Annual w/o groundwater before 2004 Fallow with groundwater
OLS SAR model: MLE OLS SAR model: MLE OLS SAR model: MLE
SWP allocation -0.180*** -0.0031 -0.0133** 0.0285*** 0.0262 0.00434 0.00686 -0.00377
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Surface water/ total demand -0.146*** -0.00706* -0.117*** -0.0108** -0.0513 -0.194 0.0465*** 0.234***
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.23) (0.01) (0.03)
Groundwater access -0.202*** -0.0107*** -0.156*** -0.00835***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
CSI (Potato) -0.0107* -0.00119 -0.0268* -0.00339* -0.0245 0.0536 -0.0111*** -0.0530***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01)
CSI (Wheat) -0.000718 0.00132 0.0125 0.00521*** -0.00455 -0.0439 0.00667 -0.0235
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Price ratio 0.160*** 0.0198*** 0.00855 -0.00966** -0.653*** 0.0955 -0.0240*** 0.000658
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Agricultural capacity 0.0300*** 0.00250*** 0.0221*** 0.00258*** 0.0102*** 0.0432*** -0.0163*** -0.0540***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lagged crop choice 0.953*** 0.924*** 0.676*** 0.0726*** 0.675*** 0.287***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Spatial correlation 0.976*** 0.221*** 0.601*** 0.848***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05)
Constant 0.263*** -0.0115 0.0777 -0.0663*** 0.955*** -0.354 0.296*** 0.809***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.19) (0.49) (0.03) (0.08)
Observations 9,414 9,414 9,414 9,414 815 815 6,181 6,181
R2ˆ 29% 94% 11% 94% 59% 14% 79% 66%
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at water district level.
2. Spatial weight matrix: Inverse distance.
Table 3.9: Robustness Check: Continuous Outcome Measure
decisions, a negative and statistically significant coefficient for SWP allocation is found in
column (1) and (3) and such effect goes away when lagged crop choice is put in control.
This is consistent with the results in Table 3.6.
Column (5) and (6) imply a positive although not statistically significant effect of SWP
allocation on annual crop planting decisions in SWOdistricts before 2004. This is consistent
with the findings in Table 3.7. We are not able to restrict the sample into a subsample with
only high fallow density, since the sample size shrinks dramatically. Nevertheless, having
not found a significant effect at farm level implies that fallowing annuals in dry years is not
a common action in response to drought. Instead, large farms can maintain production and
only small farms with low profitability fallow.
Column (7) and (8) are test results of our main focus. Consistent with Table 3.8, the
coefficient of SWP allocation on fallow decisions is not statistically significant. It implies
that farmers do not fallow land when surface water supply is low, confirming Hypothesis
3.4 that the surface water market is inefficient.
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3.6 Conclusion
Water sales from groundwater districts to surface-water-only districts are likely to continue
in the Central Valley over next few years. These sales are driven both by droughts and
by the increased demand for permanent crops. Beyond California, markets are likely to
become popular in the era of global warming and the increasing shortage of surface water
supply. The consequence of establishing a surface water market varies depending on the
underlying economic and hydrological condition of the region. This chapter shows that a
surface water market can cause harm when groundwater extraction is unregulated. Since
the marginal cost of pumping groundwater is low, farmers simply replace any water they
have sold by pumping more groundwater. The overall impact of the water market is to grant
more farmers access to groundwater, making the CPR problem even worse.
In the Central Valley, the surface water market neither reallocates resources nor sustains
the aquifer. The scale of increased extraction to replace the surface water sold off is large.
On average, the import demand from surface water-only-districts is about 140,000 AF per
year. If all import comes from the groundwater districts, extra groundwater extraction to
replace the surface water sold off accounts for 8% of all groundwater use by all the water
districts. What’s worse, the surface-water-only districts are at the boundary or out of the
groundwater aquifer; therefore, the water transferred to that area eventually runs off instead
of percolating back to the groundwater system as a source of natural recharge.
According to the USGS report (2009)17, the long-term average groundwater pumpage in
the Central Valley as a whole is about 8.6 million acre-feet (MAF) per year while the
annual recharge is only 7.7 MAF. Kern County agriculture alone consumes 20% of total
groundwater extraction in the Valley. Moreover, if we apply the same ratio of extraction
to safe yield in the whole Valley to Kern County, over-extraction above the safe yield in
Kern County is about 174,000 AF per year, more than 80% of which could be blamed to
the surface water trade!
17Groundwater Availability of the Central Valley Aquifer, California.
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This chapter’s conclusions have implications for all aquifers in arid or semi-arid regions
– places where the land constraint rather than the water constraint binds in agricultural
activity. Some argue that depletion of aquifer is caused by excessive transition from annual
to permanent crops, which increase water demand andmakes it more inelastic. Others argue
that a water market reallocates water efficiently so that the overall reliance on groundwater
basin will decline. Findings of this study suggest that neither the transition to permanents or
lack of water market are to blame for depletion. Rather, it is the common pool. As long as
the groundwater basin is unregulated, low-value farmers have no incentive to stop growing
annual crops or to halt their surface water sales, and their extraction from the groundwater
aquifer will not stop. Therefore, the very first step to solve the sustainability and efficiency
problem of water use is to define groundwater rights and stop unlimited pumping. It is
only after closing the common pool that a water market can work as expected to reallocate
resource toward higher efficiency.
The argument presented here is not specific to water. The effectiveness of market is rarely
guaranteed when it involves a common property. As the CPR problem origins from the
users’ unlimited use of the resource, market sometimes introduces demand that leads to even
higher depletion of the common pool. Fur-bearing animals went nearly extinct in the early
nineteenth century as an outcome of the North American fur trade (Berkes et al. (1989b)).
Today, the water users in the Central Valley of California are risking the future of the valley
on excessive pumping caused by private water trade. The market cannot be assumed to be
helpful to solving the resource depletion problem. If we want a market to work efficiently
while not depleting the resource that is traded, we must define the boundary of the resource
system properly.
3.A Consistency of PML Estimator
When deriving the PML estimator, I make a simplification of the weight matrix by assuming
away the spatial effects of orders larger than three:
A ≈ A˜ = I + ρW + ρW (3.62)
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Below, I show how the estimator will behave if I use a full Taylor expansion of A instead of
taking the approximation.
Take the observation j as an example. Let iK denotes its order K neighbor. The influence
coefficient from its first-order (direct) neighbor is:
I1 =
1
n j
d ji1 (3.63)
where n j is the number of j’s neighbors and d1i1 is a neighbor indicator that equals to 1 if
observation j and i1 are neighbors and 0 otherwise. Influence on observation j from its first
order neighbors is thus:
x1j = ρ
∑
i1
I1xi1 (3.64)
Similarly, the influence coefficient from j’s second-order neighbor is:
I2 =
∑
i1
I1
1
ni1
di1i2 (3.65)
Influence on observation j from its second order neighbors is thus:
x2j = ρ
2
∑
i2
I2xi2 (3.66)
Following the same procedure, the influence coefficient from j’s order-K neighbor is:
IK =
∑
iK−1
IK−1
1
niK−1
diK−1iK (3.67)
Influence on observation j from its order-K neighbors is thus:
xKj = ρ
n
∑
iK
IK xiK (3.68)
By definition, the sum of j’s order-1 influence coefficients is
∑
i1 I1 = 1. Apply this to I2,
I3,..., we have
∑
iK IK = 1. If the independent variable x’s are of the same order across
the observations, the order-K spatial influence on j is of order ρK . Since |ρ| ∈ [0, 1], the
higher the order of spatial influence included in the estimation process, or the smaller the
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spatial autocorrelation coefficient ρ, the larger consistency of the estimated coefficients we
get. Nevertheless, to show the robustness of the tests, I present the PML estimation results
including order-1 and order-3 spatial influence in the Appendix Table 1.
As shown below, the estimated coefficients from order-1 and order-3 spatial influence are
very similar and do not deviate too much from the order-2 PML estimation results we
present in the main tables. Therefore, taking the approximation of the weight matrix helps
simplify the estimation process while not causing the estimated outcome vary too much.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Permenant Annual w/o groundwater before 2004 Fallow with groundwater
Order 1 Order 3 Order 1 Order 3 Order 1 Order 3
SWP allocation -0.17 -0.199 0.459 0.413 0.896 1.312
(0.20) (0.20) (1.11) (0.97) (0.87) (1.01)
Surface water/ total demand 0.0764 0.0583 1.278 1.526 1.164*** 0.822**
(0.21) (0.21) (3.83) (3.60) (0.43) (0.42)
Groundwater access -0.414*** -0.432***
(0.11) (0.11)
CSI (Potato) 0.168 0.172 -0.473*** -0.420*** -0.523 -0.272
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.35) (0.37)
CSI (Wheat) 0.0488 0.0472 -0.129 -0.149 -0.252 -0.372
(0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.23) (0.27) (0.33)
Price ratio 0.730*** 0.754*** -4.344* -3.933* -1.553 -2.370**
(0.20) (0.20) (2.61) (2.11) (1.03) (0.97)
Agricultural capacity 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.126*** 0.119*** -1.990* -2.836***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (1.09) (0.24)
Lagged crop choice 6.790*** 6.667*** 4.045*** 3.645*** 7.627*** 8.579***
(0.16) (0.13) (0.87) (0.88) (0.97) (0.39)
Network influence
Spatial correlation 0.251*** 0.183*** 0.534*** 0.297*** -0.738*** -0.884***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01)
Constant -6.613*** -6.621*** 3.452 2.955 18.80** 24.43***
(0.65) (0.67) (5.27) (4.78) (8.86) (2.28)
Observations 108,918 108,918 9,035 9,035 72,065 72,065
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at water district level.
2. Spatial weight matrix: Neighbors within 1 mile circle.
Table 3.10: Spatial Influence: PMLE at Order 1 & 3
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C h a p t e r 4
OPTIMAL AQUIFER MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Groundwater pumping in the United States increased substantially after WWII as the post-
war technical developments enabled farmers to extract groundwater at greater depth and
on a much larger scale (Dale, French, and Wilson, 1964; Hornbeck and Keskin, 2014).
Due to the open access nature of groundwater, aquifer depletion has been observed widely
throughout the US west (Ostrom, 1990; Blomquist, 1992) , raising interest in studies of
optimal groundwater management. Among them, a famous paradox was raised by Gisser
and Sanchez (1980) that the benefit from managing groundwater extraction is actually very
low although serious depletion of the aquifers has been a major concern in dry regions all
over the world for several decades. To understand the puzzle, researchers vary the baseline
settings in Gisser-Sanchez model. Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991) found that aquifers
have significant buffer value against surface water supply risk, but Knapp and L. J. Olson
(1995) concluded the gains from optimal management are relatively small after considering
deliberate recharge from the stochastic surface water flow. Knapp, Weinberg, et al. (2003)
replaced the stochastic surface water supply with out-of-basin surface water trade and still
did not find large gains from optimal control. Koundouri (2000) and Laukkanen and
Koundouri (2006) documented significant gain from management for small aquifers where
water scarcity is a severe issue. It is puzzling that the economic models do not predict the
increasing demand for groundwater management in large basins like the Central Valley of
California.
This chapter returns to this problem but takes a different tack by considering the important
heterogeneity among groundwater users’ willingness to pay for water. In the Central Valley
of California, two broad types of crops are planted, annuals and permanents. Annual crops
(alfalfa, wheat, cotton, etc.) are planted and harvested each year, so they are easy to fallow
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in dry years. On the other hand, permanent crops (almonds, citrus, grapes, etc.) take
several years to mature and then yield fruit for decades. The total cost before a tree starts
to produce can be large, including the waiting time, maintenance cost and the risk of death.
Therefore, permanent crops are long-term investments and require a regular supply of water.
Not surprisingly, the return from permanent cropland is much larger than the return from
annual cropland1.
The sharp differences between annual and permanent crops create an incentive to close
the common pool and put the basin into proper management. With the high return from
permanent crops as the benchmark of the value of groundwater stock, growing annual
crops becomes no longer socially efficient when the water table is deep enough. Conflicts
of interests arise because the annual crop farmers want to continue irrigating their fields
with groundwater while the permanent crop farmers wish to save the water for future use.
The social planner agrees with the high-value users. Therefore, a regulation that limits
groundwater extraction by annual crop farmers is needed, and leads to substantial efficiency
gain.
According to my theoretical model, the heterogeneity among agents divides the optimal
groundwater pumping path into two stages. At the early stage, when water is near the
surface, both annual and permanent crops use groundwater; at the late stage, only permanent
crops consume groundwater. The major efficiency gain from management comes from the
transition period of the two stages. Under open access, the farmers are only restricted by
the pumping cost, so the annual crop farmers stop extraction when the pumping cost equals
the return their crop, which is much later than under the socially optimal plan. A proper
management plan not only delays depletion of the aquifer, but also saves some water from
annual crops to irrigate more valuable permanent crops.
Not accounting for heterogeneity may be the reason that earlier papers found little efficiency
gain from optimal management. Previous models of optimal groundwater pumping usually
1According to Kern County Crop Report (2016) the value generated per acre of fruits and nuts is about
eight times the value generated per acre of field crops.
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assume the demand function of water is continuous and elastic. When the data contain
both annual and permanent crops, the standard model’s demand function describes only the
early stage when the water table is high enough that both annual and permanent crops use
groundwater. Therefore, it loses the main source of demand elasticity to water table change
that occurs when the economy transits between stages. Once we take in permanents, the
slope of water demand is much steeper than one might observe in the early stage data.
Using the heterogeneous agent model, I find the optimal groundwater extraction and the
value of artificial recharge, and then discuss how to implement such a plan. To begin, it
is clear that a market for water will be needed at some point to transfer water from annual
farmers to permanent farmers. Then, I first show that plans that assign individual rights to
the groundwater stock at once will not produce the socially optimal groundwater extraction
path. In this case, individual farmers still want to pump more than the socially optimal level
because saving unused water rights in the aquifer creates positive externality by raising
the water table. Unlike the stock rights, assigning operational pumping rights equal to the
socially optimal extraction per period results in the efficient extraction path when there is
no friction in the water market.
Besides being efficient, the optimal pumping plan must also be incentive compatible.
Rationing the pumping rights proportional to the size of farmland seems to be a fair
arrangement. However, the permanent crop farmers are likely to vote against such regulation
because they might have to pay a higher cost to purchase water rights from the annual crop
farmers than their gain from the optimal management. Because of the difference in return,
annual crop farmers will stop pumping groundwater when the water table falls below a
certain level. Below that level only the permanent crop farmers will use groundwater. If
pumping rights are equally shared by the farmers, the permanent crop farmers will have
to purchase the rights from the annual crop farmers and thus share their profits with them.
Considering the cost of buying water rights, the permanent crop farmers may prefer the
open access regime where the annual crop farmers leave by themselves.
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The incentive compatibility problem worsens if the aquifer does not meet the bathtub
assumption. Under that assumption, the aquifer is such that all pumpers have equal access.
While in most real cases, aquifer’s geology actually determines who are going to use
groundwater as the water table declines because some parts are shallower than others
(Guilfoos et al., 2013). Like the annual crop farmers, farmers over the shallow part of the
aquifer will have to stop extracting when water table falls enough. Then, only the farmers
overlying the deep part of the aquifer have access to the resource. They may vote against
the pro rata rationing and wait for other agents to abandon their wells.
This chapter then looks at policy outcomes under different political decision rules. If the
permanent crop farmers in the deep part of the aquifer are pivotal, delay of groundwater
management could occur since those farmers would like to wait for others to leave so they
can claim the residual water by themselves. Farmers in the shallow part of the aquifer
bear the loss of social welfare from uncontrolled extraction, so they want to implement the
optimal management early and equally share groundwater rights. To become pivotal, the
shallow farmers may want to include landowners who do not use groundwater and share
water rights with then to form a winning coalition.
I also examine artificial recharge as a potential way to enhance groundwater use efficiency.
Results in this chapter are consistent with Knapp and L. J. Olson (1995). Artificial recharge
is part of optimal aquifer management only when water table is very high or very low. When
the water table is close enough to the surface, artificial recharge pays because the saved
pumping cost for extracting the rest of water is large (because there are relatively many
users). When the water table is very low, it pays to save water to grow more permanent
crops.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 will discuss the optimal ground-
water extraction and crop decision in social planner’s case. Section 4.3 will compare the
socially optimal path with the path under open access. Section 4.4 considers the implemen-
tation of optimal aquifer management, including the regulation specifying pumping rights
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and the rules to assign the rights. Section 4.5 will discuss the option of artificial recharge.
In Section 4.6, I will conclude.
4.2 Social Planner’s Groundwater Extraction and Crop Choice
The Model
I consider irrigated agriculture in a region that overlies a groundwater aquifer. Surface
water supply is SH in a wet year (W) and SL in a dry year (D). Each period denotes a
wet-dry cycle where the uncertainty of surface water supply comes from the number of wet
and dry years during each cycle. In this chapter, I consider a simple model where each
wet-dry cycle begins with a pair of wet dry yeras but I build uncertainty into when the
drought ends. With a probability µ it enters the second dry year after which a wet year
occurs and a new cycle begins. With a probability 1 − µ it enters a wet year and a new
cycle begins immediately. Denote the event that the second dry year happens as d. d is a
binary variable that Pr(d = 1) = µ. This setup can be generalized to a model with a Poisson
Process characterizing the upcoming dry years after the first dry year. After a dry year,
the probability of another dry year is µ and the probability of a wet year hence entering a
new cycle is 1 − µ. A more general setting of the stochastic surface water supply can be
found in Knapp and Olson (1995). Given our setup, the realized weather would run from
WDWDWDWD ... (the extreme wet history) toWDDWDDWDDWDD ... (the
extreme dry history) or anything in the middle. Denote the wet history as HW and the dry
history asHD.
In theory, there are various types of recharges, including rainfall, percolation of irrigation
water and percolation during surface water conveyance. They are all positively correlated
with surface water supply. For simplicity, I normalize natural recharge in dry years to be 0
and only count the recharge in the wet year, which I denote by R. The impact of artificial
recharge will be discussed in Section 4.5.
Denote extraction from the aquifer by G, and the depth to water in the aquifer at the
beginning of period t by Ht .The per unit pumping cost is z(Ht) at period t. z′(H) > 0,
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namely the pumping cost increases as the water table falls. In this model, we take a specific
form z(H) = αH. One can think about the pumping cost as the energy consumption to
lift groundwater to the surface which is approximately a linear function of water depth.
Although depth to water changes within period due to extraction and recharge, I simplify
the cost function to ignore the short-term change of water level and only reflect the changes
between periods.
Water is used to produce two types of crops, annuals and permanents. It takes a unit of water
to produce a unit of annual or permanent crop. By assumption annual crops have no cost
and return ra per year. Denote the annual acreage as Ka. Permanent crops cost Ck to plant
and return rp per year, and die at a rate δ between periods. One can think of the permanent
crops as a capital investment that depreciates at rate δ. Without loss of generality, I assume
permanent crops are planted in a wet year. Denote the period t stock of permanent crops
as Kt , and the period t newly planted crops It . New permanent crops planted in period t
produce fruit in period t + 1.
To capture the conflict of interest between annual and permanent crop farmers, I consider
them as separate types. Annual crop farmers are Type-A and they control land that is best
suited for annual crop (or their human capital is constrained to annual crops); permanent
crop farmers are Type-P and they can grow both kinds of crops. Assume Type-A farmers’
land is La and Type-P farmers’ land is Lp. The number of annual and permanent crops
are bounded by the land capacity L and Lp. In theory, farmland or farmers could transit
between Type-A and Type-P. One can think that there is some cost of transition so that in
equilibrium we observe both annual and permanent crop farmers. This model takes the
proportion of annual and permanent cropland as fixed. Normalize total farmland L to be 1:
La + Lp = L = 1.
The social planner’s profit each year depends on the type of marginal crop that consumes
groundwater. I consider the case where the return of permanent crops rp is much larger
than that of annual crops ra. So whenever there is a secure water supply, it will be used for
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permanent crops. The aquifer’s large stock of water provides a secure supply, while surface
water supply is insecure as it varies between wet and dry year. Consequently, groundwater
generates a higher value for permanent crops, so it is always applied to the permanent crops
first.
Annual crops at the margin
When annual crops consume groundwater, the social profit in a wet year is:
Yw(Lp,H) = rpLp + ra(SH + GH − Lp) − z(H)GH − Ck I, (4.1)
All permanent land is used. As surface water is cheaper than groundwater, the social planner
will always use all surface water before pumping groundwater. The surplus surface water
and the groundwater goes to annual cropland. Some new permanent crops are planted in
the wet year.
Similarly, the profit in the first dry year is:
Y d1 (Lp,H) = rpLp + ra(SL + GL1 − Lp) − z(H)GL1 (4.2)
and the profit in the second dry year is:
Y d2 (Lp,H) = rpLp + ra(SL + GL2 − Lp) − z(H)GL2 (4.3)
Total social profit at period t is:
Y (Lp,Ht, dt) = Yw(Lp,Ht) + Y d1 (Lp,Ht) + Y d2 (Lp,Ht)1{d = 1} (4.4)
The stock of permanent crops Kt and water depth Ht are state variables. Their laws of
motion are:
Kt+1 = Kt = Lp (4.5)
Ht+1,1 = Ht − R + GH + GL1 when dt = 0 (4.6)
Ht+1,2 = Ht − R + GH + GL1 + GL2 when dt = 1 (4.7)
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In the analysis of optimal groundwater use, I assume the aquifer satisfies the bathtub
assumption under which water flows instantaneously within the aquifer. Therefore, the
changes of water stock, R and G, affect the water table equally no matter where the
extraction of recharge is taken place. Further, by assumption, depth to water and maximum
water depth are the same at every location. Since the size of aquifer is normalized to 1, a
change in R or G are equal to a change in water depth. Long-term changes in water depth
depends on the length of the drought.
Permanent crops at the margin
Similar as above, if only the permanent crops consume groundwater, the social profit in the
wet year is:
Yw(K,H) = rpK + ra(SH − K) − Ck I, (4.8)
the profit in the next two dry years are:
Y d1 (K,H) = Y d2 (K,H) = rpK − z(H)(K − SL) (4.9)
Here, we consider the case when total permanent cropland Lp ∈ (SL, SH). There is enough
surface water to irrigate all permanents in a wet year, but not in a dry year. The equilibrium
acreage of permanent crops K will also be in the interval (SL, SH). It is socially optimal to
growmore permanent crops than SL because recharge to the aquifer in the wet year provides
extra secured irrigation supply. When only permanent crops consume groundwater, the
social planner use the surplus water to grow annuals in the wet year and pump groundwater
to irrigate all the permanents in the dry year.
Groundwater extraction G always takes a corner solution G = K − SL when permanent
crops are marginal. Theoretically, the farmers could choose to only irrigate a fraction of the
permanent cropland and let the rest of trees die (G takes an interior solution). This happens
if the cost of using extra groundwater exceeds the present value of the future returns by the
permanent crop. If this is true, the farmers are unlikely to plant the new permanent crops
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at the beginning, so I will take a corner solution I = 0.2 In this model, I consider that the
increased pumping cost due to the realization of second dry year is smaller than the fixed
cost of planting permanent crops so whenever I takes positive value, G will take a corner
solution.
Total social profit at period t is:
Y (Kt,Ht, dt) = Yw(Kt,Ht) + Y d1 (Kt,Ht) + Y d2 (Kt,Ht)1{dt = 1} (4.10)
The law of motion of permanent crop stock and water depth are:
Kt+1 = Kt(1 − δ) + I (4.11)
Ht+1,1 = Ht − R + Kt − SL when dt = 0 (4.12)
Ht+1,2 = Ht − R + 2(Kt − SL) when dt = 1 (4.13)
The social planner wants to maximize the present value of social profits:
∞∑
t=0
ρtY (Kt,Ht, dt) (4.14)
where ρ is the discount factors and 0 < ρ ≤ 1. The optimal control problem is to choose the
path of {Gt, It}∞t=0 that maximizes the expected value of (4.14) subject to the corresponding
profit function and transition equations at period t. The permanent crop planting decision
It is made in the wet year, so when deciding It , the social planner takes an expectation over
the severity of drought at period t and all periods after.
Socially optimal pumping plan
Intuitively, the transition path of {Ht,Kt} under optimal management includes two stages
depending on the type of marginal crop that uses groundwater. At Stage 1, water depth H
is small enough so it is profitable to irrigate the annual crops with groundwater. Given the
constant return of annual crops and the falling water table, all land will be farmed since if
2An exception is when µ is very small and the variation of surface water supply is huge, so the farmers
will plant permanent crops at the wet year and let them die if the second dry year happens.
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it is profitable to irrigate the annual crop with groundwater at next period, it pays to grow
more now and to plant all the permanents possible.
At Stage 2, water depth has increased to the point that it is no longer profitable to use
groundwater for annuals but it is still profitable for permanent crops. Assume Lp > SL + R
so that the water table keeps falling if all permanent cropland is farmed. Finally when the
water table falls below the level defined by Hi, permanent crop acreage will fall below Lp
as the pumping cost is so high that it is not profitable to deplete the aquifer further. There
will be an upper bound of water depth Hs at which the permanent crop stock K s = R2 + S
L
so that even when two droughts (d = 1) occur in a row, the water table will not fall below
Hs. At Hs, if a normal drought occurs (d = 0), the water table will recover, so will the
permanent crop stock. Water depth and permanent crop stock converges to Hs and K s when
severe droughts (two consecutive dry years) occur again.
Proposition 3 in Knapp and L. J. Olson (1995) guarantees the convergence of groundwater
stock to a invariant distribution. In this model, I solve the Stage 2 stochastic dynamic
programming problem first and characterize the full path of optimal control using backward
induction.
Stage 2
At Stage 2, the social planner makes a planting decision at the wet year and takes an
expectation over the length of following drought. The Bellman equation is:
V(K,H) = max
I
rpK+ra(SH−K)−Ck I+(1+µ)[rpK−z(H)(K−SL)]+(1−µ)ρV(K′,H′1)+µρV(K′,H′2)
(4.15)
with K′ = (1 − δ)K + I, H′1 = H − R + K − SL and H′2 = H − R + 2(K − SL).
When I takes an interior solution, the first order condition with respect to I is:
∂V(K,H)
∂I
= −Ck + (1 − µ)ρVK(K′,H′1) + µρVK(K′,H′2) = 0 (4.16)
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By Envelope Theorem:
VK(K,H) = rp − ra + (1 + µ)[rp − z(H)] + (1 − µ)ρVK(K′,H′1)(1 − δ) + µρVK(K′,H′2)(1 − δ)
+(1 − µ)ρVH(K′,H′1) + 2µρVH(K′,H′2) (4.17)
VH(K,H) = −(1 + µ)α(K − SL) + (1 − µ)ρVH(K′,H′1) + µρVH(K′,H′2) (4.18)
Equations (4.16)-(4.18) characterize the transition path of {Ht,Kt} under optimal manage-
ment when the newly planted permanent crops It takes an interior solution (0 < I < δLp).
Given the path of the interior solutions, we can identify the thresholdHi where the I starts to
take the interior solution. The permanent crop stock K i = Lp when the stock starts to fall3.
Then we can figure out the path before {Hi,K i} as K = Lp for H < Hi. This completes
the Stage 2 optimal transition path of {H,K}. Based on the Stage 2 result, we solve the
Stage 1 problem to determine the threshold of water depth Ha when the dynamic problem
transitions from Stage 1 to Stage 2.
Stage 1
When the annual crop is the marginal crop that uses groundwater, the permanent crop stock
is K = LP. The Bellman equation for determining {GH,GL1 ,GL2 } is:
V(Lp,H) = max
GH,GL1
Yw(Lp,H) + Y d1 (Lp,H) + µY d2 (Lp,H) + (1 − µ)ρV(Lp,H′1) + µρV(Lp,H′2)
with GL2 = arg maxY
w(Lp,H) + Y d1 (Lp,H) + Y d2 (Lp,H) + ρV(Lp,H′2) (4.19)
where K′ = K = Lp, H′1 = H − R + GH + GL1 and H′2 = H − R + GH + GL1 + GL2 . The
pumping decisions in a wet year and the first dry year are made with the uncertainty of the
second dry year, while when making the second dry year pumping decision, the decisions
before are given and there is no uncertainty about the future.
When transitioning from Stage 1 to Stage 2, groundwater extraction takes a corner solution
(G = 0 in wet year andG = Lp−SL in dry year). This could happen in any of the three years
3It is possible that I will takes a corner solution I = 0 when the permanent crop stock K falls. Here we
assume the depreciation rate δ is large enough so I always take the interior solution when K declines.
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during a period. As water depth and the pumping cost are non-decreasing when K = Lp, if
it is not profitable to pump groundwater for annuals in the early years, it is not profitable to
irrigate annual crops using groundwater in the years after either. I consider the case when
G = 0 takes place in the wet year. The other two cases have similar solutions.
Since the transition takes place in the wet year, in the dry years following, the social planner
only uses the surface water supply to irrigate existing crops and no permanent crop planting
or pumping decision needs to make. The social planner will not pump groundwater for
annual crops in the next drought. The value function is:
V(Lp,H) = max
I,GH
Yw(Lp,H) + Y d1 (Lp,H) + µY d2 (Lp,H) + ρ(1 − µ)V(K′,H′1) + ρµV(K′,H′2)
(4.20)
with K′ = (1 − δ)Lp + I, H′1 = H + GH + (Lp − SL) and H′2 = H + GH + 2(Lp − SL).
The first order condition with respect to GH is
∂V(Lp,H)
∂GH
= ra − z(H) + (1 − µ)ρVH(K′,H′1) + µρVH(K′,H′2) = 0 (4.21)
As {K′,H′1} and {K′,H′2} are on the optimal path of Stage 2, the values of VH(K′,H′1) and
VH(K′,H′2) are given. From Equation (4.21) and GH = 0, we can identify the minimum
water depth Ha where annual crops stop using groundwater.
Combining the the results at Stage 1 and Stage 2, the path of {H,K} under optimal man-
agement is:
1. For H ∈ [H0,Ha]: K = Lp; H′ = H − R + 1 − SH + (1 − SL)(1 + 1{d = 1}) until
H = Ha;
2. for H ∈ [Ha,Hs]: K = Lp at the beginning, then it converges to an invariant
distribution around K s; H′ = H − R +K − SH + (K − SL)(1+ 1{d = 1}) and it varies
around Hs in the end.
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The stochastic control problemdoes not have a closed form solution forHa andHs. However,
we can solve for the two cases of the wettest possible historyHW and driest historyHD to
infer the upper and lower bound of Ha and Hs.
Optimal path under extreme wet or dry condition
Suppose the probability of a second dry year µ is a parameter the agent draws from the
history. If the history of weather realizations is HW , the social planner updates his belief
and takes µ = 0 to make the optimal extraction and crop decision. If the history of weather
realization isHD, the social planner updates his belief and uses µ = 1.
The outcome under extreme wet condition is:
Hs,W =
2rp − ra − Ck( 1ρ + δ − 1)
α
− ρR
1 − ρ (4.22)
Ha,W ≈ r
a
α
− ρ(L
p − SL)
α(1 − ρ) (4.23)
K s,W = R + SL (4.24)
The outcome under extreme dry condition is:
Hs,D =
3rp − ra − Ck( 1ρ + δ − 1)
2α
− ρR
1 − ρ (4.25)
Ha,D ≈ r
a
α
− ρ(L
p − SL)
α(1 − ρ) (4.26)
K s,D =
R
2
+ SL (4.27)
Solutions to the two dynamic programming problems under extreme weather conditions
can be found in Appendix 4.A. In each case, Hs,W and Hs,D are the corresponding steady
state water depth. After H hits the steady state level, the water table only varies within a
wet-dry cycle but not between cycles. Within the wet-dry cycle, the water table rises in the
wet year and falls during the dry year(s).
Based on the outcomes under extreme conditions, with a µ ∈ (0, 1), the stock of permanent
crops converges to a distribution around K s = K s,D, the water depth converges to a distribu-
tion around Hs ∈ (Hs,W,Hs,D) and the water depth where the social planner stops irrigating
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the annuals with groundwater is Ha ≈ raα − ρ(L
p−SL)
α(1−ρ) . The social planner’s minimum perma-
nent crop stock is the same as the steady state level under extreme dry condition since that is
the maximal acreage of permanent crops the social planner can grow without depleting the
aquifer. Water depth varies between the extreme wet steady state and extreme dry steady
state since at the upper bound, there is a chance water level will recover if only one dry year
occurs and at the lower bound, there is a chance water table will fall if the second dry year
occurs. The water depth where the social planner stops pumping groundwater for annual
crops is similar under different weather histories4. When the water table is relatively high,
the shadow price of groundwater is similar in all histories. The uncertainty of weather
condition mainly affects the state towards which water depth and permanent crops converge
when water scarcity binds.
Next, I will discuss the efficiency gain from optimal management, the issue of implementing
the optimal regulation and artificial recharge based on the model results. For computational
convenience, I assume µ = 0 in the following discussion. This is the case under extreme
wet condition. In theory, the gain from management should be even larger under worse
weather conditions when water is scarcer.
When µ = 0, under the optimal extraction plan, the path of changes of H, K , Ka, I and G
is:
1. For H ∈ [H0,Ha]: H′ = H − R + 2 − SH − SL; K = Lp; Ka = La; I = δLp;
GH = L − SH; GL = L − SL;
2. for H ∈ [Ha,Hs): H′ = H − R + Lp − SL; K = Lp; Ka = SH − Lp in wet years and
Ka = 0 in dry years; I = δLp; GH = 0; G = GL = Lp − SL .
3. for H = Hs: H′ = H; K = K s; Ka = SH − K s in wet years and Ka = 0 in dry years;
I = δK s; GH = 0; G = GL = K s − SL .
4The differences come from the difference in the steady state water depth and groundwater stock under
the two extreme weather histories. Although the steady state may occur far into the future, it still affects the
evolution of the groundwater stock after Ha, so Ha is slightly different under the two cases.
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The details of characterizing the optimal path are in Appendix 4.A.
4.3 Open Access to Groundwater
To compare with the optimal management, I also characterize equilibrium groundwater
extraction and crop choice when individual farmers have open access to groundwater.
Unlike the social planner, individual farmers take future water depth as given and ignore the
consequences of their behavior on the water level when making their pumping and planting
decisions. I assume there is a surface water market so that the surface water will always
be reallocated to high-value users when there is water scarcity. As discussed by Chapter
3, a well-functioning surface water market may lower total social welfare when there is
heterogeneity in access to groundwater. I will discuss this issue in Section 4.4 when we
relax the assumption that the aquifer is a bathtub. Here, however, I maintain the bathtub
assumption and because all farmers have the same access to groundwater, a surface water
market is efficient.
Suppose each individual farmer holds l units of farmland. Her per-acre surface water supply
over a wet-dry cycle is s = sH + sL . If she is a Type-A farmer, she only grows annual crops.
Her profit at period t is:
yat (Ht) = ra(gt + s) − z(Ht)gt (4.28)
If annual crop farmers use groundwater, the surface water is infra-marginal and there is
no surface water trade. As the individual ignores her own impact on groundwater depth,
she solves the individual optimization problem for each period. Therefore, gt = 2l − s if
Ht < r
a
α and gt = 0 otherwise. Similar as H
a in the social planner’s case, denote
ha =
ra
α
(4.29)
ha is the water depth where annual crop farmers stop withdrawing groundwater in the open
access regime.
For a Type-P farmer, she can grow both permanent and annual crops. For H < ha, all
permanent crop farmers grow permanent crops and fully irrigate their land. Once H > ha,
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annual crop farmers no longer use groundwater. Type-P farmers purchase surface water
rights from the Type-A farmers since the cost of extraction is larger than the return of the
annual crops. In wet year, Type-P farmers can purchase enough water to irrigate all their
land without groundwater extraction, while in a dry year, they need to pump groundwater
as the total surface water supply cannot meet the demand for all permanent cropland.
I consider the optimization problem of a representative permanent crop farmer when the
water depth is H > ha. The price of surface water equals the return to annuals ra in the wet
year when water is abundant and it equals the pumping cost z(H) in a dry year when water
is scarce. The farmer’s profit function at period t is:
y
p
t (kt,Ht) = rpkt − ra(kt − sH) + rpkt − z(Ht)(kt − sL) − itCk (4.30)
Because planting new permanent crops it affects future profits, the farmer chooses {it}∞t=0
to maximize the sum of future profits:
∑∞
t=1 y
p
t (kt,Ht). Like the social planner, the Type-P
farmer will use all land to grow permanent crops(k = l) as long as H < hs and only grow
k s acreage of permanents while using the surplus surface water in the wet year to grow
annuals. hs and k s are the steady state of water depth and permanent crop acreage in the
competitive case:
hs =
2rp − ra − Ck( 1ρ + δ − 1)
α
(4.31)
k s =
l
Lp
(R + SL) (4.32)
Note that, in the equilibrium above the steady state stock of permanent crops k s is identical
for all permanent crop farmers. In fact, it does no have to be so; however, a necessary
condition for the steady state is that the stock of permanent crops be
∑
kp = R + SL . If
H < hs, it always takes a corner solution, so the permanent crop farmers fully use their land
kt = l.
Social planner vs. Open access
With an efficient surface water market, the inefficiency of the open access regime mainly
comes from the commons problem. Individual farmers ignore the impact of their extraction
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on the water level in the aquifer and pump too much. Optimal management improves social
welfare in two ways if we compare the key water level Hs and Ha with hs and ha.
First, ha −Ha ≈ ρ(Lp−SL)α(1−ρ) > 0. The social planner stops applying groundwater to the annual
crops earlier than the individual farmers. That not only delays depletion of the aquifer, but
also reallocates some groundwater from annual crops now to higher-return permanent crops
in the future.
Second, hs − Hs = ρR1−ρ > 0. The social planner stops depleting the aquifer at a water depth
shallower than the individual farmers. The savings from lower pumping costs are larger than
the value of depleting extra stock of groundwater. However, individual pumpers deviate
from the socially optimal extraction when H = Hs because of the commons problem.
In theory, both channels of efficiency gain could be significant. Efficiency gain from the first
channel is positively correlated to the scale of permanent crops Lp and negatively correlated
with surface water supply in the dry year SL . When Lp increases or SL decreases, the gain
from reallocating water from annual to permanent crops is larger since the permanent
crops yield higher return. This channel is likely to be underestimated if people ignore the
sharp difference between annual and permanent crops and estimate a smooth water demand
function.
The second channel could have a huge influence if natural recharge R is large. Since the
steady state permanent crop acreage equals to R+SL , a larger natural rechargemeans a larger
equilibrium permanent crop acreage and a larger amount of groundwater to be extracted at
the steady state. That raises the social planner’s incentive to maintain a higher water table
and thus a lower pumping cost. On the opposite, when R is small enough, the equilibrium
extraction is so low that even the social planner feels unnecessary to save water for a lower
pumping cost. When R = 0, the socially optimal steady state water depth is the same as the
competitive case. There is no gain from optimal management in this case.
The first channel of efficiency gain becomes significant when water depth approaches Ha
and the second channel of efficiency gain is important when water depth is close enough
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to the steady state. For a water depth that is very low, the efficiency gain of groundwater
management occurs in a far future so the discounted welfare improvement from optimal
management is small.
However, for a water depth close to Ha, according to this model, the efficiency gain from
optimalmanagement can be significant as it reallocates groundwater from low-value annuals
to high-value permanents. Studies that fail to consider the difference of the two types of
crops will take a smooth water demand function and hence miss the efficiency gain from this
channel. For example, in Knapp, Weinberg, et al. (2003), they estimated a water demand
function using Kern County Water Agency 1998 report, when both annual and permanent
crops were farmed in the county and the annual crops were always the marginal crops. The
estimated water demand function then only captures the demand elasticity of annual crops
and ignores the inflexible water demand from high-value permanent crops. That biases
down the estimate of efficiency gain.
The second channel of efficiency gain usually does not add too much to the welfare im-
provement of optimal management. Even though the equilibrium recharge is significant
and the difference of equilibrium water depth between optimal management and common
access regime is large as in Knapp and L. J. Olson (1995), the time required to reach the
steady state is so long that the discounted value of the efficiency gain is tiny. This is often
the case for large aquifer with plenty of groundwater stock to deplete before water becomes
scarce. For small aquifers, water is scarce; therefore, it is important to manage the steady
state water depth as the efficiency gain is realized immediately.
4.4 Implementation of Optimal Aquifer Management
Since the benefit of managing the aquifer could be substantial with heterogeneous farmers,
it is important to design a mechanism to implement the socially optimal groundwater use
plan. The literature of natural resource management has discussed various mechanisms that
improve social welfare. This chapter will focus on the institution that defines the property
rights of groundwater. Other means such as pumping tax and restriction of land use may
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also achieve the optimal outcome. I will briefly talk about them when discussing the design
of pumping rights.
Defining the property rights of groundwater includes two important aspects: the design of
water rights, and an incentive compatible assignment of those rights. I assume that there will
be an efficient water market where the agents could trade their water rights (both surface and
ground water) without transaction costs. Thus the design of groundwater rights determines
whether the market can induce a socially efficient outcome or not. How the water rights
are assigned does not affect the efficient allocation according to Coase (1960). However,
the assignment of water rights could affect whether the new policy will be approved by the
voters.
Design of water rights
The water rights design that has been widely discussed or implemented including one-
time groundwater stock rights and operating pumping rights. V. L. Smith (1977) proposes
to create water rights for the stock of groundwater to solve the water valuation problem.
According to Chapter 2, such an arrangement does not completely solve the commons
problem as the agents tend to use more stock rights in the early period than is efficient
because saving the stock rights creates positive externality as it raises the water table which
also benefits others. Suppose the rights for natural recharge are negligible for this section5.
Proposition 1 states the inefficiency result for stock rights.
Proposition 4.1 If one-time stock rights of groundwater are created and distributed to a
large number of pumpers, the total extraction per period will not match the socially optimal
volume.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 is in Appendix 4.B. Intuitively, when the return gap between
annual and permanent crops is large enough, it takes a long time after annuals no longer
5The issues of distributing the flow rights are similar to the issues of stock rights as the main conflict of
interests is always between farmers with access to groundwater and those without.
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access groundwater before the permanent crop farmers stop mining the aquifer. At Ha, the
marginal value of holding water rights is very small since the scarcity will arise far into
the future. Therefore, the price of stock rights will be so tiny that the annual crop farmers
will essentially ignore it and continue pumping groundwater until H approaches to ha. As
a result, assigning water rights for groundwater stock at once does not solve the commons
problem.
To avoid the externality caused by unused water rights, individual farmers must not have
discretion to choose extraction. Instead, each period’s available water rights should equal
the socially optimal extraction. Such varying water rights already exist and are called
operating pumping rights as in Chapter 2. In that chapter, we have discussed how some
Southern California basins set their pumping rights per period equal to the recharge to the
aquifer. They do not issue pumping rights for the stock of water since their groundwater
stock has been severely depleted. In this chapter, we have shown that the optimal aquifer
management includes a period of depleting the groundwater stock and then maintaining the
steady state water table by setting average pumping to equal average recharge to the aquifer.
As the recharge is assumed to be constant, the operating pumping rights discussed in this
chapter are designed for the stock of groundwater:
Operating Pumping Rights: For H ≥ Ha, the pumping rights are 0 in wet years. In dry
years, the pumping rights are Lp − SL for H ∈ [Ha,Hs) and R for H = Hs.
Operating pumping rights assign exactly the same number of pumping rights to the farmers
per period as the optimal extraction derived in the social planner’s case. When there is
a water market without friction, the water use is always efficient, so is the crop decision.
Similar to pumping rights, a varying pumping tax such that the annual crop farmers stop
pumping at Ha and the permanent crop farmers stop further depleting the aquifer at Hs
generates the same result. Land use control that restricts growing annuals when water depth
is beyond Ha may also work. The political issues to implement those policies could be
different. In this chapter, we discuss the political conflict raised by water rights assignment.
103
Incentive compatibility of optimal management
The Bathtub Assumption Holds
Because of the heterogeneity among the farmers, the assignment of pumping rights should
also be incentive compatible to make sure that the policy is approved by the agents. The
following assignment rule is individually incentive compatible when the aquifer satisfies
the bathtub condition.
Assignment 1: Pumping rights are shared by all farmers proportional to their land when
H ∈ [Ha, ha] and pumping rights are only assigned to Type-P farmers proportional to their
land when H > ha.
When H ∈ [Ha, ha], under open access, all the farmers use groundwater proportional to
their land. According to the Assignment 1, they hold exactly the same amount of water
rights as under open access. Since the water market gives the farmers the option to trade,
they all better off from the increased total social welfare.
When H > ha, total social welfare under optimal management increases compared with
the open access regime. Since the annual crop farmers sell their surface water rights to the
permanent crop farmers in the dry year, there exists a price of surface water rights such that
annual and permanent crop farmers share the increased social welfare.
Assignment 1 discriminates among farmers based on the crop they grow. Such arrangement
exists in some water districts in the Central Valley of California. Those districts have
the rule that in dry years, permanent cropland has the priority over annual cropland in
receiving irrigation water. The political resistance to implement such regulation should be
small when the aquifer satisfies the bathtub condition. Moreover, if the farmers are given
a take-it-or-leave-it offer of Assignment 1, they will accept it, since they are all better off
compared with the outside option. Of course, the annual crop farmers might seek a more
even water rights arrangement. We discuss the political decision-making process in detail
in next subsection6.
6Assignment 1 satisfies the incentive compatibility for each individual since all farmers are better off
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The Bathtub Assumption Fails
When the bathtub assumption does not hold, one consequence of depleting the basin is that
some farmers lose their access to groundwater because they lie above the shallow part of the
aquifer. The location of farmland creates another dimension of heterogeneity that affects
the farmer’s access to groundwater. With well-defined property rights, and if groundwater
rights can be traded separately from land, the location of farmland does not matter as the
rights holders could exercise their water rights in remote wells and convey water to their
land. However, before establishment of the property rights, groundwater extraction and
use are usually attached to the land where it is pumped. Therefore, under the open access
regime, some farmers may no longer be able to farm with groundwater if the water table
falls to a level beyond their reach. The remaining farmers benefit from their exit because
total extraction falls, and depth to water grows more slowly.
It is then not surprising that Assignment 1might not be approved by all the farmers. Farmers
may not want to share pumping rights with others if they lie above the deep part of the
aquifer and are the only users who can pump when water table falls to certain level. They
may vote against the policy to delay the groundwater management.
To characterize the political conflicts caused by Assignment 1, I consider an aquifer with
a “V” shape. The share of land that has access to groundwater when water depth is H is
given by:
L(H) = 1 − τ(H − H0) (4.33)
where τ is the slope of the aquifer. The bottom of the aquifer corresponds to water depth
H¯ = 1τ + H0.
I also use L(H) to denote the group of farmers with access to groundwater when the
water depth is H. I call those farmers “groundwater users” and those without access to
groundwater “non-groundwater users.” At the beginning, H = H0 so all land has access
compared with the open access regime. A proposal that allocates all water equally may also win if the annual
crop farmers form a winning coalition given the specific political decision rule.
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to groundwater. When water depth increases, farmland at the edge of “V” loses its access.
Suppose H¯ > hs so the aquifer will never be completely mined.
Individual farmers’ payoff differ between the optimal management and open access region.
The main source of variation is the usage of groundwater which is affected by their location
on the aquifer. The value of their surface water rights also differ depending on the equilib-
rium water value under the two regimes. To illustrate the political difficulty to implement
the optimal management plan, I will focus on groundwater use by agents over different parts
of the aquifer. I will discuss the influence of the price of surface water and how it affects
the political issue at the end of this section.
Political decision-making problem
In this subsection, for simplicity, I assume surface water supply is starkly uncertain SH = L
and SL = 0 sowe do not need to consider the farmers’ payoff inwet years as there is abundant
surface water to farm all land. Moreover, groundwater is the only source of irrigation water
in dry years, and we do not need to consider the impact from surface water trade. I also
assume the permanent crop return rp has already captured the fixed cost of planting and the
depreciation of crops, so we do not need to consider them in this section.
The political decision-making process to decide whether or not to implement the optimal
groundwater management plan (operating pumping right and assignment rule 1) runs as
follows. Suppose the political process starts at water depth Ht < Ha. All farmers in L(Ht)
have voting rights and they will share the pumping rights as defined by the assignment rule
1. The voters will vote for a policy Hr which is the level of water depth where the regulation
goes into place. The farmers can propose and vote for multiple Hr’s within a period. If no
Hr is passed by the voters, the groundwater aquifer remains open access and the political
process is repeated at t + 1. The questions are whether there is an Hr that will be supported
by a vote of the majority of the farmers and if yes, what is the highest Hr?
The farmers’ preference over the policy is determined by their payoff under two regimes.
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Denote the farmers’ payoff under open access by w and under optimal management by v.
I use H to denote a farmer who loses her access to groundwater when water depth hits H.
Denote Ht as period 0.
Under open access, for a farmer H ∈ [Ht, ha], her payoff is:
wa1(H) =
t(H)∑
t=0
ρt[ra − z(Ht + H
2
)] or wp1 (H) =
t(H)∑
t=0
ρt[rp − z(Ht + H
2
)] (4.34)
where t(H) = H −Ht is the number of periods before the water depth hits H and the farmer
loses access to groundwater7. z(Ht+H2 ) is the average pumping cost. Note, wa1 denotes the
payoff for an annual farmer and wp1 denotes the payoff for a permanent farmer.
For a permanent crop farmer H ∈ (ha, hs], her payoff is:
w
p
2 (H) =
t(ha)∑
t=0
ρt[rp − z(Ht + h
a
2
)] +
t∗(H)∑
t(ha)
ρt[rp − z(h
a + H
2
)] (4.35)
where t∗(H) = t(ha) + H−haLp . Groundwater depletes slower (at rate Lp) when annual crop
farmers are out.
For an annual crop farmer H > ha, her payoff is:
wa2(H) =
t(ha)∑
t=0
ρt[ra − z(Ht + h
a
2
)] (4.36)
The annual crop farmers only farm when H ≤ ha.
For a permanent crop farmer H > hs, her payoff is:
w
p
3 (H) =
t(ha)∑
t=0
ρt[rp − z(Ht + h
a
2
)] +
t∗(hs)∑
t(ha)
ρt[rp − z(h
a + hs
2
)] (4.37)
The payoff at steady state is 0 because the return rp equals the pumping cost z(hs).
Given a proposal to regulate the aquifer at water depth Hr , the farmers calculate their payoff
under regulation. Hr is always no smaller than Ha since for water depth H < Ha, there is
7The amount of groundwater at each water depth level reduces when water depth increases because the
aquifer becomes narrower. However, this farmer’s use of groundwater at each water depth level is unchanged
since other farmers also lose their access to groundwater because of the falling water table.
107
no gain from regulation. After regulation, all farmers share the pumping rights for water
stock between [min{Hr, ha}, ha], and only the permanent crop farmers share the pumping
rights for water stock between [max{Hr, ha},Hs].
If Hr < ha, an annual crop farmer’s payoff after regulation is:
va1 (Hr) = Lp
T(Hr )∑
t=t(Hr )
ρt[rp − z(H
r + ha
2
)] (4.38)
where T(Hr) = t(Hr) + (ha − Hr) L(ha)+L(Hr )2Lp . Groundwater stock is depleted slower than
under open access because total extraction is limited to Lp per period. Given the fixed
amount of extraction, groundwater depletes faster when water is deeper because of the “V”
shape. L(h
a)+L(Hr )
2 measures this change. The farmer shares
Lp
L = L
p fraction of the payoff
that equals her share of pumping rights.
A permanent crop farmer’s payoff is:
v
p
1 (Hr) = Lp
T(Hr )∑
t=t(Hr )
ρt[rp − z(H
r + ha
2
)] +
T∗1 (Hs)∑
t=T(Hr )
[rp − z(h
a + Hs
2
)] (4.39)
where T∗1 (Hs) = T(Hr)+ (Hs − ha) L(H
s)+L(ha)
2Lp . The groundwater depletion when H > h
a is
faster than under open access since in that case, only a fraction of permanent crop farmers
can use groundwater.
If the regulationHr > ha, the annual crop farmers’ payoff is 0 after regulation. A permanent
crop farmer’s payoff is:
v
p
2 (Hr) =
T∗2 (Hs)∑
t=t∗(Hr )
[rp − z(h
a + Hs
2
)] (4.40)
where T∗2 (Hs) = t∗(Hr) + (Hs − Hr) L(H
s)+L(Hr )
2Lp .
Now I derive each farmer’s preference over the policy choice Hr . First of all, for any farmer
H, she prefers earlier regulation (a smaller Hr) if Hr > H. That is because after the farmer
loses her access to groundwater, she can only benefit from the pumping rights which are
assigned by regulation.
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For an annual crop farmer H < ha, her payoff from the regulation Hr < H is:
Wa1 (H) = wa1(Hr) + va1 (Hr) (4.41)
=
t(Hr )∑
t=0
ρt[ra − z(Ht + H
r
2
)] + Lp
T(Hr )∑
t=t(Hr )
ρt[rp − z(H
r + ha
2
)]
As long as ra < Lprp, the annual crop farmer always prefers a smaller Hr . This condition
holds in this model since we assume the return of permanent crops is much larger than
annual crops. The same argument holds for any annual crop farmerH ≥ ha. For the annual
crop farmers, although they can use more groundwater under open access than the pumping
rights assigned to them, the return from their land is much smaller than the return from
selling the pumping rights to permanent crops farmers. As a result, the annual crop farmers
always prefer earlier regulation (smaller Hr).
For a permanent crop farmer H < ha, her payoff from the regulation Hr < H is:
W p1 (H) = wp1 (Hr) + vp1 (Hr) (4.42)
=
t(Hr )∑
t=0
ρt[rp − z(Ht + H
r
2
)] + Lp
T(Hr )∑
t=t(Hr )
ρt[rp − z(H
r + ha
2
)] +
T∗1 (Hs)∑
t=T(Hr )
[rp − z(h
a + Hs
2
)]
The permanent crop farmer needs to make a trade-off when choosing the optimal Hr . The
regulation slows groundwater depletion, but after regulation, the permanent crop farmer
needs to share pumping rights with farmers who have already lost their access to ground-
water. This is different from the bathtub case when the permanent crop farmers are strictly
better off after regulation because their total water consumption does not change. In this
model, the larger Hr is, the more farmers have lost their access to groundwater. Therefore,
the permanent crop farmer’s loss from sharing pumping rights with others is larger and she
is more likely to prefer regulation delay (larger Hr). Let H∗ be the threshold where the
permanent crop farmer gains more from unlimited extraction than regulation. For Hr < H∗,
the farmer prefers a smaller Hr ; for Hr ≥ H∗, the agent prefers a larger Hr .
Without loss of generality, I assume H∗ < ha. For permanent crop farmersH ≥ ha, H∗ also
applies if the permanent and annual crop farmers are randomly distributed over the aquifer.
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The trade-off for permanent crop farmers when choosing an Hr above ha is the same.
As a result, for annual crop farmers and permanent crop farmers H ≤ H∗, they always
prefer a smaller Hr and their ideal point to implement optimal management plan is Ha. For
permanent crop farmers H > H∗, they prefer a smaller Hr for Hr < H∗ or Hr > H and a
larger Hr for H∗ ≤ Hr ≤ H. Their ideal point to implement optimal management plan is
Ha or H. H∗ must be smaller than Hs since at Hs, permanent farmers H > Hs always want
a later regulation than Hs:
Proposition 4.2 Farmers over the deep part of the aquifer prefer a deeper steady-state
water level Hsv than the socially optimal level Hs.
A formal proof is in Appendix 4.C.
There is another threshold H∗∗ > H∗ where the agent H∗∗ is indifferent between Ha and
H∗∗. For all permanent farmers H > H∗∗, their payoff from regulation at Ha and H∗∗ are
the same as farmer H∗∗, so they have a unique ideal point at H which yields higher payoff
to them than H∗∗.
The preference of agents in this model is similar to single-peaked preference, except for
permanent farmers H > H∗ whose preference has two local maximums (Ha and H). The
majority rule still generates a unique winning policy, that is Ha if the median voter is an
annual crop farmer or permanent crop farmer H ≤ H∗∗, or H if the median voter is a
permanent crop farmer H > H∗∗.
Other super-majority voting rules are more likely to delay the implementation of optimal
management than the majority rule. For instance, if unanimous consent is required for
passing the vote, then there will be no regulation until water depth hits Hsv , the steady
state preferred by permanent crop farmers over the deep part of the aquifer. For other
thresholds 100% > θ > 50%, if more than θ agents prefer Ha, then the policy choice is
Ha, otherwise the policy will be the ideal point of agent H where a fraction θ of voters
prefer a regulation Hr ≤ H. The policy will be always settled in the political decision
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making process considered in this problem. Because water depth will keep increasing if no
regulation is implemented, ideal points smaller than H will pass and at H, the fraction θ of
voters will have to accept the regulation otherwise the results will only be worse.
Under the simple majority rule, the optimal policy point Ha does not necessarily pass the
vote. That leads to delay of optimal aquifer management and loss of social welfare. One
way to solve this issue is to enfranchise farmers H < Ht. By sharing voting rights and
pumping rights with those agents, as shown by this model, they will vote for implementing
the regulation at Ha. As a result, the enfranchisement can lead to a winning coalition for
Ha and hence the socially optimal outcome.
Of course, the proposal to grant more agents with voting power might be rejected by current
voters if the median voter realizes the consequence of an enlarged voting group. However,
politicians usually take the advantage to setting the agenda of the political decision-making
process. For example, they can define the group of voters as everyone lying over the aquifer.
The state legislation, although it hesitates to intervene local groundwater management, also
exercises its authority to define the local body of regulation (SGMA2014). This rationalizes
the inclusion of all landowners within a basin when deciding the groundwater management
rules, even though some of the land has lost its access to groundwater.
Impact from surface water market
In the last subsection, we have discussed the political issue when there is heterogeneity
among the farmers’ access to groundwater. Another mechanism that influences the farmers’
incentive for groundwater management is the surface water market. According to Chapter
3, with the surface water market, non-groundwater users can purchase surface water from
groundwater users, and the sellers will pump groundwater to compensate the amount of
water sale. The surface water market in fact grants the non-groundwater users a means
to use groundwater. If the surface water supply is enough to cover all farmland without
groundwater access, water use in the open access regime will be the same whatever the
shape of the aquifer. If the surface water supply can not fulfill the demand from all the high
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value land, water sellers can grab the economic rent generated from the high-value crops by
pricing at the permanent crop farmers’ willingness to pay. In this section, I focus on the dry
years to discuss the issue with surface water market. Without loss of generality, I assume
the surface water supply is abundant in wet years so there is no need to trade surface water.
Although it is not the focus of this chapter, we can notice that the surface water market could
lower social welfare when water depth H ∈ [Ha, ha], the same as the conclusion in chapter
3. With the surface water market, all farmers will irrigate their land and the groundwater
extraction is larger than the socially optimal level. However, if there is no surface water
market, groundwater extraction is capped by the groundwater access. Although some high
value permanent cropland may not be farmed due to lack of groundwater accessibility, total
social welfare can still be larger if the saved groundwater is more valuable than the extra
permanent crops8.
As the farmers supply and demand for surface water change during the water pumping
process, I assume perfect competition in the surface water market. Depending on their
groundwater accessibility and type, the farmers are in four categories. Each category’s cost
and return for surface water is:
Permanent Farmer, Groundwater User (PG): Cost: min{z(H), rp}; Return: rp
Annual Farmer, Groundwater User (AG): Cost: min{z(H), ra}; Return: ra
Permanent Farmer, Non-groundwater User (PN): Cost: rp; Return: rp
Annual Farmer, Non-groundwater User (AN): Cost: ra; Return: ra
For groundwater users, at water depth H the cost of selling surface water is either the
replacement cost by pumping groundwater, z(H), or the opportunity cost to fallow the land.
The price or value of surface water is determined by the competitive equilibrium in the
surface water market. Denote it as pw. There are three thresholds of water depth, H1, H2
8For example, consider the extreme case when all the groundwater users are permanent crop farmers and
all the non-groundwater users are annual crop farmers. Without the surface water market, water use is socially
optimal but with the market, the groundwater users will sell surface water to annual crop farmers at price z(H)
and pump groundwater to compensate.
112
and H3. H1 is the water depth where the irrigation water demand from non-groundwater
users equals total surface water supply in the economy; H2 is the water depth where the
irrigation water demand from non-groundwater permanent crop farmers equals total surface
water supply from annual crop farmers; H3 is the water depth where the irrigation water
demand from non-groundwater permanent crop farmers equals total surface water supply
in the economy.
Assume H1 < H2. As the number of non-groundwater users increases with H, pw = z(H)
for H ≤ min{ha,H1}, pw = ra for min{ha,H1} < H ≤ min{ha,H2}, pw = z(H) for
min{ha,H2} < H < H3 and pw = rp for H ≥ H3.
As for the value of water when groundwater pumping is regulated, it always equals rp since
the regulation creates scarcity of water and only permanent crops are farmed. Therefore,
the value of surface water is always smaller under open access than under the optimal
management, except for H ≥ H3 when total surface water supply in the economy could not
satisfy the irrigation water demand from non-groundwater permanent crop farmers. If we
consider the gain from potential surface water trade, the farmers’ payoff from groundwater
management increases because the value of their surface water rights increases. Therefore,
allowing surface water trade generates extra incentive for the farmers to vote for the optimal
groundwater management.
4.5 Artificial Recharge
Besides managing the existing groundwater stock, one should consider artificial recharge
to control the water table in the aquifer and enhance the efficiency of groundwater use. The
recharge has two positive effects. First, it raises the water table therefore lowering future
cost of pumping. The impact on pumping cost lasts until the economy hits the steady state.
Therefore, the cost effect is larger when water depth is low as the saved pumping cost can
apply to a larger amount of groundwater to be extracted.
The second benefit to recharge is to save water for use on higher value crops. This occurs
when water is scarce. In this model, it only happens at the steady state. The social planner
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may want to save water in the wet year and use it in the dry year to maintain a larger acreage
of permanent crops.
Next, we modify the model by introducing artificial recharge Q to the social planner’s
problem. WhenQ takes a positive value, it is not profitable to pump groundwater for annual
crops since otherwise the surface water should be directly applied to the annual crops to save
the pumping and recharge cost. Denote the cost of recharge as c. The Bellman equation
including the recharge decision is:
V(K,H) = max
Q,I
rpK+ra(SH−K−Q)−cQ−Ck I+rpK− z(H)(K−SL)+ρV(K′,H′) (4.43)
where K′ = K(1 − δ) + I and H′ = H − R −Q + K − SL .
The first order conditions with respect to I and Q are:
∂V(K,H)
∂I
= −Ck + ρVK(K′,H′) = 0 (4.44)
∂V(K,H)
∂Q
= −ra − c − ρVH(K′,H′) = 0 (4.45)
and by Envelope Theorem:
VK(K,H) = rp − ra + rp − z(H) + ρVK(K′,H′)(1 − δ) + ρVH(K′,H′) (4.46)
VH(K,H) = −α(K − SL) + ρVH(K′,H′) (4.47)
According to Equation (4.45), artificial recharge to the aquifer occurs when the discounted
next period shadow price of groundwater stock ρVH(K′,H′) is equal to or larger than the
opportunity cost ra plus the cost of recharge c: ρVH(K′,H′) ≥ ra + c.
In this model, if artificial recharge occurs at the steady state, K s = R + SL +Qs. Equations
(4.45) and (4.47) imply VH(K s,Hs) = −α(R+Q
s)
1−ρ = − r
a+c
ρ . If Q takes an interior solution,
Qs = (r
a+c)(1−ρ)
αρ − R ≤ S
H−R−SL
2 . According to (4.47), as K declines when H increases,
the shadow price of groundwater stock −VH(K,H) decreases as H increases. Therefore, Q
takes a corner solution Q = SH − Lp before the steady state. It is never profitable to use
groundwater on annual crops.
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If (r
a+c)(1−ρ)
αρ − R > S
H−R−SL
2 , the shadow price of groundwater stock is so low at he
steady state even when the natural recharge reallocates all water from annual crops to
permanent crops. Similar to equation (4.47), the change of shadow price is VH(K,H) =
−α(L − SL) + ρVH(K′,H′) when both annual and permanent crops use groundwater; the
shadow price change isVH(K,H) = −α(Lp− SL)+ ρVH(K′,H′)when only permanent crops
use groundwater before the steady state.
As a result, if ra + c ≥ ρα(L−SL)1−ρ , natural recharge never happens since the saved pumping
cost does not cover the cost of recharging; if ρα(L
p−SL)
1−ρ ≤ ra+c < ρα(L−S
L)
1−ρ , natural recharge
only occurs at stage 1; if ra + c < ρα(L
p−SL)
1−ρ , natural recharge occurs at both stages and stops
before the water table getting close to the steady state.
In this model, the benefit from artificial recharge mainly comes from the cost saving effect
(channel 1). Saving water into the aquifer returns a value equals to the discounted shadow
price of groundwater stock, which is the present value of saved pumping cost over an infinite
horizon. The benefit of reallocating water from annual crops to permanent crops (channel
2) occurs only at the steady state as the scarcity of water only occurs then. As shown in the
case when Q > 0 at the steady state, natural recharge increases the equilibrium acreage of
permanent crops by the same amount Q. This effect is larger when the opportunity cost ra
and the recharge cost c are smaller.
Notice that, in this chapter, we show that there is natural recharge when ra + c ≤ −ρVH .
While according to results in Section 4.2, it is profitable to irrigate annual crops with
groundwater if ra − z(H) ≥ −ρVH . Since ra + c > ra − z(H), usually only one of the
two things is predicted by the model. Either both annual and permanent crops consume
groundwater, or positive natural recharge occurs. This is consistent with the findings in
Knapp and L. J. Olson (1995) that the optimal management includes no artificial recharge
under a large set of parameter values.
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4.6 Conclusion
Groundwater depletion has been widely observed in dry regions like California. In 2014,
the state of California issued the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, which for
the first time in its history provided a framework for sustainable groundwater management.
However, despite its goal to achieve sustainability, the lawwas passed in a contextwhere very
little is known about the desired groundwater management, thus very few practical actions
were suggested by the law. In general, the state pushed the responsibility of developing
groundwater management institution down to local agencies, in the hope that the local users
can find a way to achieve sustainable groundwater management.
For both the state government and the local water management agencies, figuring out
the socially optimal groundwater extraction is the very first step to implement proper
management. Knowing the optimal outcome removes the uncertainty of groundwater users
over the impact of the policy and helps when they have to come to a vote. It also sets up the
standard for the policy makers to evaluate different policy outcomes. In this chapter, I solve
the dynamic optimization problem for the social planer’s groundwater extraction and base
all the following discussion of optimal groundwater management on the optimal pumping
plan.
In an agricultural economy with both annual and permanent crops, the socially optimal
extraction requires the water users to stop applying groundwater on low-value annual crops
at a water level higher than the individuals’ stopping point. To implement such pumping
scheme, assigning water rights of the remaining groundwater stock to the farmers and
letting them trade will not help. Since pumping cost increases as the water table declines,
the pumpers tend to take their water out of the aquifer too fast. To avoid the externality,
groundwater pumping rights need to be assigned to the users per period at a volume equal
to the socially optimal extraction.
The design of groundwater rights can lead to optimal outcome if there is an efficient water
market. However, the water rights allocation may not be individually incentive compatible
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so the regulation may not be approved by the voters. The political issue is severe when there
is heterogeneity among the farmers’ access to groundwater. Farmers over deep part of the
aquifer may prefer to delay regulation so they can use more groundwater under the open
access. To resolve the political conflict, sometimes the policy maker should enlarge the
group of decision makers and share the pumping rights with more agents to get the optimal
regulation to pass the vote.
In the literature of groundwater aquifer management, the optimal groundwater extraction
has been well studied, while the issue of implementing the optimal management generally
remains untouched. This chapter, by revealing the potential problems in groundwater rights
design and allocation, shows that it may not work if we just assign property rights to
groundwater and share the rights to the users based on a pro rata rule. Each period’s
pumping rights should be carefully calculated to induce the optimal outcome. To do so,
better knowledge of the aquifer hydrology, the farmers’ value of water and prediction of
surfacewater delivery are required. Given that information, this chapter generates prediction
on the policy choice under different voting rules. Specifically, I identity the condition when
the optimal regulation can get approval by the voters. Since it is possible that the regulation
always delays under the majority voting rule, this chapter suggests to expand the voting
group to share with more agents the welfare gain from optimal management so they will
become supporter of the regulation. That requires a change of political agenda which
demands efforts from politicians and law makers. Only by collaboration from different
intellectual communities, we can implement the sustainable groundwater management.
4.A Solution to the Dynamic Programming Problem under Extreme Weather Con-
ditions
I solve the problem for the extreme wet case (HW ). The solution to the extreme dry case
follows the same procedure. The Stage 2 problem is solved first:
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Stage 2
At Stage 2, the Bellman equation is:
V(K,H) = max
I
rpK + ra(SH − K) − Ck I + rpK − z(H)(K − SL) + ρV(K′,H′) (4.48)
with K′ = (1 − δ)K + I and H′ = H − R + K − SL .
When I takes an interior solution, the first order condition with respect to I is:
∂V(K,H)
∂I
= −Ck + ρVK(K′,H′) = 0 (4.49)
By Envelope Theorem:
VK(K,H) = rp − ra + rp − z(H) + ρVK(K′,H′)(1 − δ) + ρVH(K′,H′) (4.50)
VH(K,H) = −α(K − SL) + ρVH(K′,H′1) (4.51)
When I takes the interior solution, we have the Euler equation by combining equations
(4.49, 4.50, 4.51) and substituting out K′ from the transition equation of H:
2rp−ra−z(H)−Ck(1
ρ
−1+δ) = αρ(H′′−H′+R)+ρ[2rp−ra−z(H′)−Ck(1
ρ
−1+δ)] (4.52)
Let c1 = rp − ra + rp − Ck( 1ρ − 1 + δ), then the Euler equation could be written as:
c1 − z(H) = αρ(H′′ − H′ + R) + ρ[c1 − z(H′)] (4.53)
This equation gives the transition of water depth along the optimal path when I takes an
interior solution at Stage 2. Since at the steady state, I = δK s,W which is an interior solution,
the steady state Hs,W satisfies Equation (4.53). Therefore, the steady state stock of water
depth is:
Hs,W =
c1
α
− ρR
1 − ρ (4.54)
The steady-state stock of permanent crops that stabilizes the water depth is:
K s,W = SL + R (4.55)
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Next, we figure out the path before H = Hs,W . Suppose I takes a series of interior solutions
before the steady state. Based on the Euler equation (4.53), we substitute out H′′ and H′
using the transition equation of H:
H = Hs,W − ρ(1 − ρ) (K
′ − K) (4.56)
For K′ ≤ K , H ≥ Hs,W . That means if the stock of permanent crops declines along the
optimal path when I takes an interior solution, it could be either the steady state or water
depth going beyond the steady state Hs,W . That guarantees the existence of steady state as
when H > Hs,W , the stock of permanents will keep falling until water table recovers.
The equation above also suggests along the path where the stock of permanent crops falls
and the water depth increases, I must take a corner solution before hitting the steady state.
Due to the discontinuity, H could rise above Hs,W , which will converge to Hs,W eventually.
Here we consider a simple situation when H falls right at Hs,W . This will always hold if we
consider a continuous time model.
It depends on the size of Lp and δ whether the corner solution is I = 0 or I = δLp. If
(1 − δ)Lp < K s,W , the size of permanent crops K = Lp before the steady state. We can
derive the path of H correspondingly. If (1− δ)Lp > K s,W , then the size of permanent crops
first stays as Lp, then falls at a rate K′ = (1 − δ)K until it hits K s. We can also derive the
path of H correspondingly.
From now on, we assume the parameter values satisfies (1− δ)Lp < SL + R so the path of I
is I = δLp before hitting the steady state. The analysis based on the other case is the same.
Until now, we have characterized the path after Ha based on which we can derive Ha using
backward induction.
Ha,W : When Annual Crops Stop Using Groundwater
When the annual crops are the marginal crop that uses groundwater, the Bellman equation
is:
V(K,H) = max
I
rpK+ra(SH−K)+rpK+ra(SL−K)+raG−z(H)G−Ck I+ρV(K′,H′) (4.57)
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with K′ = (1 − δ)K + I and H′ = H + G − R.
The first order condition with respect to GH is
∂V(Lp,H)
∂G
= ra − z(H) + ρVH(K′,H′) ≥ 0 (= 0 if G takes an interior solution) (4.58)
We want to know Ha,W , the lowest H such that ra − z(H)+ ρVH(K′,H′) < 0 or equivalently
G = 0.
At Ha,W , no groundwater is used for annuals, then the optimal path is in stage 2: H′ =
H + Lp − SL − R until H = Hs,W . Let c2 = Lp − SL − R denoting the drop of water table
each period when K = Lp. It takes T = Hs,W−Ha,Wc2 periods to reach the steady state.
According to the Envelope Theorem (4.50), VH(K,H) = −z′(H)(K − SL) + ρVH(K′,H′).
Starting from Ha,W ′, K = Lp for T − 1 periods and K = K s,W for the remaining time. So:
VH(Ka′,Ha,W ′) =
T−2∑
t=0
−ρtα(Lp − SL) +
∞∑
t=T−3
−ρtα(K s,W − SL)
= −1 − ρ
T−1
1 − ρ (L
p − SL) − ρ
T−3
1 − ρ(K
s,W − SL) (4.59)
Note that ∂VH (K
a ′,Ha,W ′)
∂Ha,W =
log ρ·ρT−1
1−ρ [Lp − SL − ρ2(K s,W − SL)](− 1c2 ) < 0, so there is a
unique Ha,W such that ra − z(Ha,W ) + ρVH(Ka′,Ha,W ′)1−βL = 0 and for all H > Ha,W ,
ra− z(Ha,W )+ ρVH(Ka′,Ha,W ′)1−βL < 0. The Ha,W is the water depth where the farmers stop
irrigating the annual cropswith groundwater. AssumeT is large enough soVH(Ka′,Ha,W ′) ≈
− Lp−SL1−ρ . Then
Ha,W ≈ r
a
α
− ρ(L
p − SL)
α(1 − ρ) (4.60)
This also implies that for the period before H = Ha,W , ra − z(H) + ρVH(Ka,Ha,W )1−βL > 0.
So all annual cropland is farmed. The optimal path is illustrated at the end of Section 4.2.
4.B Proof of Proposition 4.1
When individual farmers hold water rights and trade, the equilibrium market price for water
at period t is pt , which satisfies the no arbitrage condition:
pt = ρpt+1, (4.61)
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If pt < ρpt+1, an agent can purchase water rights at period t and resell it at next period to
earn a positive present value. If pt > ρpt+1, an agent holding unused water rights can sell
the rights at period t and buy back at period t + 1 to earn a positive present value. As there
is unused water rights until the steady state, this condition holds for all the time before the
steady state.
At the steady state, as the groundwater supply binds at the amount of flow rights, the price
of water p(Hs) = rp + (1−δ)Ckρ − z(Hs), which is the return of permanent crops in a dry year,
plus the saved planting cost if the tree dies due to lack of water, minus the cost of pumping.
The price of water remains at that value in the steady state since the water supply does not
change.
As p(Hs) is finite, together with the no arbitrage condition, when water depth is at Ha, the
price of water p(Ha) = ρT p(Hs) where T is the number of periods it takes for water depth
to change from Ha to Hs. According to (4.21), the price of water such that the annual crop
farmers stop pumping is p = ρVH(Ha′,Ka′). Based on equation (4.18)
VH(Ka′,Ha′) =
T−2∑
t=0
−ρtα(Lp − SL) +
∞∑
t=T−3
−ρtα(K s − SL)
= −1 − ρ
T−1
1 − ρ (L
p − SL) − ρ
T−3
1 − ρ(K
s − SL) (4.62)
For a T large enough, p(Hs) < p, so the annual crop farmers do not stop pumping at Ha.
The one-time stock rights do not produce socially efficient groundwater use.
4.C Proof of Proposition 4.2
Without loss of generality, I assume the farmers H > Hs are homogeneous with respect
to groundwater accessibility (This is purely for computational convenience. But we can
imagine that farmers in that group are able to redistribute profits to form a coalition against
the regulation). Under Assignment 1, at H = Hs, the individual permanent crop farmer’s
return per period is:
y
p
r (Hs) = rpk sr − z(Hs)(k sr − sL) (4.63)
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k sr = K
s l
Lp because the groundwater pumping rights are assigned to the permanent crops
farmers proportional to their land.
Without the regulation, the permanent crop farmers H > Hs continue to withdraw ground-
water and irrigate all their land. They are able to grow more permanent crops than those
without access to groundwater H ≤ Hs. Denote the groundwater user’s permanent crop
acreage at the competitive equilibrium hs be k sv. k sv > k s. The individual permanent crop
farmer’s return per period is:
y
p
v (hs) = +rpk sv − z(hs)(k sv − sL) (4.64)
Here we consider the case when k sv < l so the permanent crop farmers do not sell their
surface water rights at the steady state.
The return of depleting the aquifer from Hs to hs is:
y(Hs, hs) = (rp − z(Hs, hs))W(Hs, hs) (4.65)
where z(Hs, hs) is the average pumping cost when pumping water from Hs to hs and
W(Hs, hs) is the amount of groundwater between the two water levels.
The difference of the individual return under two different regimes is:
∆(Hs) = y
p
r (Hs)
1 − ρ −
(rp − z(Hs, hs))W(Hs, hs)
LpL(Hs) − λ
y
p
v (hs)
1 − ρ (4.66)
λ is a parameter capturing the time difference as the competitive steady state occurs later.
Let Hsv = arg max∆(H). When the aquifer is a bathtub, L(Hs) = L and k sv = k s. Hsv = Hs
since Hs is the socially optimal steady state.
Note that, ∆HL(Hs) < 0 and ∆HH < 0. Therefore when L(Hs) < L, Hsv > Hs. Namely,
the permanent crop farmers in L(Hs) prefer a steady-state water depth Hsv higher than the
socially optimal Hs. They will vote against the regulation in the hope to delay the steady
state at H = Hsv .
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